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Norms and interests have shaped state choices towards the Montreux Document, the only 
tool to account for new networks and relations between states and markets and the only 
instrument to address the concern that Private Security Provision operate in a legal vacuum. 
The neo-liberal norm stirred greater unconstrained use of private security with increased 
contracting also depending upon other concurring factors. At the domestic level, and 
particularly in contexts of late state development, choices bear much more upon the varying 
influence of the anti-mercenary norm.  
 
I distinguish between regulatory politics at the global and state level. I show the content 
and the unforeseen directions of the anti-mercenary norm, which narrow at the global level 
but regenerate at the state level. In a competition between the neoliberal norm and the anti-
mercenary norm, contingency and crisis favor the neoliberal norm while domestic 
dynamics of electoral politics and political entrepreneurs stir the anti-mercenary norm.  
In the empirical comparison of attitudes and expectations around norms in African states, 
I help illustrate their approaches to contracting and PMSCs norms. The focus on African 
states’ engagement is justified by the developmental urgency of appropriate standards. 
State practice reveals greater agency than expected as well as past pathways of contestation 
and plausible strategies of extraversion. South Africa alternated between leadership, 
collaboration and criticism of governance choices. In Nigeria, an engagement with 
regulatory cooperation represents a reversal of long-standing position. The agency of states 
can be traced even in post-conflict contexts like Liberia and Sierra Leone with distinctive 
contributions to prospective regulatory efforts. The international influence of strong states, 
I argue, can either improve regime creation or indirectly weaken it. Thus, the emergence 
of a regime for PMSCs norms and recognition of ‘PMSC’ as an assigned name builds upon 
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Portions of the research and analysis presented in Part III were previously published in a different 
form. 
Part of chapter 8 was published in DeWinter-Schmitt, R. (Ed) Montreux Five Years On: An analysis 
of State efforts to implement Montreux Document legal obligations and good practices, available 
at http://ihrib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/MontreuxFv3.pdf 
Part of the preamble and Chapter 9 was published as Boggero, M. "Private Security and Governance 
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1. Regulatory cooperation and the governance of private security actors 
The proliferation and influence of private security is often hailed as one of the most significant 
changes in international politics- from the privatization of foreign policy to the ethics of 
contracting, from the effectiveness of companies to the tensions between private contractors 
and government military personnel. As Abrahamsen and Williams wrote, the state’s much-
vaunted monopoly of legitimate force is increasingly enmeshed in networks and relations that 
cannot always be contained within the boundaries of the national state.   
What is private security? Let us start with some definitions. “PMSCs” or Private Military and 
Security Companies are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, 
irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, 
armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance 
and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security 
personnel. 1 Thus, the primary business of PMSCs is not the production and procurement of 
hardware, typical of the defense industry, but the procurement and delivery of services both 
in peace and in conflict zones. 
The use of PMSCs is not problematic per se and there is no evidence that contractors are more 
likely to misbehave than national soldiers or police forces. However, they can, like their public 
                                                          




counterparts, engage in harmful or inappropriate behavior.  First, PMSCs could impinge on 
states’ rights and obligations. A security firm that operates in tasks that are inherently governmental 
could infringe on the basic nature of states’ claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, 
creating externalities for states.2 Second, international law does not require that security be 
provided by public entities but the provision of security services may imply use of force, thus 
raising the possibility to violate human rights, particularly when there is an absence of adequate 
control and oversight or where accountability structures are weak or inexistent.”3 If the 
contractors’ human rights abuses or criminal misconduct cannot be resolved, prevented or 
remedied, the argument goes that PMSCs work in a realm of impunity.4  
Having recognized the lack of a framework for PMSCs activities, states engaged in multiple 
initiatives: the Montreux Document (hereinafter Montreux or the Document) and the 
International Code of Conduct (hereinafter ICoC or the Code), the United Nations Draft 
Convention; as well as national legislations governing PMSCs.  
The politics of private security governance is not explained by conventional theories that claim 
that global issues and policies reflect the underlying military and economic capabilities. 
Reflecting the realist tradition in international relations, analysts find it difficult to explain how 
regulation evolved in spite of conflicting national interests and cannot explain the involvement 
of states that had no strategic interest in cooperation.5 The assumptions on the nature of the 
state elude the complexity of bureaucratic politics.  
                                                          
2 cf. Chapter 1; pp. 42-44 
3 B. Buckland and T. Winkler, Public Private Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities in Security Governance, Geneva Center for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Horizon 2015 Working Paper No. 2 (2010), at 10. 
4 If some of these abuses cannot be resolved in principle, then there is an underlying impunity, i.e. immunity. This phenomena refers to Status 
of Forces Agreement  




Yet, constructivist approaches are challenged as well. Assuming the existence of PMSCs 
norms, which cannot be said to be determinants of state behavior nor can they be shown to 
be global and proscriptive social norms- would be simplistic. There is a thus gap in our 
understanding of the relation of PMSCs norms to the anti-mercenary norm and their varying 
influence on state and inter-state policy making. Which body of norms guide states in their 
relations to PMSCs? What remains of the influence of the anti-mercenary norm? Is 
reformulated and limited? Are there alternative accepted PMSCs norms? At the state level, 
what are the political conditions that foster regulatory cooperation? Vice versa, what shapes 
severe regulatory responses to PMSCs, including ban?  
 
Variation in regulatory choices  
These questions are animated by the extraordinary variation in regulatory choices in the last 
decade. While some governments allowed PMSCs, others banned them altogether. In 
maritime security, several countries have changed policy recommendation almost overnight, 
from strongly advising against private security, to recommending their use. In Spain, the 
government chose to authorize and subsidize the fishing industry’s use of PMSCs. The largest 
Iranian tanker operators, as well as Chinese shipping firms, now use PMSC services for their 
fleet. In the last decade a more permissive environment has developed and the United Nations 
specialized body, the I.M.O., has acknowledged the situation and issued guidance to organize 
the practice. However, how can we then account for heterogeneity in state choices and what 




Second, cooperation in this realm poses a distinct puzzle in terms of the definition of the 
actors. The tractability of the issue-area necessitated a disassociation from the categories of 
mercenarism and privateering and to a large degree, regulatory cooperation still consists in 
facilitating the acceptance of the term PMSC, the invention of which I see as akin to a 
‘permanent inherited patronym’. 
The African puzzle 
A lack of African participation developed both at the level of conception (2005-2008) and 
then, during the implementation stage, in the first seven years (2008-2015).  PMSCs built the 
army of Liberia and Chinese PMSCs work in Sudan; yet, these African states did not endorse 
Montreux. 
The puzzle of state preferences in the developing world and in Africa6 it is particularly 
problematic.  While most African states either use or warrant the use of private security within 
their borders, they mostly ignore the Montreux Document, the central international tool for 
regulation that recalls the pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for 
States7. Given the earlier role of African states in shaping international law in the closely related 
field of anti-mercenary conventions and given that the Montreux Document, the main 
initiative, builds upon them, it is even more perplexing that African states ignore Montreux 
and PMSC governance. Neither did African states have put forward an alternative continental 
governance framework.  
 
                                                          
6 I refer to African subcontinent throughout the dissertation 
7 Chapter 1 is devoted to the Montreux Document, the result of a joint initiative by Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) launched in 2006, which recalls existing obligations of States, PMSCs and their personnel under international law whenever 





Two stories exemplify the problems and give substance to the puzzle I have outlined. First, in 
a much-publicized article, Nigeria’s Election: Brought To You By These Hired Guns, a South Africa 
firm helped the Nigerian army and an international coalition in the fight against Boko Haram. 
Thus, the company worked in a legal vacuum. Nigeria did not sign the Montreux Document, 
the only international tool that poses a framework of accountability for PMSCs. Why have 
Nigerian policymakers reversed their course and what explains the rapprochement and 
engagement with the Document?8  
 
Another useful story is about Angola, a country that did endorse Montreux. In the recent 
“Blood Diamonds: Torture and Corruption in Angola,” advocate and activist Rafael Marquez 
recounts hundreds of cases of torture and killings that took place in a diamond-mining district 
in Angola. The abuses were partly carried out by guards from a private security firm9 and took 
place before and after the endorsement of the Document by Angola.  What is the political 
commitment to Montreux of signatory African states like Angola? How can regulatory 
cooperation help foster the emergence of PMSCs norms? 
 
2. The Complexity of Naming 
 
 “Who is it that can tell me who I am?”  
                                                          
8 Cf. Chap. 6, based on my interviews 
9 Email Correspondence with the author. The abuses were carried out by guards from a private security firm, Teleservice, and by members 
of the Angolan Armed Forces. Marques de Morais later brought the charge against the generals on the basis of testimonies about torture and 
killings that were presented in his book. Nine generals are the owners of the private security company Teleservice and the diamond mining 





The analysis begins by laying the foundations: identifying the actors, and choosing the 
appropriate terms. In the course of my interviews, a former Ambassador, now working for a 
major PMSC, claimed. “We are a technology company”. 10 In a similar vein, De Nevers recalled 
the following episode that involves AFRICOM’s first Commander. He stated in January 2010 
that AFRICOM does not use “private military contractors”. De Nevers continues: “It is important to 
note, however, that many of the companies contracting with AFRICOM fall within the broad 
rubric of PMSCs.11 
These episodes reflect the reticence in the use of the term Private Security and Military 
Company, which is the consequence of the interplay of variables rooted in the variation in 
states’ choices. It is indeed not a coincidence that all studies and accounts of PMSCs begin with the 
problem of simple definition, as Carmola writes, that they are ambiguous or polymorphous entities— a mix 
of old and new, public and private; slippery, and hard to pin down analytically.12  
 
PMSC as a permanent inherited patronym  
The byzantine complexity of names used to be a formidable obstacle to understanding society 
until the invention of permanent inherited patronyms established a precondition of 
statecraft13.  The development of the modern state coincided with a process of standardization 
and classification; the ability of the state to plan and administer was based on its capacity to 
measure and assess complex social dynamics.  
                                                          
10 Author interviews, Washington DC, September 2014. I inquired about her firm participation to the private security regulation process 
11 De Nevers in Kinsey and Patterson (eds.) Contractors and War: The Transformation of United States Expeditionary Operations (Stanford Security 
Studies) (p. 71). Stanford University Press. Kindle Edition. 
12 Carmola, Kateri (2010-02-05). Private Security Contractors and New Wars: Risk, Law, and Ethics (Contemporary Security Studies) (p. 9).  
She cites: Avant 2005: 22; Singer 2003: 40; Alexandra et al. 2008: 7; Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007: 3. Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition. 




The analogy helps frame a fundamental problem of imposing patronyms onto the 
contemporary byzantine public-private nexus. Firms used to be nameless until the rise of the 
term PMSCs. Like pre-modern citizens, they did not have a permanent patronym until the 
Montreux Document. 
This analogy to the development of the modern state is particularly useful because the analogy 
of modern contractors to the military enterprisers of the late Middle Ages is often used. 
Indeed, before the rise of the nation-state, nearly all force was contracted. Fighting wars, 
maintaining order, and collecting taxes were among the various political tasks filled by these 
military enterprises.  
The complex identity of these firms, which Carmola describes as protean mix of organizational 
cultures that represents a new type of international actor and resists governance14 leads few firms to 
unambiguously accept the categorization. Blackwater, probably the most notorious of all the 
PMSCs, has changed its name twice and now defines itself as an ‘elite security services 
provider’, not a PMSC.15 Scholars have noted PMSCs exercising ‘epistemic power’, meaning 
they have an ability to shape security discourses by setting agendas or maintaining the terms 
to frame issues.16 However, the Montreux Document definition attests, “PMSCs are private 
business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe 
themselves. 
After the Montreux Document was endorsed, a re-naming away from the term PMSCs 
coincided with new terms- such as “Complex operations firms” or “Stability operations 
                                                          
14 Carmola, Kateri (2010-02-05). Private Security Contractors and New Wars: Risk, Law, and Ethics (Contemporary Security Studies) (p. 6). 
Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition 
15 https://www.academi.com/pages/about-us Accessed October 2015  




companies” becoming increasingly common. One firm calls itself a “stability operations 
company that offers global services to the public and private sector in munitions response; 
logistics; communications; life support services; risk management; and security”. The effort to 
uniformly use the term PMSC- and attempt to create order in the international system- remains 
contested.  
Yet, the use of PMSCs is supported by a vast academic scholarship17. Agreement on 
definitions, a point to which I return in chapter three, is the first focal point for regime 
development18.  The absence of recognized name and an insufficient traceability of identity 
lead to an array of problems akin to “anonymous incorporation” and frequently associated to 
corporate misconduct in general.19  
Another instance underscore the need for an established patronym. While a multitude of 
measures and indicators are increasingly used to evaluate complex social practices, none exists 
for PMSCs. Greater emphasis on social accountability spurred new tools for administrative 
accountability, anticorruption, citizen engagement, governance, social and political 
accountability. In international relations, the tools for statecraft have increased in the last two 
                                                          
17 Avant (2005), Percy (2007), Carmola 2011; Dunigan and Petersohn (2015); De Nevers (2011); Kinsey and Cusumano (2012); Pattison 
(2014). In line with this scholarship, I use the same term in this dissertation. 
18 Focal points have been used by regime theory before and particularly in international security research. Schelling defines a point or 
equilibrium as focal if it has some features that for reasons of psychology, history, or culture, draws attention to itself, making it “stand out” 
among all equilibria. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, chap. 4 , is cited widely in regime theory. See, for ex., Young, in Krasner, pp. 96-98. Young, 
Oran R. "Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes."International Organization 36.02 (1982): 277-297. Axelrod, Robert, and 
Robert O. Keohane. "Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions." World politics 38.01 (1985): 226-254. Or Stein, Arthur 
A. "Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world." International Organization 36.02 (1982): 299-324. He writes precommitment 
has been variously described as the power to bind, as imperfect rationality, and as egonomics; see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 22-28; … Such 
a formulation of prior agreement on principles does not require John Rawls's veil of ignorance; see A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
Focal points have analogues in other research traditions although without implicit reference to security. Regulatory politics approaches stress 
the importance of finding the key large-scale event with costly externalities that had mobilizing consequences (Mattli and Woods). The logic 
of focal points is also very similar to what is used is historical institutional analyses that emphasize the enduring impact of choices made 
during critical junctures. However, historical institutionalism departs from scholars of global regulation in the choice of the unit of analysis, 
which can range from a single organization to the structured interaction between organizations (for example, a party system or relationships between branches of 
government), to public policies, to a political regime as a whole. Cf. Capoccia and Keleman, The Study of Critical Junctures, World Politics, 59 (April 
2007), 341-69.  
19 On the issue of anonymous incorporation on the international market, cf. Findley, Nielsen and Sharman 2014. It is the first experimental 




decades with the global proliferation of ratings and rankings20, but in private security policy, 
there is no indicator.21 The recent absence of mention of the use of contactors in implementing 
the strategy to destroy the Islamic State is an expression of this trend.22 Thus, there is an 
imbalance between the growing importance of private security and the insufficient interface 




3. Approach and Aims 
 
 
My contribution is largely based on three bodies of literature: the literature on private security 
contractors, the literature on regime theory and the politics of regulation, and the African 
studies literature. 
The literature of private security contractors has developed in isolation from the developments 
in regime theory, the literature on the politics of regulation, and the international and 
comparative political economy. A scholarship on military contracting has concentrated 
overwhelmingly on the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, and focused 
                                                          
20 Cooley and Snyder, Ranking the World, 2015 (Cambridge University Press); Arndt, The politics of governance ratings, International Public 
Management Journal, 2008 
21 The Private Security Monitor based at the University of Denver provides the first available source of data- and an outstanding resource- but 
no gauge. Available at www.psm.du.edu  




on Iraq or Afghanistan, adding important case studies23. An international legal analysis of 
private contractors has developed.24  
The subject is indeed vast with themes that include the level of corruption within private 
contractor activity25; the effectiveness and savings (or lack thereof) associated with contracting; 
private contractors’ loyalty; the tensions between private contractors and government military 
personnel26; the privatization of foreign policy27; or the issue of ethics of contracting and just 
war theory.28 
 
The literature of private security contractors in Africa has built upon the seminal work of 
Abrahmsen and Williams.29 Borrowing the concept of disassembly of the state and the 
emergence of global assemblages, the authors coined the term public private security assemblages 
to show how embedded institutional structures surrounding the legitimate organization of 
violence potentially disrupt prevailing institutional logic and structures of sovereignty. Other 
                                                          
23 For examinations of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a long list. Here are only few of the most prominent: Jeremy Scahill, 
Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army. (New York: Nation Books, 2008); Christopher Kinsey, Corporate soldiers and 
international security : the rise of private military companies (London ; New York : Routledge, 2006); Gerry Schumacher and Steve Gansen, A Bloody 
Business: America's War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq ( St Paul: Zenith Press, 2006);   David Isenberg, Shadow force : private security 
contractors in Iraq.   (Westport, Conn., Praeger Security International, 2009); James Jay Carafano, Private sector, public wars : contractors in combat-- 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and future conflicts ( Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security International, 2008); Rolf Uesseler, Servants of war : private military 
corporations and the profit of conflict (Brooklyn : Soft Skull Press, 2008) 
24 Some of the most notable works are: Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of 
Private Military Contractors (2007); Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private 
Contractors (2011); Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (eds.), Multilevel Regulation of Military and Security Contractors: The Interplay between International, 
European and Domestic Norms (2012). Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs, 
Yale University Press, 2011. Hannah Tonkin, State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict, Cambridge University 
Press, 2011 
25 Cf. The Commission on Wartime Contracting’s final report Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks, of August 2011, 
states that at least $31 billion, and possibly as much as $60 billion has been lost to contract waste and fraud in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
Final Report to Congress of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: 
Controlling costs, reducing risks Aug. 2011 is available at <www.wartimecontracting.gov.> Accessed October 15 2015 
26 Cf. Dunigan, Op. Cit. 
27 Stanger, Allison. One nation under contract: The outsourcing of American power and the future of foreign policy. Yale University Press, 2014. 
28 An updated literature review of this sub-field can be found in Fitzsimmons, S. "Just war theory and private security companies." International 
Affairs 91.5 (2015): 1069-1084. 




important studies have appeared;30 but none has focused on regulatory cooperation and the 
formation of state choices.  
 
Next, I rely on the regime theory literature and the literature on the politics of regulation. The 
latter provides a useful framework to think about outcomes that favor narrow interests and 
others that achieve wider public purposes.31 The regime literature is particularly important for 
several reasons, one being that it is often taken for granted by legal studies on PMSCs that 
take regimes and IR literature for granted.32 The regime literature came to be viewed as an 
experiment in reconciling the idealist and realist traditions (Haggard and Simmons 1987) and 
the notion of regime was thought as “likely to become a lasting element in the theory of 
international relations” (Puchala and Hopkins 1982). In the nineties, research on international 
regimes moved from formation and change to effectiveness – i.e., to whether regimes 
contribute to the reduction or solution of the problems they address (Stokke 2001). A literature 
on regime effectiveness emerged and showed the usefulness in the use of regime to bring 
about cooperation with quantitative studies (Underdal and Young 2002; Young 2011).  
In regime theory, the wisdom is that reaching an agreement is a stage in the negotiation, not 
the end of the process, as Spector and Zartman write.33 International regimes develop in three 
general ways: through coercion, convergence, or mutual state choice. Under external pressure, 
                                                          
30 Gumedze, S. "From market for force to market for peace: private military and security companies in peacekeeping operations." Institute for 
Security Studies Monographs 183 (2011); McFate, Sean. The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order. Oxford University 
Press, 2015.; Varin, Caroline. Mercenaries, Hybrid Armies and National Security: Private Soldiers and the State in the 21st Century. Routledge, 2014. 
31 Mattli, Walter, and Ngaire Woods. The politics of global regulation. Princeton University Press, 2009. The condition that favor the latter are an 
open and transparent process as well as demand-side conditions, information – or demonstration effects, that show to the public the effect 
of poor regulation and trigger a demand for improvements- converging interests, and a shared set of ideas. In some instances, “demonstration 
effects” associated with perception of policy failure, creates a demand for new regulatory vehicles. In these instances, new policy entrepreneurs 
through a process of conflict and cooperation persuade a large number of firms to accept non-state regulatory standards. In Vogel, D. in 
Mattli and Woods, Op. Cit., Ch. 5 
32 Dicksinson, Laura A. "Regulating the Privatized Security Industry: The Promise of Public/Private Governance." Emory LJ 63 (2013): 417. 





reluctant governments may be forced to enter agreements but in the majority of cases, regimes 
arise through explicit state choices to cooperate; this occurs when preferences shift over time.34  
When the underlying determinants of preferences change, non-cooperative governments may 
become more favorable to international regulation. Hence, I note, the importance of studying 
and explaining state choices where cooperation is either not achieved or not reached in full.35  
Finally, the literature on African studies is one where the very notion of ‘African state’ 
contrasts with the traditional theories of statehood and state creation. The most distinctively 
“African contribution to human history could be said to have been precisely the civilized art 
of living fairly peaceably together not in states”36. I rely on a literature whose relationship with 
the International Relations discipline has been marked by the dominance of perspectives in IR 
that have sometimes dismissed Africa as a weak and marginal continent with long-standing 
dynamics of dependence. My use of IR concepts, like regime, globalization, or sovereignty 
recognizes the tensions and at the same time, assumes a level of agency within Africa and 




                                                          
34 Raustiala 1997. I define preferences as in Moravcsik: “causally independent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to specific 
interstate political interactions, including external threats, incentives, manipulation of information, or other tactics”. Moravcsik, Andrew. 
"Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics." International organization 51.04 (1997): 513-553. Whenever I the 
conditions do not warrant the use of ‘preferences’, I use ‘state choice’ 
35 Raustiala 1997; Legro 1995 
36 Lonsdale ‘States and social processes in Africa’, p.139 in Bayart, The State in Africa 
37 See Part III, Preamble, Relevance of IR, norms and regime for Africa. My use of of ‘extraversion’ refer to the classic works such as Patrick 
Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: The political instrumentalization of disorder (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1999); 
Jean-Francois Bayart, L’État en Afrique: la politique du ventre (Fayard, Paris, 1989); Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International 
System: The politics of state survival (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996). My assumptions on the politics of reform and political 
economy of development, rely on Lewis, Peter. Growing apart: Oil, politics, and economic change in Indonesia and Nigeria. University of Michigan 




My research strategy is to seek to explain what drives the mosaic of regulatory cooperation by 
using a framework- rather than a theory or a model- that is consistent with a rationalist 
approach and that articulate the interests, ideas and institutions that drive preferences at the 
state and inter-state level.  
 
I privilege the study of agency at the state-level, but I also aim at understanding the processes 
whereby states pick among the available options, and how countries “choose” to exercise their 
agency depends upon concomitant international choices. These international causes have 
domestic effects- which Gourevitch called the ‘second image reversed’.38 
I specify international regulatory cooperation as the dependent variable and I define it is the 
formal activity that comprises agenda setting, negotiation, implementation, monitoring, and 
enforcement39, a broad field that I divide into three main areas, two international and one 
national, as illustrated in the table below. 
                                                          
38 Gourevitch, Peter. "The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics." International Organization 32.04 (1978): 881-
912. 

















1. Agenda-setting, negotiation, implementation, 
monitoring, and enforcement of the Swiss Initiative 
(Montreux Document and ICoC)  
2. Agenda-setting and negotiation of U.N. Draft 
Convention;  
3. Agenda-setting, negotiation, implementation of 




The first element of regulatory cooperation is the Montreux Document, and the related 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The second is the input 
and participation to the U.N. initiative, which led to the elaboration of the Convention on 
Private Military and Security Companies. Thirdly, as states increasingly seek to regulate 
internationally, domestic institutions and anticipated implementation have been expected to 
play greater roles in explaining state choice.40 Thus, the relevant domestic regulation that 
pertains to private security deserves to be included in international regulatory cooperation; 
                                                          
40 Raustiala, Kal. "Domestic institutions and international regulatory cooperation: comparative responses to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity." World Politics 49.04 (1997): 482-509. And, he adds, because powerful states are equally influenced by these dynamics, in explaining 




international standards must eventually lead to domestic changes, and greater state control, 
because regulatory enforcement is most likely to occur at the state level.41  
 
Norms in PMSC governance 
Realists argue that norms are not inherently influential, and claim that they are a ‘reflection of 
the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculation of 
great powers and they have no independent effect on state behavior’.42 Neoliberals give more 
weight to the idea that norms shape state behavior. They argue that norms are influential in 
that they ‘not only reflect, but also affect, the facts of world politics’.43 Norms influence policy 
by providing ‘road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, 
they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and they 
become embedded in political institutions’.44  
In this perspective, norms may be regulatory (specifying standards of appropriate behavior) or 
constitutive (defining the identities of actors).45 As they take hold, constitutive norms influence 
identities and interests.46 Shared ideas and norms, too, exercise power over national leaders by galvanizing 
new social groups domestically and transnationally and convincing publics of the value of new goals and policies.47 
                                                          
41 Holmqvist, Private Security Companies, 50; and Schreier and Caparini, Privatising Security, 104–16. Tonkin, Hannah. State control over private military 
and security companies in armed conflict. Vol. 84. Cambridge University Press, 2011  
42 Mearsheimer 1994:5-7 
43 Keohane 1984: 57. Also cf. Moravcsik, Op. Cit.  
44 Goldstein and Keohane (1993:3) 
45 Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: alternative perspectives’, p. 5; Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. "International norm dynamics and 
political change." International organization 52.04 (1998). pp. 891–2 
46 Klotz, Audie. "Protesting Prejudice: Apartheid and the Politics of Norms in International Relations." Ithaca, NY (1995).; Cortell, Andrew 
P., and James W. Davis Jr. "How do international institutions matter? The domestic impact of international rules and norms." International 
Studies Quarterly (1996): 451-478. 





In defining private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they 
describe themselves, the Montreux Document aims at being constitutive.  
Most constructivist scholars have typically focused on non-security areas such as human Most 
constructivist scholars have typically focused on non-security areas such as human rights and 
the environment. An exception in the field of security is the case of landmines, a landmark 
case where humanitarian norms were seen as an independent source of change. The 
examination of the role of the ICRC in the Montreux Document has clear parallels with the 
case of the ban on landmines.48 
I shall show in chapter one that the origins of the Swiss Initiative are initially found in norms, 
not only in states’ interests. I then test if the norms that Montreux put forth have become 
constitutive after the first five years. 
At the inter-state level, the influence of ideas on the practice of politics leads me to consider 
the state’s monopoly on violence, as well as neutral humanitarianism, a notable driver of the 
Swiss initiative. The power of principled ideas, as Sikkink called it, in the form of democracy 
and human rights, can provide long-term prospects for PMSCs norms in Africa, especially in 
the context of a gradual democratization, especially as African states become increasingly 
politically pluralized and democratic.49 The anti-mercenary norm is by far the strongest driver 
or inhibitor of regulatory cooperation both at the state level and at the global level. I turn now 
to the definitions and theoretical expectations of norms. 
                                                          
48 cf. Price 1998. ICRC took the preeminent role of initiator and norm entrepreneur.  
49 Young, C. (2012: 222–224). Young contends that for most African countries this opening up has signified a move ‘away from 
authoritarianism rather than to full democracy’, the introduction of more regular elections and freer civil societies than has previously been 




Norms (II): Defining mercenary and the anti-mercenary norm 
The role and impact that ideas can have must be articulated through the definition of 
mercenary and anti-mercenary norm.  
 
Mercenaries are difficult to define. The UN definition of mercenaries and the Geneva 
Conventions involve six points but mostly revolved around the foreign status and the motive of 
financial gain. Percy proposed a new definition in terms of degree of attachment to a cause 
and legitimate control. 50 What differentiates mercenaries from other fighters is that a 
mercenary has low attachment to a cause and low legitimate control – i.e. he acts relatively 
independently, selling his services or the services of a company he commands to other entities. 
Her definition avoids several important conceptual problems.51  
Norms (III): Content and direction anti-mercenary norm 
A strong and expansive anti-mercenary norm cast a cloud on an agreed upon distinction 
between PMSCs and mercenaries and delay or interrupt regulatory cooperation on PMSCs. 
Percy argued that the norm against mercenarism has become “more puritanical” due to the 
emergence of PMSCs.  
The IR literature defines the norm as an antipathy (Taulbee 1985) or as a broad and global 
proscriptive social norm (Percy 2007). For Percy, it is a norm that has restricted state use of 
mercenaries at the same time it has influenced, and often constrained, the opportunities available for mercenaries 
                                                          
50 She claims that these variable are better because 1) The concept of attachment to a cause cuts to the heart of what we find morally 
problematic about mercenaries. Mercenaries are morally problematic because they cannot provide a plausible justification for killing; they 
cannot point to a cause in the service of which they fight, aside from financial gain. 2) The variation in the entity exercising control; in modern 
times this has been the sovereign state, while previously it might have been a lord, king, city state, or even the papacy 
51 For example mercenaries, when placed under legitimate control, are regarded as less threatening (…) They no longer represent private interests, even though 




themselves.52 The antipathy that Taulbee describes is distinct from the stigma attached to role of 
security guards in the suppression of labor disputes during the days of the Pinkertons.53 
Taulbee argued that concern started during the decolonization phase with the secessionist 
movement in Katanga hiring mercenaries to suppress a revolt in the 1960.54 
Norms can be subject to a degeneration that may lead to their gradual decline. The decline and 
disappearance of the norm on declaration of war is a case in point in the international system;55 
a common example is also the weakening in submarine warfare norms.56 The scholarly wisdom 
is that the anti-mercenary norm was however, reformulated and its application limited. In the 
last decade, the negative perception of combat activities led security firms to a reorientation 
from combat-oriented to combat avoiding.57 Both PMSCs and states acted as the 
entrepreneurs for policy change.58 PMSCs providing defensive services only, do not violate 
the anti-mercenary norm and have become increasingly legitimate actors.  
Norms (IV): Theoretical Expectation on the anti-mercenary norm 
None of the above literature, however, has studied the role of the anti-mercenary norm in the 
context of African states. I build a theoretical expectation that the norm has been reformulated 
                                                          
52 It originates in two characteristics. One is the fact that mercenaries do not fight and kill for a collective political cause but for personal 
gain. The other is the lack of legitimate controls over mercenaries. Both features have survived in various manifestations over the centuries, 
ensuring the survival of the norm against mercenary use until today (Percy 2007) 
53 It should be noted that private force was a precursor of the police in the U.S.A as well as in Europe. Pinkerton created an agency in Chicago 
that provided investigation and security services, particularly on railways across the country. On Pinkerton’s, see Frank Morn, The Eye that 
Never Sleeps. He is memorialized in two photographs on the second floor of the Smithsonian Museum of American Art in Washington D.C.  
54 It is the association with the self-determination norm that determined its strength for Percy. It was really “rooted in the symbolism of 
“racism and neocolonialism within the Afro-Asian bloc”, for Taulbee and neither the “reversal of loyalty”, nor their military effectiveness is 
an explanation of the antipathy towards mercenary involvement Taulbee, James L. "Myths, mercenaries and contemporary international law." 
Cal. W. Int'l LJ 15 (1985): 339.341-2). 
55 Fazal, Tanisha M. "Why States No Longer Declare War." Security Studies 21.4 (2012): 557-593. 
56 Legro, Jeffrey W. Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II. Cornell University Press, 1995. Ch. 2 
57 Percy 2007:227; Petersohn 2014; Leander 
58 Petersohn 2014 and Leander emphasize PMSC and their role of change agent or even of epistemic community; Fitzimmons claims norm 




but is still influential. I probe for the drivers of the norm at the state-level and at the inter-
state level. I have theoretical expectations on both fronts.  
 
First, negative reactions to the rise of PMSCs within many institutional ambits, including the 
UN, demonstrate that the norm is still alive. The existence found confirmation in Percy’s 
interviews of peacekeeping directors.59  Percy claims that “Without (the norm), (…) we cannot 
understand how today's private military industry developed and the obstacles it faces”.  
Secondly, at the state-level, I expect the norm to be especially strong and ambiguous in 
contexts where mercenarism resonated. When the norm becomes puritanical, it “prevents 
clear thinking (…) leading to condemnation of the use of private force whether that force is 
directed towards stopping a war or towards promoting it” and this leads to a moral position 
that “is, in some cases, perverse”.60 Given this anticipation, I inquire if the rhetoric of 
mercenarism can be a proxy for something else and part of a strategic move to influence the 
public. Thus I consider several questions such as for example: Who adopts the idea and who 
are the advocates? What social and political character do they possess; how do ideas come to 
prevail- i.e. what linkages they have to the political power so that they rather than a rival set 
of ideas, prevail?  
 
                                                          
59 Percy 2007:224 
60 Percy 2007:220. Condemning the use of private force, even in situations where states have no other choice, seems to be 
deeply unfair. If ‘other nations, individually or collectively, are not going to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping or peacemaking forces, 
shouldn't a state have a right to hire a force able to keep order? It seems distinctly odd, both legally and morally, to argue that a state is 
somehow required to depend on whatever conscripts it can muster and train them as best it can, rather than obtain expert assistance from 
outside’. (…)It is even more odd to condemn a state for receiving expert private assistance to solve its dire security problems when expert 
public assistance receives plaudits from the world community. American and French interventions to end hostilities in Liberia and Côte 





Continuity or change in PMSC governance depends crucially upon states’ interests. I should 
be quite clear: ideas do not shape capabilities or threats. However, they do influence the way 
we think about interests. Thus, my definition relies primarily on Katzenstein’s assertion that 
interests are not obviously discovered by self-interested, rational actors but rather they are constructed through 
a process of social interaction.61 Instead of relying on Thucydides’ strong definition for interests as 
the ‘surest of bonds between states’ or Morgenthau’s conceptualization62, my inquiry is led by 
the search for construction of interests- be it national interests or economic interests.  
Such notion of interest helps rationalize the beliefs of policy makers and how these ultimately 
shape state preferences. Ideas interpenetrate state interests. Threats in the United States led to 
a retreat of the ideals enshrined by the constitution, as Benabib wrote63. The interplay between 
interests and international factors contributes to the development of states’ choices towards 
Montreux and I contrast the role of the U.S. and China in shaping interests and ideas. If state 
capitalism embrace corporate private security overseas; is it regulatory politics part of 
contingent or strategic approach? I trace China’s development of security choices, the use of 
contractors after the attack on the capital of Sudan of 2008 and the engagement with regulatory 
cooperation by studying the participation of Chinese foreign policy both to Montreux and 
U.N. initiatives. 
                                                          
61  Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics. Columbia University Press, 1996.  p. 
62 Morgenthau definition is helpful in defining the concept of interest in terms of power. "It imposes discipline upon the observer, infuses 
rational order into the subject matter of politics and guards against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with 
ideological preferences”. Cf. Morgenthau H. J. (1972) Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace 
63 Politics in Dark Times, p.3. She writes that the U.S. Constitution hemorrhaged in the hands of those who claimed the executive power, beyond the rule of 
domestic and international law, would determine the status of enemy combatants. Evidence was mounting that torture, including waterboarding, was used by the 




Some accounts conflate the privatization of security and the interest of a single state or of 
corporate actors. There is no lack of merit in this claim. For example, the literature stressed 
the role of the insurance company as a form of private authority and policy-making in global 
governance.64  These players were agents of change in PMSCs governance and influenced the 
construction of interests in the field of maritime security. However, my research assumes that 
state interests are hierarchical superior in the process of interest construction, be it small and 
medium states’ as much as strong states’ interests.65  Be in Switzerland or South Africa- views 
born from the national interests asserted the need for reform paths. It was national interest of 
small states like Switzerland that informed and shaped engagement with international 
regulation as well as the creation of the Montreux Document itself. It was the perception of 
encroached sovereignty that shaped the South African contestation of Montreux. 
 
Institutions  
Third and last, my methodological choice is to search for the influence of institutions and 
institutional change because a degree of autonomy in institutions can explain how the past 
influences the present and the future, and the way that incremental institutional change affects 
the nature of path dependence (North 1990). With this third variable, I avoid the excessive 
emphasis on the role of ideas, or on the impact of interest.66  
                                                          
64 Carmola 2010 Haufler 1997; Ericson and Doyle 2003, 2004.  
 
65 Chapters one and six 
66 I refer to Van de Walle, African Economies, Ch. 2, and to Lewis, Growing Apart, Ch. 2. Some approaches put too much emphasis on the 
impact of interest groups on the state especially for the inability to overcome opposition to the policy reform. Other approaches 
underestimated the capacity of the state considerably by taking government commitments for granted, conflating state autonomy with state 




An institutionalist approach is not novel in analyzing the Market for Force; Deborah Avant has 
juxtaposed economic and sociological institutionalist logics and stressed that institutions 
provide a nonmarket channel to overcome market failures.67  Since Avant’s seminal 
contribution, Montreux has further forced states and non-states to regularize expectations and 
constrain behavior. Arguably, some degree of change has taken place since Montreux - i.e. the 
recognition that non-state legitimate actors with an internationally assigned name can use of 
force in the context of self-defense- hierarchically subordinated, however, to the state 
responsibilities- i.e. obligations to prevent, remedy, investigate and prosecute. A new 
community of practice has defined the players and the rules particularly associated with the 
rise of a monitoring mechanism of states into voluntary regulations.68  
A dimension of institutional change is that it often arises from political conflict in which actors 
and interests contend for preferred institutional arrangements. Indeed, conflict characterized 
the development of a field where both market actors- from PMSCs themselves, to insurance 
and the shipping industries69- and non-market actors and international organizations, like the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) were capable of shaping some outcomes and craft the new ‘rules of the 
game’.70  Conflict is indeed common in the accounts of the creation of new organizational 
fields- like transnational arbitration.71 My study suggests that states and nonmarket actors were 
indispensable in defining new rules of the game amidst conflicts and divergence in 
interpretation. While none wanted to be driver of intergovernmental discussion around topics 
                                                          
67 She generated a useful framework to analyze the three levels of control over PMSCs 3 areas where it matter the most: when the states 
contract for private delivery; when states regulate security services exports, and when non-state actors finance security services  
68 Cf. Chap. 4 
69 On the influence of the insurance and shipping industry on regularizing PMSCs on board ships, see chapter 7 
70 Cf. Chapter 1 for ICRC and Chapter 5 for IMO 
71 Dezalay, Yves, and Bryant G. Garth. Dealing in virtue: International commercial arbitration and the construction of a transnational legal order. University 
of Chicago Press, 1998. Their history stresses the delicate transition from personal charismatic to routinized and specialized expertise 




with contentious histories, like mercenarism and piracy, both the ICRC and the IMO, stroke 
a balance between the organizations’ mandates with the interests of key societal actors and the 
political incentives faced by governments; they accompanied the rise of a form of voluntary 
regulation that contributed to regularize expectations, risks and costs. This is what I examine 
in Chapter four, “Designing Institutions: the Role of the State in Voluntary Regulation”. I 
suggest that a weakness of commitment lurks over regime construction and the autonomy of 
institutions as explanatory variable. 
In part III, I choose to nuance the influence of institutions because of the increase evidence 
of the role of informal institutions. In the African context, informal institutions are not just 
constraints that can be done away with, as the neo-institutionalist approach puts it, but the 
very fabric on which social fabric is based.72  
At the inter-state level, the continent’s main political institution, the African Union, has never 
taken up the question of private security regulation even if several arrangements have been 
devised for peace and security.73 The A.U. convened a meeting of experts to review the 
organization’s legal instruments, including the 1977 Anti-Mercenary Convention. As noted by 
Gumedze, the latter could have presented an opportunity for the AU to simultaneously address the 
challenges posed by PMSCs in the region74. However, the time was not ripe: the A.U. was more 
interested in enforcing broader norms that help maintain political order, like the prevention 
                                                          
72 Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. "Africa works: the political instrumentalization of disorder. Indiana University Press,1999. For an 
account of the economy of affection, cf. Hydén, Göran. African politics in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
73 E.g. the Peace and Security Council, to the Panel of Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (EWS) and the African Standby Force. 
In a study of security arrangements, Engel and Porto refer to the AU architecture as a de facto regional regime, although limited by a lack of 
follow-through. Engel, Ulf, and João Gomes Porto, eds. Africa's new peace and security architecture: promoting norms, institutionalzing solutions. Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 2010. Engel, Ulf, and João Gomes Porto. "The African Union's new peace and security architecture: toward an evolving 
security regime?." African Security 2.2-3 (2009): 82-96. 




of military coups75 and the control conventional ‘mercenaries’ of the type high-lighted by the 
2004 coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea. 
 
Case study method  
 
In what follows, I use a variety of devices including process tracing, the case study and the 
paired-case methods. First, I use process tracing to identify the intervening causal process- the 
causal chain and mechanism- between independent variables and the outcome of the 
dependent variable. In their Case Studies and Theory Development, George and Bennett write that 
tracing the process that may have led to an outcome, helps narrow the list of potential causes.  
 
In part II of the dissertation, I use the case study methodology at the global level. Then, in part 
III, I use case studies at the state level.  
 
In chapter three, I seek order by attempting a disciplined interpretive case study. 76  I select a venue 
and time- the conference Montreux +5- as the litmus test for assessing implementation efforts 
of States in implementing PMSCs norms and for understanding how key events selected or 
blocked some possible future paths. I try applying a known theory- regime theory- to the 
terrain of PMSCs governance77.  Thus, I use a variety of process-tracing- i.e. analytic 
                                                          
75 Souaré, Issaka K. "The African Union as a norm entrepreneur on military coups d’état in Africa (1952–2012): an empirical assessment." 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 52.01 (2014): 69-94. The evolution of policy on coups included condemnation, sanctions, and the concept 
of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG), with a list of situation considered illegitimate, including ‘intervention by mercenaries 
to replace a democratically elected government’ 
 
76 Odell, John S. "Case study methods in international political economy." International Studies Perspectives 2.2 (2001): 161-176. 
77 Ibid. The more explicit and systematic the use of theoretical concepts, the more powerful the application. Although this method may not 




explanation- and convert the historical narrative into a reasoned explanation couched in the 
theoretical tradition of regime theory.78 
My methodological choice is to proceed first at the global level and then proceed to the 
continental level, combining micro- and macro analyses and narratives. The first section of the 
dissertation focuses on worldwide governance (Part I). The first section of the dissertation 
focuses on global description of the emergence of what I call the ‘private security regime 
complex’.  
The second investigates the limits and potential of the working parts (Part II).  Haas wrote 
that the literature had focused on correlates of regimes- such as political order and economic growth- 
instead of studying the transformative process that regimes may initiate or foster.79 The first two parts of 
the research investigate whether such a transformative process has developed. 
 
Following other scholarship on regime complexity, because state preferences do not reflect 
state behavior, understanding preferences is fundamental. Then, I move to the state level of 
analysis in the context of Africa (Part III). I focus on the puzzle of preferences in African 




My selection of case studies consists of four main cases: Nigeria, South Africa, Sierra Leone 
and Liberia. All cases are in Africa because the continent offers an array of variation in study 
                                                          
78 Varieties of Process-Tracing, George and Bennett, Op. Cit., pp.210-212 





of the conflictual evolution of PMSC governance. Even if PMSCs are visibly deployed in 
contexts such as Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, or sometimes in Latin America, few states had 
comparable levels of agency that comprise contestation or extraversion. The ‘marginalized’ 
continent offers more inspiration on state choices on PMSCs governance than Asia or Latin 
America. 
Second, the focus on Africa fits with the priorities outlined in the literature on private security 
in international politics where the markets re-distributes power over the control of force particularly in 
transitional or immature states.80 Avant mentions three altered expectations for IR theories. 
For mature democracies, the market for security often enhances a state’s capacity but also erodes 
transparency and constitutionalism. Second, it offers short-lived increases in capacity to transitional 
or immature states. Third, private security reinforces the dilemmas pointed to by the literature on the resource 
curse and rentier states, deepening the expected difficulty of state building. If the primary criterion for case 
selection should be relevance to the research objective81 of the study82, then Africa is the most 
germane context. 
Two country cases could not be ignored in the mosaic of regulatory cooperation- the 
hegemonic African states, Nigeria and South Africa. The South African case is unique both 
because of the history of private security and because of the repeated attempted expropriation 
of foreign-owned security companies. South Africa has a highly regulated industry and almost 
two millions registered security officers83. It was also South Africa that gave impetus to the 
                                                          
80 Williamson 1975; Thomson 1994; Williamson 1999 cited in Avant 2006: 508 
81 Avant’s third point is that privatized security challenges the oft-assumed collective monopoly of states over violence. Avant 2005 p. 228; 
Avant 2006: 508 
82 George and Bennett, Op. Cit., 83  




project of the United Nations Draft Convention on private security. At the heart of the 
preoccupations was ‘foreign enlistment’ or the hiring of so-called Third Country Nationals 
(TCN)- i.e. the reliance of PMSCs on foreign employees for a variety of tasks in the security 
area- including guarding military bases, facility maintenance, guarding checkpoints or sensitive 
infrastructure. TCNs posed several problems: they may not be accountable to any American 
government authority84, they were reportedly associated to illicit activities85; and they were 
especially susceptible to forced labor and human trafficking86. In reference to Montreux, Perret 
also writes: 
The States of origin (of Third Country Nationals) may not fall under the current categories 
of Contracting, Territorial, or Home States. For example, in Chile’s situation, some of its citizens 
were contracted by U.S. companies through non-U.S. based hiring firms under contracts that 
referenced neither Chilean nor U.S. law. The Montreux Document’s State categories do not 
directly address this situation. 87   
 
The second case is Nigeria. She is Africa’s hegemon and can develop a vast influence over the 
practices of the market for security. The role and influence of Nigeria is key in understanding 
institutional agency in supporting or thwarting new initiatives, and thus affecting preferences, 
both domestically, and through the regional and continental organizations that can resist or 
alter the embedded prevailing institutional logics. Relatedly, Western Africa is one of the most 
important contexts for other reasons. First, it has been the most volatile area of Africa and the 
                                                          
84 U.S. Commission on Wartime Contracting, Interim Report 2009, cited in Mandel, Overview of American Government Expeditionary 
Operations Utilizing Private Contractors, in Kinsey and Patterson, Op. Cit., p.18 
85 Mandel, Op. Cit., p.18.  
86 Ibid., DCAF Report; Perret, Op. Cit. 
87 Perret in DeWinter-Schmitt, p. 38. It should however be mentioned that the Montreux Document refers not only to the home, contracting 




nexus between PMSC and instability is unequivocal.88 Secondly, a focus on West Africa casts 
a net over state difficult and incomplete choices on private maritime security. Yet, the Gulf of 
Guinea, one of the most dangerous in the world, is where PMSCs are increasingly used.  
“With more cases, the investigator can begin to chart the repertoire of causal paths that lead 
to a given outcome and the conditions under which they occur”.89 Thus, I search for other 
cases that have been considered relevant by the literature and by recent policy debates, and 
cases that adequately represent policy decisions for and against regulation, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia are ideal cases: the former is a signatory of Montreux, the latter is not. The two cases 
are similar systems that only differ in the dependent variable, i.e. participation to international 
cooperation. The likeness of Sierra Leone and Liberia allows us to control for important 
explanatory factors and accentuate the comparative value of the analysis when tracing policy 
formation. International factors and contingency explain resistance to regulatory cooperation. 
Thus, my selection consists of four main cases: Nigeria, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
I also use two minor case studies for comparative insights: Uganda and Madagascar, which are 
not fully-fledged but help investigate selected questions- i.e. the accommodation to the 
Montreux Document for the former; and in the case of Madagascar, the tension between the 
varying influence of the anti-mercenary norm and human rights norms. 
 
Data and interviews 
 
Interviews and participation to conferences constituted a key source for this work as well as 
                                                          
88 Cf. Branovic’s statistical survey on the use of private military and security companies in failing states in the period 1990–2007. Cf. Chapter 
Six 




the analysis of primary and secondary literature, archival material, and news sources. Further, 
I could test my ideas with fieldwork in South Africa in January-February 2014 and in Sierra 
Leone in September of 2015. I relied on sources and scholarship available in English, and in 
other European languages. 
 
I draw from a variety of data collected during research work conducted in 2013 and 2014, 
including over 70 interviews with politicians, including a president, ambassadors, PMSCs 
directors and security officials, lawyers, delegates of international organizations and other 
informants.  I relied on many interviews carried out in Washington, London, Geneva, and 
Africa. Other interviews took place at conferences on PMSCs, such as the workshop on 
maritime security at DCAF (Geneva, Switzerland, July 2014), and at the United Nations, at 
the second IGWG (New York, July 2013); and at the third IGWG (Geneva, Switzerland, in 
July 2014). 
My research benefited from my participation as a contributor to the Montreux Five Years On: 
An analysis of State efforts to implement Montreux Document legal obligations and good practices 90- or the 
Shadow Report- an attempt of academics and activists to write a report, alternative to the 
official one, with challenges and recommendations for addressing gaps in the effectiveness of 
the Document91.  The one-day conference at American University Washington College of Law 
provided an initial arena to assess the divergence of opinions regarding the achievements of 
the Montreux Document. 
 
                                                          
90 Rebecca DeWinter-Schmitt (Ed) Montreux Five Years On: An analysis of State efforts to implement Montreux Document legal obligations and good 
practices, available at http://ihrib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/MontreuxFv3.pdf 
91 The presentation of the results at the conference at American University Washington School of Law provided an initial arena to assess the 


















Elements of political economy  
 
The variation in the level of contracting depends upon the varying effect of a series of global 
factors. The literature on the privatization of security proposes six main explanations for the 
increase in contracting. The first three are by far most prominent: increased demand due to 
Western unwillingness to intervene, the spread of neoliberalism, changes in the availability of 
military supplies and personnel. The others include post Cold-War military downsizing, 
changes in Warfare, and technological change92. Thus, scholarly inquiries into private security 
have increasingly rejected single cause explanations in favor of a more comprehensive gradient 
of factors. 
 
In what follows, I give particular emphasis to some of these aspects, particularly the end of 
the Cold War and the reluctance to intervene, and contextualizing these factors in the African 
continent, I propose a matrix that comprises several key junctures (see Table B below).  
 
The end of the Cold War spurred an excess supply of veterans and weapons that became 
available for new opportunities (Factor A). These are generally seen as the first contemporary 
                                                          
92 Based on Hilde van Meegdenburg (2015) What the Research on PMSCs Discovered and Neglected: An Appraisal of the Literature, 




instance of private security but some argue that a market for force has always existed whenever 
supply aligned with demand, and veterans needed jobs.93 Yet, the global political economy that 
ensued was more than a misalignment of demand and supply. Besides, the end of Apartheid 
and the restructuring of the South African security (Factor A1)94 added a continental 
dimension that drove supply further. The introduction of private security as an alternative to 
military aid was not perceived as a problem for governments.95 
                                                          
93 Avant 2005:80. Also cf. Carmola 2010. She reviews scholars of military downsizing and finds there is a long-established patterns of 
demobilized forces migrating to other areas of the world with their expertise for sale. From the Peloponnesian War to the demobilized 
Russian and British hired by Chiang Kai-Shek (Fenby 2004); the Germans in China in 1920s (Krebs in Lock 1998); to the US veterans of 
WWI finding employment as strike breakers in mining camps; to the wars of independence in colonial Africa and South Asia fought by 
WWII veterans. 
94 A push factor in Abrahmsen and Williams, Op. Cit, p.25 




TABLE B96 Global Changes in Demand or Supply Political Economy in Africa  
Cold War A 
Change in availability of labor and arms spurs supply of 
PMSCs 97 
A1 




The Black Hawk Down accident disrupts support to aid 
practices98; the U.N. contemplates use of PMSCs for 
peacekeeping missions.99  
 
B1 
Faced with unrest and less international support, 
governments in developing countries use PMSCs for 







Strong states use contracting to circumvent constraints (Ex. 
MPRI mission in Croatia circumvented a UN embargo)  
 
Neoliberalism: justifications for contracting are reinforced by 
initiatives formulated during the Reagan-Thatcher era that 
encouraged government privatization and outsourcing 
 
C1 
Unwillingness to intervene intensifies. Western 
nations hire PMSCs to train African states’ military 
and security forces; Warlord and private security in 
Sierra Leone: “Arms to Africa affair”  
                                                          
96 Table B is my elaboration based on Baum and McGaha 2013; Avant 2005, Gumedze 2007 and 2012 , Ostensen 2011, Carmola 2010 
97 Singer 2003, Avant 2005; Howe, Herbert M. Ambiguous order: military forces in African states. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. 
98 Avant, 2005. PDD25, for example, resulted in US opposition to the UN peacekeeping operation proposed to end the 1994 genocide in Rwanda 
99 Cf. Chap. Two. For example, to respond to a Security Council mandated peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the UN approached Defense Systems Limited (DSL) to deploy 7000 Ghurka guards to 








U.S. contracts to PMSCs rise domestically and internationally 
to guard high-value assets 
D1 
Counter-terrorism policies increase use of PMSCs in 
Africa; use of PMSCs in anti-terror operations from 
Kenya to Nigeria100 
 
Iraq War E 
The Iraq War, not Afghanistan spurs, the need for PMSCs of 
foreign enlistment. Role of incidents: Fallujah presented for 
the US military a second ‘Mogadishu moment’101; Nisoor 
Square led to the endorsement of the Montreux Document 
E1 
Third Country Nationals: Demand for cheap labor 
for security related tasks, aided by “security 
entrepreneurs” in Africa and government laissez 
faire 
Piracy  F 
Demand for maritime policing to counter piracy in Horn of 
Africa 
F1 
Increased use of PMSCs in maritime-related tasks  
 
                                                          
100 cf. Chap. 6 




Then, an essential factor became the Western unwillingness to intervene, which is indicated as 
an explanation by a relative majority of scholars.102  
The West becomes more reluctant to intervene after the Black Hawk Down accident 
dramatically influenced Western public (Factor B, in the table). For states, PMSCs are a less 
visible alternative commitment. In regional context, states use PMSCs for political control. 
For Herbst, the increased demand for private security services in Africa, was due to Western 
countries conscious and strategic decision to disengage from African politics103 (Factor B1).  
States are also able to circumvent constraints but the relation to PMSCs is not without 
externalities. The MPRI mission in Croatia circumvented a UN embargo104, Sandline evaded 
an arms embargo in Sierra Leone thus associating private security to the problems of proxy 
forces and plausible deniability. In Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes (EO) first, and Sandline 
next, were associated to the ‘Arms to Africa’ affairs which spurred a realization of the extent 
of PMSCs work, and led to the United Kingdom’s Green Paper of 2002.  This was a turning 
point in the perception of the legal nature of PMSCs. As Kinsey writes, it would have been a 
simple matter of procedure to outlaw PMSCs but “there occurred a shift in the perceived 
legality of the activities” of PMSCs105. 
 
Organizations, like states, UN agencies and NGOs increasingly contemplate the use of 
PMSCs106. Demand for training and peace operations increases in the wake of growing 
                                                          
102 According to a survey of 151 works, 30 percent indicate Western unwillingness to intervene, as opposed to spread of neoliberalism (22%), 
availability of milltary supply and personnel (18%), post-Cold War military downsizing (11%), changes in warfare (9%), technological change 
(6%). Cf. van Meegdenburg, Op. Cit.,  
103 Jeffrey Herbst, ‘The Regulation of Private Security Forces’ in Greg Mills and John Stremlau (eds), The Privatisation of Security in Africa (1999) 
125.  
104 PMSCs also enabled governments to circumvent constraints on military action, either self-imposed (e.g., Congressional limits on US troop 
deployments) or by international agreement (e.g., UN embargos). Cf.Baum and McGaha 2013 
105 cf. Kinsey 2006: 90-93; On Sierra Leone, cf. Chap.8 
106 Østensen identified three factors in the U.N. demand for PMSCs. The formulation of new principles like the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
proposing extended responsibilities leading to evolving peace operations; a shift away from Western states as prominent troop providers, 





conflicts in interventions107 (Factor B2). In the face of conflicts, the ineptitude of African 
militaries, as Howe calls it, suggests an outstanding ambiguity between the need to address the 
threat to the existence of African states and the political responsibility in improve their military 
forces.108 
In the Balkans the need to intervene was not clear to the U.S. public109(Factor C). A continued 
disinclination towards foreign interventions coincides with political and economic ideologies 
that favor a diminished level of state intervention, and an all-volunteer military force110. 
The use of PMSCs enables governments to circumvent constraints on military action, either 
self-imposed (e.g. Congressional limits on US troop deployments) or by international 
agreement (e.g. UN embargos). The US government gives greater support to PMSCs 
involvement in foreign policy. Not so the UK government111- but controversies surrounding 
the British firm Sandline lead to a turning point in British politics as well, both in the oversight 
towards PMSCs but also towards their acceptance as legitimate actors.112  
The Arms to Africa affairs also reveals the extent of what Will Reno termed Warlord Politics 
(Factor C1). Foreign privatizing of security gives rulers of weak states capabilities and access 
to resources they would otherwise find difficult to obtain. The reluctance to intervene and the 
neo-liberal norm puts weak states in front of a dilemma: for Reno, “closer integration of 
[African] states into global markets promotes warlord politics”.113  
 
                                                          
107 Avant 2005:19-21 
108 Howe, Op. Cit. 
109 Singer 2003:58 
110 Cohen, Eliot A. Citizens and soldiers: The dilemmas of military service. Cornell University Press, 1985, chap. 7-8. For a thoughtful and more 
recent examination of the competing ideological theories of republicanism and liberalism- which also includes neoliberalism- and how it 
continues to shape our understanding of the ideal role of the state, society and the military, cf. Krahmann (2010) 
111 Avant 113 on MPRI in Croatia; Kinsey 2006: 61 
112 Cf. fn. 107, Kinsey 2006: 72. Plans for regulation contained in the Green Paper subsequently failed but some progress was made 
(Krahmann 2010:116-117) 




A fourth factor is the rise in non-state violence, which includes first and foremost the 
September 11th attack but continues to this day, with an acceleration in lethality in the Middle 
East and Africa. The September 11th Twin Towers attack changed world affairs dramatically 
and ignited a draconian response from the United States government that included the 
Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Both the global use and the visibility of PMSCs rose (Factor D). 
An array of firms like Blackwater, ArmorGroup or Control Risks expanded their work.  
The scale of the atrocity committed on 9/11 was unprecedented: the U.S. had not suffered 
domestic casualties of such a scale since the Civil War114. The attack was aptly described as an 
unprecedented horror115; it marked the beginning of a new phase for international relations116; 
a return to state prerogatives in establishing the norms that govern international behavior117 
and of politics in dark times.118 Based on such sense of vulnerabilities, the U.S. devised 
determined that the Geneva Conventions did not bind the conduct of the war, or ‘War on 
Terror’, as it became known, a point to which I return in chapter one.  
 
The increased use of PMSCs was however, contingent, not planned. The choice to use 
contractors is often related to lack of planning. It is more contingent than strategic, as illustrated 
in the case of Nigeria, in chapter six. As Avant argued in relation to U.S. policy: 
There was no campaign to privatize part of the military. To the contrary, as the decade unfolded, 
a variety of concerns were raised as use of private forces was implicated in poor performance, abuse, 
                                                          
114 With the exception, of course, of Pearl Harbor. Cf. Richardson, Louise. What terrorists want: Understanding the enemy, containing the threat. 
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2007. Ch.6, “What Changed and What did not on September 11 2001” 
115 “foraging around for a term to elucidate the incomprehensible, the media and intellectual elites entrusted with making sense of it all have 
resurrected the construct of totalitarianism and of the Nazi era. (Barber in Benhabib 269). “as the Holocaust defied explanation, today 
terrorism defies imagination and leaves America uncomprehending, vulnerable to fear-mongering and extremist polemics”. Barber is 
unconvinced, however, about the comparison of Islamic Jihadism and totalitarianism and writes that in spite of the affinity the 9/11 and the 
Holocaust are incommensurable. 
116 Rosenau 2005- Globalization, security, and the nation state : paradigms in transition. Edited by Ersel Aydinli & James N. Rosenau 
117 Evangelista, Matthew. Law, ethics, and the war on terror. London: Polity Press, 2008 




and cost overruns…a direct causal linkage to expansion of their use after 9/11 cannot be 
established.119 
 
PMSCs became part and parcel of the security relationships even with parts of the world that 
the U.S. had considered only of marginal strategic security interest such as Africa120. Africa had 
a strategic significance in the pre-9/11 period. Al-Qaeda first attack against the United States 
occurred in Somalia against the US-led humanitarian mission in the 1990s.121  Yet, post 9/11 
counter-terrorism policies led to new security arrangements being forged (Factor D1)122. 
 
The war effort in Iraq had a greater influence on the sector, (Factor E). It led to extensive 
overseas recruitment for PMSCs; enlistment developed, was opposed and other times aided 
by government laissez faire (Factor E1)123. Historically, few international problems were 
caused by foreign enlistment but contestation of this process occurred in Africa where it ran 
counter domestic laws in several countries.124 The phenomenon of TCN was almost entirely 
driven by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. No more than twenty-four percent of U.S. contractor 
employees in Iraq and Afghanistan were actually U.S. citizens.125  
 
                                                          
119 Burk, James, ed. How 9/11 changed our ways of war. Stanford University Press, 2013. 
120 Oyebade 2014; Branch 2011; cf. Part III  
121 P. Pham in H. Solomon. p.7 Then, more known perhaps, are bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar el Salaam in 1998. 
122 Notably, the U.S. has developed various counterterrorism initiatives involving the African Union (AU) and groups of selected states: the 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCP), the successor to the Pan-Sahel Initiative, and the Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative. Also, 
in 2008, the overall U.S. military activities in the continent coalesced into a full military command known as AFRICOM 
123 See Chapter 6 
124 Cf. Chapter 6. Several countries banned recruitment altogether. Percy writes that, the overseas recruitment of British and US PMSCs was 
not considered problematic for Western policymakers. Neutrality laws have never banned foreign enlistment. As Percy explains, the ‘real 
purpose of the neutrality laws was to prohibit the commission of unauthorized acts of war by individuals within their countries. (Percy, Op. 
Cit.) 
125 Schooner, Steven L., and Collin D. Swan. "Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity." 
Journal of National Security Law & Policy (2012). U.S. Commission on Wartime Contracting, in its February 2011 Interim Report to Congress 




Last but not least, and quite independently of non-state violence and counter-terrorism 
policies, Somali piracy spurred a unique demand for PMSCs (Factor F). Coupled with naval 
patrols, the use of security teams on board ship to counter pirates became an established 
practice securitize the Horn of Africa.126 More liberal preferences developed. In Spain, where 
the government authorized and subsidized the fishing industry’s use of PMSCs; in Iran, the 
world’s fourth largest tanker operator, Iranian NITC, deployed armed security on board 
ships.127; a Chinese shipping firm allocated hired a British PMSC for a fleet of 80 ships.128  
The strategy was highly successful in protecting trade in an economy that relies heavily on 
transportation of goods by means of international waters.  Pirates expelled, commerce 
restored.129 Not a single pirate attack was successful on ships with armed guards on board.130 
The United Nations specialized body, the I.M.O., eventually issued guidance to organize the 
practice.131 While this activity represent a smaller share than the market on land132, one firm 
forecasts the global maritime security market to grow from $13.94 billion in 2014 to $20.87 
billion in 2019133. However, this increase in contracting creates present challenges for domestic 
regulation with the example of the floating armories- part storage depot, part housing for PMSCs- 
which by being positioned in high-risk areas of international waters could be targets for attack 
or circumvent national laws limiting the import and export of weapons 134 (Factor F1).  
                                                          
126 Note that earlier, pirate attacks in the Malacca Strait between 1999 and 2005 led to the first antipiracy services in this waterway but the 
practice did not become established until later. See Chapter 7 
127 Cullen, Patrick, and Claude Berube, eds. Maritime private security: market responses to piracy, terrorism and waterborne security risks in the 21st century. 
Routledge, 2012: 32 
128 Berube and Cullen, p.6 
129 It was the imperial motto chosen for the Bahamas in 1718 and it originates from the elimination of piracy by Governor Rogers. However, 
Storr argues when Rogers expelled the seafaring pirates from the Bahamas, commerce was not restored, other forms of piracy thrived. Storr, 
Virgil Henry. Enterprising slaves & master pirates: Understanding economic life in the bahamas. Peter Lang, 2004. 
130 Private security on board ships was part of a large set of measures to prevent attacks; cf. Chap. Seven 
131 Author’s Interviews, June, 2015; Cf. Chapter Seven 
132 Cullen and Berube, Op. Cit. 
133 http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/maritime-security-market-1033.html Accessed April 8, 2015. At a Compound 
Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 8.4% from 2014 to 2019 




































1.1 Content and significance  
 
The Swiss initiative produced the Montreux Document, a non-binding legal tool divided into 
two main parts136. Both parts examine the hard and soft law relevant to the three categories of 
states implicated by PMSCs’ activities: contracting states, territorial states, and home states. 
Contracting states are states that directly contract for the services of PMSCs; territorial states 
are states on whose territory PMSCs operate; home states are states of nationality of a PMSC, 
i.e. where a PMSC is registered or incorporated.137 
 
The Document stresses that the 73 ‘‘good practices’’ contained in the Document “may lay the 
foundations for further practical regulation of PMSCs through contracts, codes of conduct, 
national legislation, regional instruments and international standards138. The preface of the 
Document makes it clear that the PMSCs norms are not limited to armed conflict settings and 
                                                          
135 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the APSA-ISA Security Conference, Austin (TX), July 2014 
136 The first one “recall(s) existing legal obligations of states and PMSCs and their personnel”, and the second one “provide(s) states with 
good practices to promote compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law during armed conflict (part two).” Montreux 
Document, preface, para 2. 
137 Montreux Document, preface, para. 9. 
138 White, N. D. (2011). “The Privatisation of Military and Security Functions and Human Rights: Comments on the UN Working Group’s 




not exclusively applicable to states.139 This is significant because PMSCs continue to be used 
in both international and non-international armed conflicts, but also in a wide variety of 
contexts, many of which are not armed conflicts. 
 
Cockayne writes that “given the uncertainty around the US position on such issues . . ., this 
was no small achievement. Indeed, one US government participant (called it) ‘a significant 
achievement of historic importance’”140. By reaffirming that International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law apply during armed conflict and that states have an 
obligation to ensure respect for them, the Montreux Document “clearly addressed the 
prevailing concern at the time that PMSCs operated in a potential legal vacuum.”141  
 
The Document encourages cooperation between states in implementation, suggesting that the 
realization of the Document’s aims will be an ongoing process.142 Naturally, part of that 
cooperation includes working with PMSCs.143 
 
1.2 Origins 
In the Swiss initiative, the idea of neutral humanitarianism, advanced by ICRC through its 
reflections and quiet advocacy, had two ideational components. Taken together these ideas, 
which have historically served as “focal points” across a number of policy arenas, provide an 
explanation of the early preference formation in this issue-area. The first idea is 
                                                          
139 The Montreux Document, U.N. doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636, at Preface ¶¶ 5 & 8 (2008) available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc  
140 Cockayne, Op.Cit, p. 401  
141 The concern had been raised by Singer: P. Singer, ‘War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law’, 
42 Columbia JTL (2004) p. 521. representatives of private military companies do not seem concerned that their employees are at any risk of 
prosecution under the treaty: ‘Industry analysts have found that the Convention, which lacks any monitoring mechanism, has merely added 
a number of vague, almost impossible to prove, requirements that all must be met before an individual can be termed a mercenary and few 
consequences thereafter. 
142 The Montreux Document, U.N. doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636, at Preface ¶ 6 (2008) available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc  




humanitarianism; the second is neutrality. I shall look at how each component relate to PMSCs 
norms. 
 
On the one hand, using humanitarianism in international security derived legitimacy from an 
accepted conventional understanding that in fields like disarmament, the banning of entire 
categories of conventional weapons was carried out on humanitarian ideals144. Borrie writes 
that: 
 
Where limited progress in the disarmament and arms control domain has been achieved over the 
last decade, it tends to have been accompanied by humanitarian approaches, with assistance from 
international organizations, field-based practitioners, academic researchers and transnational civil 
society. 
 
Second, the conception of PMSCs norms has been shaped by the neutrality of a state—
Switzerland- and an organization—ICRC.  
 
In the past, the practical development of the concept of neutrality allowed defining the 
problem of mercenarism as one where the state has a responsibility for the actions of its 
subjects or citizens. Thomson explained the problem as the result of “unintended and 
undesirable consequences for interstate politics”145 and a problem that came from the supply 
                                                          
144 Borrie, John, and Vanessa Martin Randin. Disarmament as humanitarian action: from perspective to practice. (United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research, 2006); Borrie, John. Unacceptable harm: A history of how the treaty to ban cluster munitions was won. (United Nations 
Publications UNIDIR, 2009).  
145 Thomson 1990:55. Authorizing non state violence in the international system served states interests but came with unintended 
consequences both for privateering, mercenaries, mercantile companies. Cf. Thomson, Chapter 3. For a critique of this approach, cf. Percy 
(2007) where she contends that one of the central problems with Thomson's neutrality-as-control-mechanism argument is that even in states 




side rather than the demand side: “a state that allowed its citizens or subjects to serve in a 
belligerent’s military could not claim neutrality”.146 
 
The argument that I develop has continuity and differences vis-à-vis Thomson’s argument. 
The mechanisms of sovereignty and neutrality remain foundational to order in the 
international system. However, while in the seventeenth century externalities were raised from 
the supply side rather than the demand side, the current externalities originate both in the 
supply and demand sides.  
 
On the one hand, on the demand side, abuses in the use of contractors led the United States 
to be involved in the Swiss initiative from the start, using it to inform domestic policy. On the 
other hand, on the supply side, neutral states like Switzerland identify the liability of being 
used as a base for activities in foreign conflict and crisis regions, a point to which I return 
below. It is the driver of state sovereignty that prompted Swiss foreign policy to join in with 
ICRC and press on for the initiative to be signed and accepted. Further, foreign enlistment 
created externalities to countries where Third Country Nationals were recruited.147 
 
 
Table 1: Externalities in Historical Perspective 
 Origin of Externality 
Century Supply Demand 
XVIIth-XVIIIth 
Individuals (mercenaries) could 
start wars 
None 
                                                          
146 Thomson 1990:59 
 





Contractors can compromise 
neutrality of home states; break 
domestic laws of (some) 
territorial states  
Poor control of contractors can 
lessen military effectiveness of 




1.2.1 Actors  
 
The process tracing of the Swiss initiative must necessarily start with the identification of the 
actors that are involved- i.e. the Swiss state and the two non-state actors. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (from now ICRC) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (from now DCAF), were the only non-state organizations present 
from the inception of the Swiss initiative. The DCAF is an international foundation established 
in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss Confederation with the aim of improving security sector 
governance through security sector reform.  
 
The definition of ICRC is more complex and more important for the purposes of this article. 
2013 marked the 150th anniversary of the creation of the ‘International Committee for Aid to 
Wounded Soldiers’ by Henry Dunant and four others. The committee, later to become the 
ICRC, adopted the first Geneva Convention in 1864.  
 
From a policy perspective, the ICRC is part of a complex organization with, on the one hand, 




as a private national organization in Switzerland sets its own global foreign policy.”148 ICRC 
claims to act for the advance of human dignity and in the name of humanity. It also claims to 
be impartial, in the sense of responding to human suffering regardless of nationality, religion 
or any other human characteristics.  
 
On the other hand, from a legal point of view, ICRC is an ordinary association under Swiss 
private law. Its private nature and its uniform nationality guarantee its independence vis-à-vis 
other States, and ensure the neutrality without which it could not operate. This also applies to 
the Swiss State, in whose neutrality the ICRC is generally embedded—without, however, being 
dependent on that State. Rather, both sides insist on strictly observing this independence 
irrespective of actual proximity.149 Furthermore, the humanitarian conventions to which the ICRC has 
actively contributed ever since its founding recognize its role, and invest it with specific assignments with the 




1.2.2 Norms: First Stage of the Initiative 
 
The first seeds of the Swiss Initiative can be found in ideas and norms, not in states interests. 
In the next two sections I show how the difficulty of the Swiss initiative lay in overcoming 
                                                          
148 ICRC is part of an organization, the International Red Cross, which consists of three components: the national societies, the International Federation of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It is a complex, hybrid NGO, as there is a NGO within a NGO (the 
Federation) and a transnational organization (the ICRC), which as a private national organization in Switzerland, sets a global foreign policy. Routledge History 
of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day. P.54 
149 Probst R. (1989) P. 125  




diverging state interests—between states wielding the most power in that market, the United 
States, and host states that had none.  
 
At the origin of the Swiss initiative is a document discussed within the ICRC in 2004.151 Neutral 
humanitarianism embodied by ICRC drove the first phase of negotiation. It is an idea defined 
as an impartial, independent, neutral approach that operates in peace and war, and that can be 
tied to various laws or be conducted on the basis of a-legal pragmatism.  
 
The document was presented at the annual international conference of ICRC in 2004; it 
claimed that: “armed forces rely more and more both on civilians, with tasks that used to be 
strictly military, and on private security firms. This change is calling into question the accepted 
categories of actors in armed conflict.”152  
 
These questions led to a further reflection and eventually a special edition of the scholarly 
journal of ICRC.153 The articles in the special edition suggested several important points: first, 
that the usefulness of the criteria for being a mercenary is limited; second, that human rights 
concerns are less likely to be about whether an individual fulfills the criteria for being a mercenary and 
more likely to be focused on issues of corporate accountability, contract law and individual criminal responsibility 
under the laws of armed conflict, as Clapham writes.154 Third, another approach is to think about how 
private military companies may trigger state responsibility under international law.155 
 
                                                          
151 CICR, Rapport pour la XXVIII conference international de la Croix-ROUGE et du Croissant Rouge, Geneve, Decembre 2003, RICR 
152 CICR, Rapport pour la XXVIII conference international de la Croix-ROUGE et du Croissant Rouge, Geneve, Decembre 2003, RICR, 
March 2004, p.249. Author’s translation. These are deliberative rather than operational meetings that take place every four years. 
153 International Review of the Red Cross. Volume 88, Issue 863, Private Military Companies - 01 September 2006 





It was pragmatic neutral humanitarianism, presumably severed from nationalism and national 
interests, which led the ICRC to launch a series of expert meetings to clarify the notion of 
direct participation in hostilities.156 “Direct participation” by civilians in combat erodes PMSCs 
protection against being targeted. It may also make them liable for criminal prosecution if 
captured. Determining status and what constitutes “direct participation” in conflict were 
problematic, however, and state actors and the ICRC did not always agree on how to interpret 
International Humanitarian Law’s guidelines. The “Interpretative Guidance on the notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law”, published a year 








The Swiss Federal government considered the appropriateness and potential of new 
international, binational and supranational initiatives.158 It claimed that to date, there had been no 
                                                          
156 Available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf, last accessed September 20th 2014 
157 The status of the personnel of private security and military contractors in armed conflict situations is to be determined by International Humanitarian Law on a 
case by-case basis, with particular regard to the nature and circumstances of the functions in which they are involved. However, there is a presumption that personnel 
of PMSCs are protected as civilians under IHL unless they are incorporated. In Williamson, Jamie A. "Challenges of Twenty-First Century Conflicts: A 
Look at Direct Participation in Hostilities." Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 20 (2009). P. 465. One of the criticism can be found in Watkin, Kenneth. 
"Opportunity lost: organized armed groups and the ICRC direct participation in hostilities interpretive guidance." NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 42 
(2009): 641. For a response, cf. Melzer, Nils. "Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques 
of the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities." NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 42 (2009): 831. 
158 Report by the Swiss Federal Council on Private Security and Military Companies, December 2005 p. 57. Employees of private security 
companies had been among those participating in those human rights violations. Available at: 
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/national_regulations/countries/europe/switzerland/report_swiss_2005_private-security-and-




forum to bring parties together to discuss approaches to the establishment of both 
international and national standards.  
 
This was only partly true. As a matter of fact, the African Union (AU) had just convened a 
meeting of experts to review the organization’s legal instruments, including the 1977 Anti-
Mercenary Convention.159 However, it was not a ‘forum to discuss approaches;’ the A.U. was 
interested in seeking to control conventional ‘mercenaries’ of the type highlighted by the 2004 
coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea160.  
 
In 2005, the UN also started to re-engage in this process from a clean slate. With the 
establishment of a second Special Rapporteur on the Use of Mercenaries, and then, of a new Working 
Group that succeeded the mandate of the Special Rapporteur. The UN stopped assuming 
PMSCs and mercenaries were one and the same.  
 
In the decisive year of 2005, the Swiss initiative had also come to the conclusion that the 
available conventions and protocols regarding mercenarism would suffice, and secondly that 
PMSCs were corporate entities. This was no easy step. From the intitiative’s inception, in fact, 
the textbooks in preliminary meetings could make a reference to private firms only via the 
concept term of mercenarism. The subtle and crucial juncture occurred and is described by 
Blamond: “in the ‘ouvrage de réference’, Sassoli and Bouvier- ‘Un droit dans la guerre?’- 
security firms are not present in the index and are not referred to, except by way of a reference 
to mercenarism.”161  
                                                          
159 This presented an opportunity for the AU to simultaneously address the challenges posed by PMSCs in the region (Gumedze, 2011) 
160 Cf. Chapter on South Africa 
161 Balmond, L., p115, fn 6. The full citation is Sassoli and Bouvier, “Un droit dans la guerre?” CICR, Geneve, 2003. This work does not appear, 






Swiss Domestic Politics 
 
In 2005, the crucial shift occurred and humanitarian concerns and preoccupations with 
International Humanitarian Law were no longer the sole drivers of the initiative. When the 
Swiss diplomacy initiated the intergovernmental consultation, with the cooperation of ICRC, 
it prioritized its own national security preoccupations—i.e. “the issue of private security 
companies that could use Switzerland as their base for activities in foreign conflict and crisis 
regions.”162  
 
On the one hand, the first motivation stressed the need to ensure the safety of citizens abroad, 
particularly in conflict zones; Switzerland must “itself on occasion have recourse to the 
services of private security companies.” Similar strategic interests are found in the second 
motivation: “Switzerland has an interest not to be used as a base for illegal or dubious 
operations abroad” and the government should respond to charges that “private military or 
security companies active in conflict zones could be operating from within Switzerland.” Thus, 
even if normative foundations are still mentioned, the Swiss initiative had already become an 
amalgam of priorities.163 
 
                                                          
https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/topics/Comprehensive-bibliography-private-military-and-security-
companies_en.pdf, Accessed January 18, 2015 
162 The report found only some evidence. In the Basel region, three licensed companies known to be operating in war zones or crisis areas. 
Another private security company domiciled in canton Ticino made an unsolicited offer for its services to the Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs while operating from Ticino without a license, according to the cantonal authorities.  
The company elected domicile in Ticino as a way of gilding its image (Swiss neutrality). Report by the Swiss Federal Council on Private 
Security and Military Companies, December 2005.  
163 The implementation and, where necessary, the development of international law, especially human rights and international humanitarian law, is among 




In fact, the 2004 coup in Equatorial Guinea had involved a partly Swiss-owned firm and some 
employees were arrested in Zimbabwe.164 The coup created the impression that PMSCs were 
really able to act as a conduit for mercenaries of the old-fashioned kind: the mercenaries 
involved were mostly former PMSCs personnel and some were still employed by a PMSC as 
in the case of two employees of the company Meteoric Tactical Systems providing security to 
diplomats of Western Embassies in Baghdad-among whom the Ambassador of Switzerland.165  
 
Closer to the U.N. evolving policy position, Del Prado stated that: “Equatorial Guinea is a 
clear example of the link between the phenomenon of mercenaries and PMSCs as a means of 
violating the sovereignty of states.”166 
 
Thus, during the second stage of the Swiss initiative, ideals and state interests became fused. 
From 2005, one could presume a cooptation of the Swiss initiative. Switzerland as neutral state 
had a specific state interest—i.e. restraining other states and private individuals from using its 
territory and resources for hostile purposes.  
 
Final stage: Montreux and the ICoC 
In September 2008, the Swiss initiative produced the Montreux Document. Firms agreed to 
the ICoC and a governing Association of states and firms was created, called the Montreux 
Document Forum167. The Code consists of seventy articles that encompass a wide range of 
                                                          
164 Roberts, The Wonga Coup, 144  
165 Working Group, Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10293&LangID=E#sthash.XLNljEb1.dpuf  
166 Presentation given by Gomez del Prado in Geneva on November 3, 2010. Available at: http://truth-
out.org/archive/component/k2/item/93553:beyond-wikileaks-the-privatization-of-war Accessed January 8th 2015. Also in: Gómez del 
Prado, José L. "A UN Convention to regulate PMSCs?." Criminal Justice Ethics 31.3 (2012): 262-286 




obligations firms must meet, including the respect of human rights principles, for example the 
prohibition of torture, discrimination, human trafficking and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.168 
The negotiation of the ICoC was itself long and complex and is the result of a split in the 
negotiation.169 While these standards are part of the regime complex described in chapter four, 
all have a more limited focus in the Montreux Document. Indeed, companies that maintain 




1.3 Argument in Historical Perspective  
 
 1.3.1 The Soft Power of Institutions  
 
As mentioned at the beginning, Thomson described the contract system as a problem of state 
control, one that spurred “unintended and undesirable consequences for interstate politics”. 
States had to make individuals accountable under their jurisdiction or be drawn into other 
states’ wars. In the Middle Ages, the condotta or contract system allowed nobles and cities to 
hire private soldiers, while the Chartered Companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries often employed military and police capacities. Thomson writes that sovereignty and 
                                                          
168 ICoC, § 35 on torture, ICoC, § 42 on discrimination, ICoC, § 39 on human trafficking 
169 Whereas the Montreux Document refers throughout to ‘Private Military and Security Companies’ (PMSCs). The ICoC adopts the term 
Private Security Companies and other Private Security Service Providers (collectively, PSCs). It generally aims to avoid association with 




neutrality became the mechanism to control and eliminate the externalities of non-state 
violence.  
 
The U.S. Neutrality Act of 1794 was the defining moment for the notion of neutrality and the 
control of mercenarism.170 Violation of the obligation of neutrality, through permitting the 
recruitment or enlistment of mercenaries within one’s national territory with the purpose of 
armed activity in another state, was deemed to constitute an act of belligerence. This practice 
was eventually codified into the Hague Convention. 
 
Switzerland’s foreign policy has been characterized by neutrality as a permanent feature since 
1515, a status that was internationally recognized with the Vienna Congress in 1815.171 In this 
spirit, the coherence and significance of the Swiss initiative should be noted. Switzerland 
means to control PMSCs on its territory, and aims at not being “used as a base for illegal or 
dubious operations abroad” to protect its respectability and neutrality.172  
 
In contrast to Thomson’s description, it was not only the inter-state system that proposed 
rules and practices for PMSCs governance but the neutrality of an international organization. 
The ICRC, the guardian of the Geneva Convention, gave the traction. ICRC’s often stated 
claim that the Montreux Document has a purely humanitarian purpose cannot distract from 
the motivations of state control.  
 
                                                          
170 The Act remains in force and the U.S. government has recently enforced it in Africa, in the Gambia, in December 2014; cf. 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-defendant-charged-violating-neutrality-act-planning-and-participating-plot-overthrow ).  
171 Before the Vienna Congress, since the defeat in the Battle of Marignano in 1515 and in particular since the Thirty Years War in the 17th 
century.  




A combination of states’ interests, norms and institutions existed. Certainly, Switzerland had 
built stronger networks and historical credentials by hosting and providing judges for ad hoc 
courts.173 It frequently represented other states with “protective power mandates”.174 
Nonetheless, the seal of the ICRC strengthened the Montreux Document in an extraordinary 
way. Avant that: “The US government . . . saw the legitimacy that the ICRC, the Swiss and 
DCAF had as crucial to the success of the governance initiative. They draw sharp contrasts 
between what they say were poor decisions to use hard power to generate unilateral rules (such 
as the infamous CPA Order #17) and current choices to throw their influence behind 
processes that are seen as more legitimate and representative.”175  
 
The ICRC was the indispensable institutional pillar, unlike other an inter-state organizations, 
such as those that eventually signed the Montreux Document- the European Union, The 
North Atlantic Treaty, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.  
 
Subsection 1.3.2 Neutrality in Comparative Perspective  
 
Before analyzing some difficulties in the Swiss initiative, two examples are useful to illustrate 
how the challenges of neutrality increase at moments of historical juncture—be it the rise of 
fascism, decolonization, the end of the Cold War, or the post-9/11 political climate.  
 
The first episode is the Italo-Ethiopian conflict (1935-1936). During the war, members of the 
ICRC often held or exhibited pro-Italian sympathies, and eventually the ICRC as an 
                                                          
173 Most famously in 1872 in the Alabama case between the U.S. and Great Britain 
174 Since the Franco Prussian war , these engagements peaked during World War II when Switzerland held over 200. In Graf, Andreas, and 
David Lanz. "Conclusions: Switzerland as a paradigmatic case of small-state peace policy?." Swiss Political Science Review 19.3 (2013): 410-423. 




organization leaned towards the Italian fascists.176 Another historical example is the Nigerian 
civil war—a context where the ICRC swayed inadvertently towards Biafran independence. The 
problem for the ICRC in Biafra was not encouraging compliance with the law of war, but 
providing enough relief supplies to prevent starvation.177 Yet, the Biafran leaders’ manipulation 
of the relief effort178 led to the expulsion of the ICRC representative.179 As Forsythe writes, 
the ICRC performed so poorly that its neutrality was compromised; “more Biafra would have 
led to the demise of the organization.”180 
 
These examples illustrate both the challenges for the organization and the fluidity of the 
concept of neutrality in the operational context. Arguably, it is perhaps only political neutrality 
that ICRC can aspire to.181 The challenge to maintain neutrality is higher at points of juncture—
and during these moments of transition some slips may occur.182 A closed-mouth 
interpretation of neutrality has been rejected by the many organizations that favored other 
humanitarian philosophies and an ethical obligation towards on speaking out.183  
                                                          
176 Baudendistel R. Between Bombs and Good Intentions: The Red Cross and The Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1936. (Routledge, 2006) 
 Further lack of neutrality was demonstrated when the ICRC conducted an investigation of the bombing of Red Cross hospitals in the field. 
177 Nigerian federal government issued a code of conduct to its soldiers which required that Biafran prisoners be 'treated as prisoners of war'. Instructions were given 
on the protection of civilians, mosques, churches, foreigners and private property. Foreign mercenaries, however, were 'not to be spared'. The Red Cross (ICRC) made 
fairly regular visits to detainees held by the government. (Forsythe, D. P. Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977) On the famine intervention, cf. Chandler, David G. "The road to military humanitarianism: how the 
human rights NGOs shaped a new humanitarian agenda." Human rights quarterly 23.3 (2001): 678-700. After some limited involvement at the 
beginning of the war, Biafra became the ICRC's first large-scale relief operation 
178 counting on the “reluctance of Lagos to attack the night-time weapons flights for fear of hitting Red Cross planes in the process. Forsythe 
2005:66 
179 A shooting incident caused the ICRC to pay closer attention to the Fourth Geneva convention and its Article 23 (…) and that the established government in 
a civil war had the legal right to set the terms for inspection for relief flights into the secessionist area. in Forsythe, D. P. Humanitarian Politics: The International 
Committee of the Red Cross. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977). p. 192. For a full account of ICRC work during the Nigerian 
civil war, cf. pp.180-196 
180 Forsythe 2013. He cites three main “blots on the record” of neutrality: conservatism and racism against Ethiopia during the Italian invasion; 
cooperation with the Nazis that prevented a discreet diplomacy in favor of the Jews during the genocide; the tilt towards Biafra during 
Nigerian civil war. 
181 For a critique, cf. Franke, Mark FN. "Responsible Politics of the Neutral: Rethinking International Humanitarianism in the Red Cross 
Movement via the Philosophy of Roland Barthes." Journal of International Political Theory 6.2 (2010): 142-160. ICRC’s commitment to neutrality 
leads it to a broad yet significant political partiality and, thus, a highly politicised role in international conflict. (…) The irresponsibility to these terms is rooted well 
within ICRC’s simultaneous admission to being politically involved and interested in its support for humanity, while assuming that humanity itself can serve as an 
apolitical guide to such action. It presents an acknowledged political humanitarianism while taking the position that the ground of this work, humanity, is itself 
neutral.  
182 The perception of bias made the ICRC’s relationship with most communist countries difficult throughout the Cold War. ..Is this the same pattern we will see in 
the War on Terrorism? If this pattern is repeated the ICRC must understand the limits of its neutrality, and further should understand how it is perceived and adapt 
to these circumstances. Forsythe. Op. Cit. 





I have thus outlined one factor that may have directly affected the neutrality of ICRC vis-à-vis 
the Swiss initiative—the changes post-9/11; a second one has an indirect effect—the shifting 
foreign policy of Switzerland.  
Over the years, Switzerland shifted away from an isolationist interpretation of neutrality184 and 
the traditional asymmetry in Switzerland integration to the world was greatly reduced. In 2002, 
Switzerland became a full member of the UN;185 it started to participate to military 
peacemaking, and two rounds of bilateral agreements with the EU constituted a major step 
towards European integration.186 
  
The neutrality of ICRC depends upon its relationship to Switzerland at the functional and 
symbolic level. On the one hand, the very name and emblem depended on the founders’ choice 
of the cross as a symbol—it was the reverse of the Swiss flag and a well-recognized symbol of 
neutrality in Europe in 1864187. On the other hand, the administration of ICRC depends upon 
a president who is generally a former Swiss diplomat188 and the single nationality, Swiss, of the 
ICRC Assembly.189  
 
                                                          
184 Goetschel, Laurent. 2013. 
185 For a table of the integration of Switzerland in the UN system, cf. Gabriel and Fischer, 2003, pp. 55-6 
186 Kriesi and Trechsel (2008) 
187 The current symbol comprises the symbols of the Red Cross, the Red Crescent and the Red Crystal. The latter was added as an additional 
symbol with equal status with a third additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions in 2005. The Red Crescent had been formally recognized 
in 1929 
188 Although they have all been chosen and co-opted by the ICRC. Further, they have not been seconded to Geneva by Bern. They have all 
given up their position in the Swiss administration, except in one case during the 1940s. Gasser in Gabriel and Fischer , P.121 




Thus, post-9/11 changes challenged the modus operandi of ICRC and its neutral Swiss ground 
shifted. Yet the force of neutral humanitarianism could be reliant on its institutionalization 
and was able to function with political and bureaucratic autonomy.  
 
 
Subsection 1.3.3 Neutrality in Action: between Pro and Anti-Americanism 
 
The Swiss initiative succeeded in keeping major powers at the negotiating table even if the 
U.S. had no interest in international regulation.  
 
The most direct externalities for states could be framed in terms of national interest and the 
military ineffectiveness of contractors. The problem of military effectiveness is shown in table 
1 as a possible externality for contracting states. Molly Dunigan’s study showed that armed 
security contractors tend to decrease effectiveness in situations of co-deployment with the 
military due to a combination of structural, identity and ethical issues. The effect may be 
different, she wrote, when PMSCs are deployed to support a host nation force.190  
 
Thus, military effectiveness could have shaped U.S. national interests or alternatively, a 
concern for efficiency. The Commission on Wartime Contracting, established by Congress in 
2008, found that up to $60 billion- or about one of three dollars spent—was lost to waste or 
fraud. Either framing would not suggest any substantial relevance for international reform.  
 
                                                          




However, observers recall that while the US did not join the process to develop regulations, 
preferences changed along the way: “during the multi-stakeholder processes (...) there was 
demand for US regulators to “do something” from Congress, new ideas about what the US 
might do emerged from its interactions with others”.191 
 
The following narrative emphasizes two legitimacy aspects of the institutional brokerage by 
the proponents of the Swiss initiative: the first at the domestic level, the second at the global 
level. Each shows that institutionalized neutrality was able to affect the United States— “the 
800 pound gorilla in the room.”192 They also show the delicate balance that ICRC sought to 
maintain, as well as the attacks sustained by ICRC—not by the Swiss government—as it 
defended neutral humanitarianism. 
 
ICRC under attack 
The first feature in the orchestration of the Swiss initiative is that ICRC opposed certain 
aspects of U.S. policy and arose to the status of a potentially anti-American institution. In the 
midst of growing polarization in world politics, the perceived association between anti-
Americanism and opposition to U.S. policy did not mean that anti-Americanism had anything 
to do with ICRC advocacy.193  
 
As far as the Swiss initiative went, the ICRC, more than the Swiss government, was taking the 
heat.194 The ICRC was not anti-American; yet, it came to be antagonized because of the 
                                                          
191 Instead, US preferences for this approach to regulation emerged during these multi-stakeholder processes. Though there was demand for US regulators to “do 
something” from Congress, new ideas about what the US might do emerged from its interactions with others. Avant 2014, forthcoming 
192 Avant 2012 
193 Katzenstein, and Keohane, eds. Anti-Americanisms in world politics (Cornell University Press, 2007). The authors define Anti-Americanism 
as a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general. p. 275. For a review of the main 
definitions, cf. Chiozza (2009) Anti-Americanism and the American World Order, ch. 2. 




criticisms towards detention at Guantanamo, which led to a position paper in U.S. policy 
circles that advocated a restructuring of the ICRC.195  
 
Despite the spread of anti-American views, the extent of U.S. collaboration with multilateral 
fora intensified greatly. Cooperation in counterterrorism and security with the U.N., NATO 
and at the G8 summit meetings increased; partnerships with organizations such as the World 
Bank and the IMF remained intact.196 Anti-Americanism did not prevent the signing of the 
ICC treaty either.197 Nor did it influence the ICRC. Yet, a bias developed towards the ICRC. 
Here again, Forsythe’s account is illuminating: 
 
Clearly there was a determined effort in some American political circles to discredit the ICRC, 
despite the fact that historically it had been widely recognized as mostly neutral and certainly 
discreet. During the Cold War if it had strayed from neutrality in places like Korea and 
Southeast Asia it had tilted toward the West. 
 
The post-9/11 interventions blurred accepted distinctions and categories spurring questions 
on the applicability of International Humanitarian Law to armed conflict. Forsythe writes that 
the Bush administration saw International Humanitarian Law and the international 
organizations that sought to apply it, as in league with the enemy: “what others saw as normal 
defense of normal law . . ., some others saw as ‘lawfare’, the pursuit of an anti-American agenda 
by enemies. . . . The ICRC has become the leading practitioner of ‘lawfare.’198  
                                                          
195 The restructuring was highly unlikely since an all-Swiss Assembly contributes to the neutrality of the organization but the proposal was 
one of many frequent attacks . This paragraph draws from Forsythe, 2011: 165-6 
196 Katzenstein, and Keohane. P. 281, 283-6. Also: European governments not only declined to block the nomination of Paul Wolfowitz (often referred to as 
the architect of the Iraq War) but expressed considerable support for him before his official selection. P. 288 
197 Kelley 2005 in Katzenstein, and Keohane 
198 Forsythe. D.P. The politics of prisoner abuse: The United States and enemy prisoners after 9/11. Cambridge University Press, 2011) p.164. He adds, 





‘Lawfare’ was initially conceived as a neutral term and defined as a strategy of using—or 
misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective. 
The re-invention of the meaning of the term, alternative to its original neutral characterization, 
brought forward opposing academic camps trying to recapture its meaning.199 It is in the 
context of these diverging ‘ideas about war’ that the first meeting of experts takes place. The 
U.S. representative calls into question the authority of International Humanitarian Law:  
 
I see a danger … in frequent reference to the law of war relating to international armed conflict, 
either as the applicable law or the law to which PMC/PSC should be trained. … We need to 
avoid establishing the law of war as the proper reference point, given that in all likelihood 99% 
of PMC/PSC employment occurs outside the major combat operations phase of international 
armed conflict.200 
 
The applicability of the International Humanitarian Law to terrorism would entrench the idea 
that armed conflict is normal and routine. “If efforts to combat terrorism in general always 
involve armed conflict, then it is a conflict with no boundaries in time or space. It takes place 
everywhere, has no logical culmination and irrevocably blurs the distinction between civilian 
and combatant that is so important to the Geneva convention”.201  
 
                                                          
and South American allies and the human rights industry that supported their universal jurisdiction aspirations. Rumsfeld saw this form of lawfare as a potentially 
powerful check on American military power 
199 For a review, cf. Scharf, Michael, and Elizabeth Andersen. "Is Lawfare Worth Defining-Report of the Cleveland Experts Meeting-
September 11, 2010." Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 43 (2010): 11.  
200 Records of the first meeting of experts (January 2006), W. Hays Park, The Perspective of Contracting and “Headquarters” States, available at: 
https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/topics/Presentation-perspective-of-contracting-headquarters-states_en.pdf, 
Accessed 20 November 2014 
 




In this sense, Cockayne wrote that the Montreux Document was an achievement as a 
reaffirmation by the United States, of the applicability of International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law to contemporary armed conflict, “given the uncertainty 
around the US position on such issues between 2003 and 2008”.202 The Swiss initiative was 
indeed signed and the Montreux Document informed the U.S. reform process and contributed 
to the growing global standards reflected in a “web of regulatory interaction which is American 
power at work, but power bound to general principles and processes.”203  
 
Ambiguity and risks for ICRC 
There was an opposite risk to being perceived as anti-American—i.e. that support to the Swiss 
initiative, outside of U.S. domestic politics, may have been perceived as a contribution to 
legitimate the U.S. interventions. ICRC could have been perceived as helping normalize 
contracting practices in the war effort; and second, as supporting—albeit indirectly—a mostly 
Western industry. Indeed, for ICRC, it “was by no means certain,” as Cockayne writes, “that 
it would serve as a driver of intergovernmental discussion on a topic with as controversial a 
history as the ‘mercenary issue.’”  
 
There are three points to this argument. First, the participation of ICRC to an initiative of 
regulation like the Montreux Document had few antecedents, as Cockayne himself 
acknowledges: “despite the sui generis roles of the ICRC as the guardian of International 
Humanitarian Law and the Swiss Federation as the Depository of the Geneva Conventions, 
such a cooperative initiative in fact had few precedents. 204  
                                                          
202 Cockayne, Op.Cit., p. 401. One US government participant in the process pronounced the Montreux Document ‘a significant achievement of historic 
importance’  
203 Avant, 2012 





In general, the ICRC preferred the role of passive observer—rather than active participant—
in intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder discussions, as in the case of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, and more recently, the Arms Trade Treaty.205  
 
Second, it is noted that since 2001 the ICRC had been an observer of the Voluntary Principles 
on Human Rights and Security, an initiative meant to use soft law to clarify norms in the use of 
security by the extractive firms. At the inception, the ICRC had declined to participate 
formally206. Voillat writes: 
 
The ICRC did not wish to be a formal member of the Voluntary Principles: it considered 
that formal membership in an initiative that was constituted exclusively of Western 
governments, companies, and organisations was not suitable with regard to the institution’s 
principle of neutrality207. 
Further, and this is perhaps the most ambiguous aspect, the Swiss initiative came to indirectly 
include the active participation of the security industry, in a second stage.208 The ICoC 
originated in the withdrawal of the industry from the inter-state negotiations of the Swiss 
initiative, an event that had not been planned at the outset. The Swiss government, not the 
ICRC, convened the Code but ICRC welcomed nonetheless the ICoC “as an initiative aimed 
at ensuring adherence by PMSCs to recognized standards of International Humanitarian Law 
                                                          
205 An exception of active participation is the International Coalition for the Ban on Landmines. Concern with Anti-Personnel land mines 
initially grew out of work on humanitarian laws of conflict as carried out chiefly by the ICRC. Price, R. (1997:7) 
206 Inteviews with ICRC representatives, January 2014, Johannesburg and Geneva 
207 Voillat 2012: 1098 
208 This raised the risk that ICRC- or Switzerland- could be seen as contributing to legitimate PMSCs. The question may be settled only with 
time as the Montreux Document extends its membership or else remain confined to an almost exclusively Western initiative, as the Voluntary 
Principles, which indirectly supports a mostly Western industry. The Swiss initiative did not set out to be exclusively Western, nor did it set 




and human rights law, thereby contributing to the better protection of victims of armed 
conflict and situations of violence below that threshold.”209 
 
This story of the relationship between the ICRC and the United States shows the force of 
institutionalized ideas. Acting in the footsteps of Clara Burton, whose campaign for the 
Geneva Convention in post-Civil War Washington encountered infinite obstacles,210 the ICRC 
proposed an internationalist vision that survived strong attacks from domestic US groups, and 





This chapter outlined an ideational and institutional approach to the construction of PMSCs 
governance. Purely interest-based explanation cannot entirely explain the origins and 
outcomes of the Swiss initiative. Such explanations fail to account for variation in state 
behavior. Why was the U.S. government induced to collaborate to an initiative meant to 
contribute to the defense of humanitarian norms? As Avant writes: theories of hegemony are unable 
to explain why the US would (…) move from resisting to supporting governance in military and security 
services.211 Ideas as “focal points” can instead provide an explanation of regulation. As I have 
                                                          
209 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent (Geneva, 2011). P.35 Op. cit. 
210 Clara Burton, a helper during the Civil War, and the founder of the US Sanitary Commission and later of the American Red Cross, on 
how she campaigned for the US to sign the GC, cf. Jones, Marian Moser. The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal. JHU Press, 
2012. Ch. 2 
In the face of her first rejection, she introduced disaster relief as a component that could strike a chord in a country that did not face the 
dangers of perpetual war as European nations did. 
Robert Lincoln, son of slain president, gave in to Barton tenacious campaigning and the US eventually signed the GC in 1882 
that adhered to a strict interpretation of the Monroe doctrine and recoiled from any "entanglements" with foreign organizations p. 28 
 





shown, neutral humanitarianism in actors’ preferences and policy choices, helped inspire and 
constrain a range of a state’s foreign policy behaviors212.  
 
In fact, international organizations, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)213, were crucial in advancing the regulatory 
framework around PMSCs. No organization wanted to be driver of intergovernmental 
discussion on topics with contentious histories, like mercenarism or piracy. Yet, these complex 
International Organizations were capable of shaping some outcomes and preventing others. 
 
In historical perspective, the Swiss initiative tried to deal with some of the new “unintended 
and undesirable consequences” of non-state violence suggesting an analogy with Thompson’s 
described mechanism for the suppression of mercenaries and pirates practices of seventeenth 
century states. The analysis must be complemented since the Swiss initiative is probably better 
seen as originating in a mix of both demand and supply side externalities. On the one hand, on 
the demand side, the abuses in the use of contractors led U.S. policymakers to spearhead 
inquiries and to be involved in the Montreux process from the start, using it to inform their 
actions and eventually US regulation. “The Montreux language quickly took hold as the 
dominant frame for looking at PMSCs”214. On the other hand, on the supply side, neutral 
states like Switzerland risked being used a base for activities in foreign conflict and crisis 
regions.215 This was an important driver that prompted Swiss foreign policy to defend the 
country’s neutrality. 
                                                          
212 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, p. 24-26. I return to this point and I articulate this 
approach in full in chapter three 
213 Cf. Part II, chapter 5 
214 Avant, 2012, op. cit, p.34 
215 The report found only some evidence. In the Basel region, three licensed companies known to be operating in war zones or crisis areas. Another 
private security company domiciled in canton Ticino made an unsolicited offer for its services to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 




                                                          
The company elected domicile in Ticino as a way of gilding its image (Swiss neutrality). Report by the Swiss Federal Council on Private 
Security and Military Companies, December 2005.. Available at: 
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/national_regulations/countries/europe/switzerland/report_swiss_2005_private-security-and-













































This chapter traces this process that led to the proposed accommodation of private force with 
a Draft Convention. The United Nations preferences evolved independently of the Swiss 
initiative in spite of some interaction. An international treaty aimed at setting the highest 
standards for PMSCs eventually failed to gain support. I use narratives and tables to illustrate 
how the U.N. gradually shifted to accept a distinction between ‘mercenaries’ and PMSCs, and 
how the shift informed the Draft Convention. Choices were bounded by the highly 
institutionalized anti-mercenary norm; limited by the problem of naming the protean 
organizations increasingly known as PMSCs. Key events created continuity and change- the 









2.1 U.N. practices and policies 
 
2.1.1 Evolution of practices 
 
Significance  
In what follows, I distinguish analytically between the U.N.’s own use of PMSCs in operations 
and peacekeeping and the formal treaties and conventions that it has implemented or 
proposed, but I note the interactions between the two arenas. The question of U.N. practice 
is important because of the potential role in conveying legitimacy and standards. The U.N. 
employment of PMSCs can command market-power and shape global standards and 
regulations, especially if it decided to outsource more of its peacekeeping.216 On the other 
hand, the United Nations is the highest international body able to propose and create 
multilateral treaties.  
 
Demand for Security in African Crisis  
The origins of the Draft Convention can be seen in the political economy outlined in the 
introduction: an increased demand for interventions led to a gradual shift to the use of PMSCs 
as member states’ shifted their policies on contracting. In the nineties, the United Nations 
oversaw an explosion in peace operations as evidence to the numerous demands and 
                                                          




expectations, amidst the challenges of Rwanda or Srebrenica. The first marked increased use 
of PMSCs- in the form of armed guards- occurred after the Somalia crisis.  
The humanitarian response in Somalia initially saw the deployment of thousands of US troops 
to permit humanitarian relief operations. The US withdrawal was a turning point for NGOs 
and UN agencies required to continue their work. PMSCs obtained more contracts to provide 
security, logistical support and training in conflict and post-conflict contexts217, as well as fulfill 
security and policing functions especially within peacekeeping operations and demining218. As 
of 2014, there were around 30 unarmed and armed companies used in peacekeeping missions 
and special political missions and globally, the United Nations used armed PMSCs in three 
countries and unarmed PMSCs in 12 countries where there are peacekeeping missions and 11 
countries where there are special political missions.219 
 
Limits to the expansion of private peacekeeping  
At least three elements prevented deeper changes in the policies of contracting PMSCs. The 
most important one is the lingering existence of diffuse anti-mercenary feelings, which shaped 
the dominance of the General Assembly (GA) approach. As Percy writes: “ the GA has (…) 
opposed all types of private force, the Security Council has dealt with mercenaries only in 
                                                          
217 SSR-related services related to peacekeeping (Østensen 49-50) or intelligence (Singer 2003:182). See e.g. Christopher Spearin, ‘UN 
Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and Security Industry’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 18, no. 2, 2011, p. 196–209; 
Oldrich Bures, ‘Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 4, winter 2005, 
p. 533–546; Malcolm Patterson, ‘A Corporate Alternative to United Nations Ad Hoc Military Deployments’, Journal of Conflict & Security 
Law, vol. 13, no. 2, 2008, p. 215–232. The UN approached a PMSC to provide 7000 Gurkha to protect relief in Somalia.Cited in Baum 2014. 
Eventually not hired 
218 Ghebali, Victor-Yves. "The United Nations and the dilemma of outsourcing peacekeeping operations." Bryden, A and Caparini, M (eds) 
(2006). Spearin, Christopher. "Private, armed and humanitarian? States, NGOs, international private security companies and shifting 
humanitarianism." Security Dialogue 39.4 (2008): 363-382.   
219 U.N. A/69/338, Para 11. The total estimated budget for 2013/2014 for the use of private security companies is approximately $42,125,297 




terms of the threat they pose to international security, and only once dealt with a private 
military company”.220 
Percy summarizes this process: 
The GA has taken the lead in dealing with new manifestations of private force. This hostility has 
closed off one potential avenue for the Council: the use of private force in peacekeeping operations in 
combat. (…) the GA’s response has meant that its approach has become dominant within the UN, 
making regulation of the private security industry and the continued legal control of mercenaries more 
difficult. 221 
Secondly, there was still insufficient domestic and international legislation regulating the 
activities of PMSCs.222 Third and last, but not least, the inter-state system is an essential 
obstacle: under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force for the maintenance of international peace and security.223  
 
2.1.2 Policy development for operations  
 
I now turn to describing the evolution of U.N. policies in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century before turning to the Draft Convention. 
                                                          
220 Percy 2014:633. She adds that the SC became involved only when there was a threat to territorial integrity, a concern of internationalization 
of conflict, threats to regional stability (p.635) 
221 Ibid. p. 636 
222 I return to this point for a synthesis in chapter 3. 
223 For a review of the legal arguments, cf. Sossai, Mirko. "The Privatisation of ‘the Core Business of un Peacekeeping Operations’: Any Legal 
Limit?." International Community Law Review 16.4 (2014): 405-422. On whether the law applicable to un peace operations allows the privatisation of mandated 
tasks can be grouped around three main analytical questions: if un peacekeeping forces must be State organs; if the basic principles of UN peacekeeping constitute an 
inherent limitation to the resort to pmscs; finally, if the Security Council is allowed to delegate its powers under Chapter vii of the UN Charter to a private actor, by 




The absence of clear policies characterized much of the use of PMSCs by the U.N and a variety 
of practices emerged based on missions, assessments and on agencies’ preferences. At least 
three documents can help reconstruct such evolution: the IASC guidelines, the Field Security 
Handbook and the UN Guidelines on the Armed Private Security Companies. 
The first important policy document- the IASC guidelines- originates in a 2001 discussion 
paper on the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys224. It was a non-binding 
document with a limited focus on convoy protection225, which stated that armed guards should 
be used only to protect humanitarian convoys and in cases of security vacuum.226  
At the time of writing the IASC guidelines, resistance of humanitarians towards private 
security prevailed. Since the Somalia crisis, and then again in Afghanistan, a clash of cultures 
between humanitarian and the military-security professional reverberated within the 
humanitarian agencies, from the United Nations to the ICRC and MSF in particular.227  
The militaristic security approach came to be criticized as having a negative impact on 
humanitarian practice and values. PMSCs seemed to contribute to a confusion of roles leading 
to a greater difficulty for humanitarians in being perceived as impartial.228 As Carmola wrote 
in her influential description of the organizational cultures of PMSCs: they do not just span the 
                                                          
224 On the drafting and negotiations of the document, cf. Østensen, pp. 45-46 
225 As a general rule armed guards should not be used to protect humanitarian convoys, with no distinction made between national armed 
forces, international peacekeeping forces or private companies. The general exception to the rule concerns cases of last resort in security 
vacuums. 
226 “The use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys or operations is an extreme precautionary measure that should be taken only in exceptional 
circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. The decision to request or accept the use of military or armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organizations, not 
political or military authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria.” ASC Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines on the “Use of Military of Armed 
Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys” of September 2001. This paper was approved by the IASC and reviewed by the UN Office of Legal Affairs. Available 
online: 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ENGLISH%20VERSION%20Guidelines%20for%20Complex%20Emergencies.pdf 
Accessed January 2, 2015 
227 The ICRC and the Use of Armed Guards’, Geneva, January 1997. Dan Byman, ‘Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military’, Survival, 
43(2), 2001, p. 97; Thomas Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervention in Humanitarian Crises (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); 
Chris Sieple, The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (Carlisle, PA: US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996); George, 
‘The Politics of Peace’.  




civilian-military divide, or the public-private divide: they combine aspects of three organizational cultures- 
military, business, and humanitarian- and shift among them as needed.229 
Thus, U.N. humanitarian agencies lived under conflicting imperatives that contributed to the 
difficulty of debating the topic. The result was a lingering general policy fragmentation, well 
described by Østensen: the security of civilian personnel is formally the responsibility of the DSS, the 
humanitarian agencies most often also have separate arrangements for security. Some UN agencies rely primarily 
on their own in-house capacity for the security of their staff and operations. 230 
The second document, the Field Security Handbook231, was less restrictive than the IASC 
guidelines but attentive to the issue of liability.232 No mention is made of rules for the use of 
force or other operating standards, or the range of services that can be procured. Opacity still 
prevented the discussions around PMSCs. The third document, UN Guidelines on the Armed 
Private Security Companies, or APSC Guidelines, was approved in 2012.233 It was released 
shortly after the Secretary-General, for the first time, presented a report to the General 
Assembly on the use of private security that re-asserted a precautionary principle. 234  
 
2.2 U.N. as Law-Maker 
 
                                                          
229 Carmola, Op. Cit, p.28 
230 At the same time they contribute to the DSS security function through a cost sharing system (altogether 45 per cent of total DSS expenditure) calculated on a per 
capita staffing basis. This means that the largest UN humanitarian agencies will contribute significantly to the centralized UN security system while relying mostly 
on their own internal security arrangements; this has reportedly caused some tensions between the DSS and the UN humanitarian agencies. 
231 Department of Safety and Security, Field Security Handbook, Annex O (New York: DSS, 2006). It has now been replaced by the UN Security 
Management System: Policy Manual  
232 Østensen, Op. Cit, p.41 
233 Krahmann (2014). She also stresses the need to broaden the scope beyond unarmed contractors; clarifying the conditions of use; revise 
the assessment system that justify a potentially excessive precautionary use of guards; set professional standards that do not only rely on 
ICoC, ICoCA and ISO; develop effective sanctions by specifying what is considered non-compliance or misconduct and how contract abuse 
will be penalized 




An area where the indirect potential for the U.N. to drive change in the use of PMSCs lies 
where the institution has the prerogative of creating international law. The U.N. has the unique 
ability to reach an effective definition and an agreeable issue-area, which is often the 
indispensable prerequisite in international negotiations.235 The possibility of creating a 
definition of PMSC was thwarted by the complexity of the previous deeply institutionalized 
definition of mercenary, which made it difficult to change. It is now important to articulate 
these two aspects in order to understand how norms influenced policy, in section c and then, 
how the Draft convention was generated. 
 
 
2.2.1 Influence of the anti-mercenary norm: from an unworkable definition to a slow 
transition 
 
The problem of mercenaries was first raised at the United Nations in 1961 in connection with 
the Katangese secession. The UN General Assembly, the Security Council and the 
Commission on Human Rights adopted repeated resolutions condemning the activities of 
mercenaries. In 1979, the General Assembly decided to undertake the framing of a binding 
international text against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries. The 
cumulative definition in the document resembles the existing definition in the Geneva 
Convention. However, as opposed to the Geneva Convention, the UN Convention made not 
only being a mercenary an offence, but also the recruitment, use, financing and training of 
mercenaries by sovereign governments. 
                                                          




The table below shows how the UN definition of mercenaries is almost identical to that of 
the Geneva Conventions.236  
 
TABLE 2 
Definition of Mercenary. Geneva Convention, Art. 47237 and U.N. 
Convention 
 
(a) specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;  
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (Omitted in UN version) 
(c) motivated by a desire for private gain; 
(d) neither a national of a party to the conflict; 
(e) neither a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;  
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official 
duty as a member of its armed forces.  
 
Why is this important? What is crucial is the denial of the normal protections accorded to 
combatants and prisoners of war that they had up to that point enjoyed under the Geneva 
Conventions238. The complexity of the original definition lies in states seeking to eliminate 
mercenary activity by using a roundabout method: 
 
rather than an outright ban on mercenary activity, governments embraced the notion that 
such activity could be eliminated if one created a humanitarian legal environment that was 
so antithetical to mercenaries that these individuals would be deterred from engaging in 
mercenary activity.239  
                                                          
236 Even if the UN Convention omits the requirement that a mercenary does in fact take part in hostilities. The motivation to do so is sufficient 
to be defined as a mercenary.  
237  Abbreviated versions. Art. 47 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Article 47 has two parts. The first states that “A mercenary 
shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.” Available at: https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750057  
238 Ibid. 
239 Nossal, Kim Richard. "Global governance and national interests: regulating transnational security corporations in the post-Cold War era." 




Thus, the UN Mercenary Convention embraces the same definitional strategy as the Geneva 
Conventions.  
 
2.2.1 How the anti-mercenary norm is still influential 
It is argued that norms can be subject to a degeneration that may lead to their gradual decline. 
The decline and disappearance of the norm on declaration of war is a case in point in the 
international system; a common example is the weakening in submarine warfare norms.240  
Over the course of two decades, the anti-mercenary norm was reformulated and its application 
limited. The diffusion of the negative perception of combat activities led security firms to a 
reorientation from combat-oriented to combat avoiding.241 The policy change entrepreneurs 
were both PMSCs and states.242 PMSCs providing defensive services only, do not violate the 
norm and have become fully legitimate actors243. The critical actors like the US, the United 
Kingdom, and only later the United Nations, adopted a narrowed interpretation of the anti-
mercenary norm.  
However, the norm against mercenary use continues to have clout on international 
organizations. The negative reactions to the rise of PMSCs within the UN, demonstrate that 
the norm against mercenarism use is still alive. The UN the existence of norm found 
confirmation in Percy’s interviews of peacekeeping directors that mention a “political liability” 
as a constraint to hiring.244 
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The evolution of definitions and a decline of influence of the anti-mercenary norm is 
summarized in table below. The account starts with the creation of the position of the Special 
Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries, created in 1987. It remained in existence until the policy 
shift of 2005. The Special Rapporteur Ballesteros saw no difference between mercenaries of 
the type operating in Africa during decolonization, and PMSCs. The Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan, like Ballesteros, remained anchored to the same definition.245 He declared that when he 
was Head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and when the UN needed skilled soldiers to separate 
fighters from refugees in the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma, he ‘considered the possibility of engaging a private 
firm’, but did not do so because he felt the world was not ‘ready to privatise peace.’  
 
As Percy put it, Ballesteros provides perhaps the sine qua non example of a regulator obsessed with the last 
war246. However, Ballesteros eventually moderated his stance and started a slow ‘paradigm 
shift’. PMSCs are no more mercenaries but are configured as actors ‘conducting mercenary 
activities’ - a precursor of changes to come.  
Then, the position of the Special Rapporteur was replaced by the Working Group (WG) on 
the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the 
rights of peoples to self-determination in July 2005.  
The appointment of Shaista Shameem as a new Special Rapporteur can be identified as the 
crucial moment for the shift. 247 She advocates for ‘a fundamental rethinking of the issue of 
mercenarism and its relation to the promotion and protection of human rights’ as well as ‘a 
                                                          
 245 UN Press Release SG/SM/6613/Rev.1 26 June 1998 in Ghebali, Op. Cit, p.11, fn. 63.  
246 Percy 2012 




fundamental reconsideration of (…) the responsibility of States and the United Nations with 
respect to the activities of actors currently legally defined as mercenaries248.  
                                                          




Table 3: Evolution of definitions within the United Nations, 1989-2010    
Organizational Body Definition Context  
Initial UN position 
(Mercenary 
Convention) 
Signed 1989, in force 
2001 
5- points definition: (a) specially recruited locally 
or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) motivated by a desire for private gain; (c) 
neither a national of a party to the conflict; (d) 
neither a member of the armed forces of a Party 
to the conflict; (e) has not been sent by a State 
which is not a Party to the conflict on official 
duty as a member of its armed forces 
Historical context of post-colonial Africa 





Executive Outcomes participates to the 
local conflict in Angola and are referred 
to as ‘mercenaries’  
The UN discourse criminalizes the 
company, its employees and its activity. 
Special Rapporteur, 
1998 
Unchanged but the term private security 
companies (PSCs) is introduced 





The Rapporteur moderates his critical stance; 
Construction of PSCs as legal entities with a ‘right 
to work in the area of security’ 
Not yet ready to accept that the UN 
Mercenary Convention had no relevance 
firms.  
 
To support his view, Ballesteros turned to 




PSCs must not recruit, hire, finance or use 






Internal Conflict. Shameen recommends 
that the UN re-examine the relevance of 
the term mercenary; UN Commission on 
Human Rights replaced Shameen with a 
working group consisting of five experts  
Working Group, 2005 Unchanged but shift of issue: ‘government 
agreements that provide PMSCs and their 
employees with immunity for human rights 
violations’ as one of its foremost concerns 
 
Working Group, 2010 New Definition: a PMSC is a corporate entity 
which provides on a compensatory basis military 
and/or security services by physical persons 
and/or legal entities 
New Definition in the Draft Convention;  
 
Abandoned efforts to reinforce the Anti-







Her reports point to the possibility of ‘a fundamental revamping or the total revocation of 
the UN 1989 Convention on mercenaries’ and also yield ‘a useful outcome for the United 
Nations itself with respect to effective maintenance of its peacekeeping and peace building 
mandates. In the absence of an adequate definition of mercenaries, she argues for a 
pragmatic approach as she engages fruitfully with industry and civil society.249 
The creation of a Working Group was indeed a key moment in the evolution of the United 
Nations policy on PMSCs (Cf. table 3). While it is noted that the focus appears to remain largely on 
the implications of PMSCs on the state monopoly of violence, and somewhat less on human rights violations 
per se250, the Working Group was gradually shifting the issue definition. The Working Group 
tirelessly worked to open an area of research with field-visits and reports. Krahmann writes 
that by: 
eliminating first the concept of mercenaries and second the notion of mercenary activities from its 
discourse and substituting them with PMSCs and inherently state functions, the Working 
Group not only undermined the application of the UN Mercenary Convention but also opened 
up the possibility of legalizing persons and companies selling armed force in conflicts for profit 
through ‘improved’ state regulation.251 
In fact, the Working Group used the term ‘PMSCs’ from the start and by distinguished 
                                                          
249 Ghebali in Bryden and Caparini, Private Actors and Security Governance, 2006. At a meeting in London (June 2005), convened at her 
suggestion, with representatives of we strongly recommend that the UN reexamine the relevance of the term mercenary’ because ‘this 
derogatory term is completely unacceptable and is too often used to describe fully legal and legitimate companies engaged in vital support 
operations for humanitarian peace and stability operations.’ The communiqué also stressed that ‘the industry is keen to engage with UN 
mechanisms and is willing to examine a wide variety of options to ensure that the private sector continues to be an increasing and positive 
presence in peace and stability operations’ before announcing the convening of ‘a future industry conference to develop a unified international 
code of conduct related to private sector operations in conflict/ post conflict environments’ 
250 Østensen, p.59 




explicitly between mercenaries, mercenary-related activities and the activities of PMSCs its discourse 
suggested that PMSCs were not mercenaries, and nor were their activities ‘mercenary’.252  
The labors of the Working Group culminated with the submission of the Draft Convention 
to the HRC in 2010253. Based on the proposal, the HRC established an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group (IGWG) to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the 
regulation, monitoring, and oversight of the impact of PMSCs’ activities.254  
 
2.2.3 Norm on the monopoly on violence 
An alternative normative approach is now useful. It relies on the Weberian notion of the state 
monopoly on violence. This line of analysis is useful to see how changes in the anti-mercenary 
norm, so far described, and changes in the norm of the state monopoly on violence can be 
related:  
The discursive reinterpretation of the core functions of the state and the military, and the 
differentiation between mercenaries who fight in ‘combat’ and PMSCs who engage in 
‘defensive operations’ (…) help explain how the norm of the state monopoly on violence 
can change, while at the same time the norm against mercenarism has remained strong 
(Percy, 2007b in Krahmann). 
                                                          
252 Krahmann 2011:359 
253 Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right 
of Self-determination’, UN Doc A/HRC/15/25 (2 July 2010). 





How is this shift shown? First, Krahmann shows a variation in the interpretation of the state 
monopoly on violence through the narrowing of the functions considered to be ‘inherently 
governmental’: 
 
Until the mid-1990s the inherent functions of state agencies, including the armed forces, 
were defined in the USA as all tasks that ‘represent the exercise of sovereign power’ (…). 
During the next decade, the range of these functions was progressively cut down. Today, 
the governmental discourses in the USA, the UK and Germany argue that the state 
monopoly on violence refers to the control over the legitimate use of armed force, not its 
actual exercise.255  
 
Second, Krahmann study of the discourse in official statements or parliament debates shows 
that an acceptance of the distinction between offensive and defensive security. The result is 
that PMSCs do not fall under the definitions of the UN, AU and Geneva conventions. The 
shift in the monopoly on violence is thus the product of a government use of  
 
an increasingly narrow definition of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ that pertains only 
to offensive action. Quarterly Reports on US contractors issued by the US Central 
Command emphasize that ‘private security contractor personnel are not authorized to 
participate in offensive operations’. (…) Other governments that hire armed security 
contractors have used a similar strategy. 
 
                                                          




However, I have outlined here constructivist approaches that have one feature in common- 
i.e. a focus on changes in policy discourse. There is reluctance in political science to use discourse 
in the study of ideas. Discourse is perceived as a disadvantage since it conjures up exaggerated 
visions of postmodernists and post-structuralists who are assumed to interpret “texts” without contexts and to 
understand reality as all words, whatever the deeds.256 Nonetheless, and in absence of better data on 
an opaque topic, adding discourse to a study of ideas seems fruitful to many scholars. 
 
 
2.3. Organizational contingencies 
 
The development of practices and policies evolved with mission imperatives and accidents 
driving continuity or change. The policy development on PMSCs was marked by key events 
such as the bombing of the U.N. in Baghdad that drove the sense of insecurity and the demand 
for PMSCs; and the reform of the Human Rights bodies- where the Draft Convention was 
eventually developed. I shall start with the latter. 
 
The Human Rights Commission is a human rights body that spearheaded research and field 
missions on PMSCs. After a polemic for its selectivity and politicization, the Commission was 
replaced with a new Human Rights Council (from now HRC). The proponents of the new body 
expected the HRC to be active in protecting and not only promoting human rights257. The 
agenda adopted in 2007 consists of ten items258; the issue of PMSCs is still not directly on the 
                                                          
256 Schmidt, Vivien A. "Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and discourse." Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11 (2008): 303-326. 
She writes that the term used to define this approach, discursive institutionalism, is of very recent vintage (see Schmidt 2002a, 2006a,b). Although others have used 
the same term (see Campbell & Pedersen 2001)—or similar ones, such as ideational institutionalism (Hay 2001), constructivist institutionalism (Hay 2006), or 
strategic constructivism (Jabko 2006).  
257 Ramcharan 2013  




agenda.259 Further, the reorganization happened amidst other continued challenges and 
humanitarian crises, and the problem of how to strengthen the Security Council. The High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change addressed difficult issues such as the 
composition of the Human Rights Council and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine260 but 
PMSCs were not on the agenda either. Private force remained unregulated but called for in 
situations of rapid deterioration in security levels.261  
Another important organizational factor is that the war to Iraq sidelined the organization and 
generated a crisis of confidence amongst member states and staff.262 Before the U.S.-led 
intervention in Iraq, the end of the Cold War had pointed to a new role for the United 
Nations263 but the renewed conflict led to disorientation. The Security Council was sidelined, 
and then a U.N. presence was imposed to “add tone”, in post-conflict Iraq.264 PMSCs “in 
effect substituted for U.N. peacekeepers by offering not only forces, but international 
forces”.265 
Then, in 2003, the Canal Hotel Bombing in Baghdad led to the death of many staff including 
the U.N. Special Representative. The attack deepened an already powerful sense of crisis in the 
organization’s senior staff266. A direct consequence was the creation of a new Department of Safety 
                                                          
259 However, before the new body was set up, UN Commission on Human Rights could still replace the Special Rapporteur with a group 
consisting of five experts, the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries in 2005. UN Commission of Human Rights, Resolution 2005/2, 7 
April 2005. 
260 Annan, Kofi A. 2004 A More Secure World 
261 Ostensen recalls the 2009 suicide attack on the WFP office in Islamabad Østensen : UN Under Secretary General for Safety and Security Gregory 
Starr later admitted to increased use of private security companies in Pakistan in response to a series of attacks, killings and kidnappings targeting UN personnel. 
Apparently, however, the Pakistani government made it clear it would not approve the use of foreign PMSCs 
262 Lowe, Vaughan, et al., eds. The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945: The Evolution of Thought 
and Practice since 1945. Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 402-3 
263 Annan, Kofi A. 2004 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel  
on Threats, Challenges and Change. UN Doc. A/59/565. United Nations Publications, 2004 Annan, Kofi A. 2004 A More Secure World. P. 
13. The reports points to long-standing regional conflicts that remain unresolved, such as Israel/Palestine and Kashmir. Also “Failure to act 
in the face of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia eroded international support. Optimism yielded to renewed cynicism 
about the willingness of Member States to support the Organization” ¶ 13, page 13 
264 Guéhenno, then head of Peacekeeping, cites this comment made by Prendergast. In Guéhenno, Jean-Marie. Op.Cit. Ch. 2 
265 Avant 2006:510 




and Security, and the increased use of PMSCs. 267 The position towards PMSCs however was 
uncoordinated and mostly marked by contingent choices.  
 
2.4 The Draft Convention 
 
2.4.1 Origins and Aims 
 
The Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group took on the project of elaborating a Draft 
Convention from the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries. 
The aim of the Convention was to “reaffirm and strengthen State responsibility for the use of 
force”, particularly by “identify[ing] those functions which are inherently governmental and 
which cannot be outsourced.”268  
The ‘Definitions’ section of the Draft Convention gives the foundation of the inherent state 
functions which are ‘consistent with the principle of State monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force’269, and cannot be outsourced or delegated to non-state actors. These functions include: 
direct participation in hostilities, waging war and/or combat operations, taking 
prisoners, law-making, espionage, intelligence, knowledge transfer with military, security 
and policing application, use of and other activities related to weapons of mass destruction 
                                                          
267 December 2004 of Resolution 59/276. Å. G. Østensen, 2013, at P.22.  
268 Draft Convention, Art. 1(1); Available at: 
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/international_regulation/united_nations/human_rights_council_and_ga/open_ended_wg/session_
1/un_open_ended_wg_session_1_draft-of-a-possible-convention.pdf 




and police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention including the interrogation 
of detainees270.  
Thus, the definitions of “inherent state functions” stem from the principle of state monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force, a principle that is itself contested. Although the state monopoly 
on the use of force has been an objective for most states, the chosen restrictive definition has 
no consensus in the international community. This aspect stands in stark contrasts with the 
Montreux Document, which only identified prohibitions on contracting states outsourcing 
activities that international humanitarian law assigns to states, such as exercising the power of 
the responsible officer over prisoners of war or internment camps.271 
 
2.4.2 The Draft Convention and Montreux 
 
Aware that the Montreux Document was being generated simultaneously, one of the leaders 
of the Working Group distinguished the efforts of the two: while former aimed to provide 
guidance for industry self-regulation, the Working Group, impressed as it was with the disturbing realities it 
had observed, was trying to add some legal teeth to their recommendations, and to forcefully make the business 
of PMSCs the responsibility of the states that provide them with a “home”. 272 
Like the Montreux Document, the Draft Convention developed to address specifically the 
role of states in regulating PMSCs. However, one could identify at least three types of 
differences between the initiatives. First, the Draft Convention has a much wider spectrum of 
                                                          
270 Ibid, Art 2(i)  
271 White, p. 137.  




activities, as shown in table 4 below.  
For example, the Montreux Document does not deal specifically with training, espionage, 
intelligence, or knowledge transfer273. Second, the proposed sphere of application of the Draft 
Convention is wider since it would hold both in times of peace and armed conflict and 
encompasses a large of issues of cooperation and conflict in world politics. Third, the Draft 
Convention proposes new tools and oversight mechanisms.274 
                                                          
273 Cockayne argued however that the document may extend to so-called ‘black operations’. Cockayne, Op. Cit., p.410. His view was probably 
aspirational 
274 The Draft Convention describes an Oversight Committee to ensure oversight and monitoring, with three proposed methods of supervision 
and accountability (Committee on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring. Ibid. Art. 27; its proposed purposes and prerogatives are 
described in Art. 29. ) and tasked with establishing an international register of PMSCs. Another innovation contained in the Draft Convention 










Armed guarding, protection of persons & objects Allowed Allowed 
Direct participation in hostilities Prohibited Not directly prohibited 
Waging war and/or combat operations Prohibited Unclear 
Taking prisoners Prohibited Prisoner detention allowed 
Law-making Prohibited Unclear 
Espionage Prohibited Unclear 
Intelligence Prohibited Unclear 
Use of and other activities related to weapons of mass 
destruction  Prohibited 
Maintenance of weapons system 
allowed 
Police powers, especially powers of arrest or detention 




2.4.3 Prospects and Challenges for the Draft Convention 
 
The Draft Convention confronted problems of legitimacy, capacity, and political commitment. 
First, arguments around the legitimacy of the drafting process- or of the institution that 
produced it- affected the prospects for a treaty. White writes that just as the Montreux Document’s 
legitimacy is undermined by the fact that it is promoted by those hosting and using PMSCs, so the Draft 
Convention is arguably tainted by its creator’s history276.  
The drafting process of the Convention reproduced the same political biases that have been 
seen in systematic analysis of controversial votes in the HRC, where voting heavily clusters 
                                                          
275 Based on White, in Bakker and Sossai 2012 




member states277. The voting of the resolution that had created the open-ended IGWG 
Convention had itself been very polarized.278 Moreover, a peculiar inconsistency lies within the 
United Nations’ own practice which further undermines legitimacy, as I noted in section 2.1.2 
In this sense, Østensen writes that in dealing with the practice of hiring PMSCs in zones of conflict or 
humanitarian operations, the draft convention fails to address properly UN reliance upon PMSCs279.  
Second, the U.N. initiative assumes that states will have the capacity to implement such a 
convention280. In fact, it requires state parties to establish a comprehensive domestic regime 
of regulation and oversight.281 However, enforcement and capacity are a major obstacle in 
territorial states. 
Third, the lack of general political commitment was a hindrance. The international consensus 
that is required to achieve such a comprehensive treaty simply does not exist at this point. It 
similarly prevented a regional initiative to regulate PMSCs at the European level282. Without 
the participation of key contracting states, such as the US and UK, chances are that the 
convention might become largely irrelevant. 
                                                          
277 Hug, Simon, and Richard Lukács. "Preferences or blocs? Voting in the United Nations human rights council." The Review of International 
Organizations 9.1 (2014): 83-106. They found that controversial votes initiated by Pakistan and Cuba, and to a lesser extent Egypt lead to quite 
distinct voting patterns where EU member countries play a central role, but also almost systematically lose. 
278 By a majority of 32 in favor, twelve against, and 3 abstentions . In favour (32): Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay and Zambia.  
Against (12): Belgium, France, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom, 
and United States. Abstentions (3): Maldives, Norway, and Switzerland.  
See Human Rights Council establishes Working Group on activities of Private Security Companies, renews mandates on Sudan and Somalia, 
at 4, available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1D80786AA85ABF37852577AF00755F7E-Full_Report.pdf 
279 The document barely touches upon the fact that the organisation is itself a frequent PMSC customer and carries its own responsibility for contractor adherence to 
international humanitarian law and respect for human rights. This omission becomes particularly problematic as the convention also envisions a UN organ to investigate 
potential reports of human rights violations, and subsequently impose ‘appropriate disciplinary and penal sanctions’. (Østensen 2011) 
280 Østensen, p. 60; Perret: the Draft Convention requires that each state party establish jurisdiction over potential offenses when the offence is “committed within 
its territory”, or “on board a vessel flying the flag of that [s]tate or an aircraft registered under the laws of that [s]tate at the time the offence is committed,” or “the 
offence is committed against a national of that [s]tate,” or “the offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that 
[s]tate.” These provisions do not contemplate that states may not be able to insure security or justice for its citizens or be able to implement the convention within its 
own jurisdiction. 
281 Strictly speaking the Montreux Document does not but it has encouraged a discussion around domestic reform (cf. next chapter) 
282 Perret writes that following the Priv-War Recommendations on EU Regulatory Action, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in May 
2011 in which it considered that “the adoption of EU regulatory measures, including a comprehensive normative system for the establishment, registration, licensing, 
monitoring and reporting violations of applicable law by private military and security (PMS) companies—both at internal and external level—, is necessary.” The 







I traced the development of the Draft Convention and I distinguished between the operational 
practice of the United Nations and her ability to propose multilateral treaties. The process was 
delayed by the highly institutionalized anti-mercenary norm and the protean nature of PMSCs. 
Thus, the end result was a polarization with the GA opposed to all types of private force, and 
the Security Council almost never dealing with it.  
The level of political commitment on PMSCs treaties depends upon the scope of the 
definition. The greater its scope, the greater the chances that strong states will have 
reservations. Especially in areas such as intelligence, the trade-off between privacy and 
anonymity, on the one hand, and surveillance on the other, is the result of technological 
changes that affect politics, policy and human understanding jointly and at an unprecedented 
scale. One could borrow an analogy from a related field, cyber-security, where a treaty has 
been simply an illusion: “The official response is yes, we want there to be rules of the road 
and to apply the law of armed conflict. But unofficially the answer is no countries that have 






                                                          





























As the regime literature has argued, reaching an agreement is a stage in the negotiation, not 
the end of the process.284 As Ralby wrote the Document does not resolve the issue of 
accountability for PMSCs, the Montreux Document provides a “valuable starting point for a 
process that will need to continue indefinitely”.285  Thus, it is important to investigate the 
process that followed the adoption of Montreux. One of the authors of the Document itself 
asked: “Now that states have a yardstick—imperfect as it may be—by which to measure their 
own and each others’ practice in dealing with PMSCs, will they be prepared to use it?” 
(Cockayne 2009: 427). This is the question I tackle next. This chapter tests if PMSCs norms 
succeeded in taking shape in the first five years after the signing of the Montreux Document.  
 
3.1 Montreux + 5 
 
3.1.1 Case Selection 
 
                                                          
284 Spector, and Zartman. Op. Cit. 




Case studies are often valuable for understanding key events that selected or blocked some 
possible future paths.286 This chapter seeks order by using an existing theory. I attempt a 
disciplined interpretive case study as I try applying a known theory- regime theory- to a new 
terrain287; I inquire if a regime is taking shape. 
I select a venue and time from a very limited set of options. After a few regional 
consultations288, the conference Montreux +5 was the first international forum since the signing 
of both the Montreux in 2008 and the release of the U.N. Draft Convention in 2010.  Most 
importantly, both signatories and non-signatories states of the Montreux Document were 
present. The conference created an ideal litmus test to explore what followed the adoption of 
Montreux.  Now that states have had a yardstick have they been prepared to use it? 
 
In the following sections, process tracing and participant observation drive my inquiry. I draw 
from a variety of data collected during research work conducted in 2013 and 2014, including 
over dozens of interviews with politicians, security officials, delegates of international 
organizations and other informants, as well as available literature and archival sources.  The 
narrative benefited from my participation as a contributor to the Montreux Five Years On: An 
analysis of State efforts to implement Montreux Document legal obligations and good practices 289- or the 
Shadow Report- an attempt of academics and activists to write a report, alternative to the 
                                                          
286 Odell, John S. "Case study methods in international political economy." International Studies Perspectives 2.2 (2001): 161-176. 
287 Ibid. The more explicit and systematic the use of theoretical concepts, the more powerful the application. Although this method may not 
test a theory, the case study shows that one or more known theories can be extended to account for a new event. 
288 In Asia and Latin America. The proceedings of the regional workshops held by DCAF are available at : 
http://www.dcaf.ch/Programmes/Private-Security-Governance , accessed September 2014 
289 Rebecca DeWinter-Schmitt (Ed) Montreux Five Years On: An analysis of State efforts to implement Montreux Document legal obligations and good 




official one, with challenges and recommendations for addressing gaps in the effectiveness of 
the Document290.   
 
By 2013, after five years from the endorsement, the Montreux Document endorsements 
increased to 49 States and three international organizations. The conference Montreux +5 held 
in Switzerland, in December 11-13, 2013. 
 
The conference presented data for assessing the implementation efforts of States. The official 
report relied on state responses to a survey using the following metrics: variation in the 
determination of services that can be outsourced; variation in the due diligence obligation 




3.2 Attitudes and Expectations 
 
The convergence of expectations around defined issue-areas has been shown to be one of the 
most important indicators of regime formation. Oren Young wrote a conjunction of convergent 
                                                          
290 The presentation of the results at the conference at American University Washington School of Law provided an initial arena to assess 
the opinions regarding the achievements of the Montreux Document.  
291 All participating States were asked to complete a questionnaire; it can be found at: 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/event/event1.Par.0001.File.tmp/Montreux5_Questionnaire_2013.pdf, accessed on 




expectations and recognized patterns of behavior or practice292; Krasner of convergence of expectations in a 
given issue-area293.   
 
During the conference, states positions pronouncedly diverged. The so-called BRIC countries, 
Brazil and South Africa, were vocal in disparaging the Montreux process as a “forfeiture of 
State responsibility” to regulate the industry, and were supportive of the efforts of the UNWG 
to develop a binding international convention294.  
 
A key signatory, South Africa, the country with the strongest laws in the books, was the most 
skeptical. On the eve of the “Montreux + 5” conference, Gumedze stresses how little 
relevance Montreux had for national policy. He writes: the only document which links South Africa 
to the Montreux Document is the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Strategic 
Plan 2010-2013 (Strategic Plan)295.  
A criticism of the Montreux Document is that does not address the responsibilities of States 
for PMSC personnel that are commonly referred to as Third Country Nationals. 296 This is 
illustrated in the Shadow report and has been at the heart of South Africa’s shifting policy 
preferences. Thus, what appeared, especially to Swiss negotiators, to be a repeated pattern of 
                                                          
292 Oran Young synthesizes the positive and negative conclusions (“political scientists tend to find evidence of the significance of regimes in 
addressing environmental problems. The quantitative case studies, arguably reflecting skeptical attitudes to governance systems common 
among economists, typically raise doubts about the roles that regimes play”. He adds that the large N studies have sought to move beyond 
this divide but the three works he cites carry mistakes in the titles that are misleading insofar as they tend to over-emphasize success beyond 
the environmental sphere 
293 Krasner, International Regimes, 1983 p.1. Also Puchala and Hopkins write that “a regime is an attitudinal phenomenon. Behavior follows 
from adherence to principles, norms, and rules, which legal codes sometimes reflect. But regimes themselves are subjective: they exist 
primarily as participants' understandings, expectations or convictions”.  
294 Interviews, January 2014 
295 From S. Gumedze (2013) in the Shadow Report to Montreux Document (forthcoming). The document states that DIRCO will, among other 
things “consider, supporting and participating in the Swiss Government’s initiative to disseminate the Montreux Document on Private Military and security 
Companies.”  
296 The States of origin (of Third Country Nationals) may not fall under the current categories of Contracting, Territorial, or Home States. For example, in 
Chile’s situation, some of its citizens were contracted by U.S. companies through non-U.S. based hiring firms under contracts that referenced neither Chilean nor U.S. 




strategic behavior, was an attempt to make domestic laws known and respected in international 
documents297. 
The conference “Montreux + 5” failed to project a sense of shared perceptions and beliefs.  
A reluctance to identify the problem of Third Country Nationals, or to agree on items like the 
international blacklist for PMSCs, for example, undermined trust from some states.298 The 
conference fostered the perception that contracting states were trying to shield their industry 
even on the most basic proposals299. The study is also hampered by the fact that only limited 
data was provided by the states that responded to the official questionnaire. 
Haas wrote that cluster of issues that appear on the agenda of negotiators may come to be 
suddenly “resolve(d) by tentatively recognizing an issue-area”300.  This did not quite happen 
with “Montreux+5”. At the same time, this conclusion should perhaps be tempered. As Avant 
recalls:  
A lot of country representatives from non-signatory states were attending and they were curious 
as to what regulation they should have. (…) it is rarely the case that people in the government 
sit down and discuss how to regulate PMSC. Usually they are patching together regulation 
in response to something that has happened. They are deciding to regulate or to even address 
this issue because a problem has arisen and are responding in a variety of ways; making use 
of what laws are already existing and/or maybe consulting international best practices.301  
 
 
                                                          
297 Cf. Chapter on South Africa below 
298 Interviews, Geneva, July 2014 
299 Interviews, South African ambassador, July 2014 
300 Haas, Ernst B. "Why collaborate? Issue-linkage and international regimes." World Politics 32.03 (1980): 357-405. 







3.3 Implementation of Reforms 
 
 The patterns of implementation that I summarize in table 5 are an indication that some reform 
has taken place. The efforts to advance on the determination of services have had mixed 
success. On the one hand, there were improvements in domestic accountability policies. Of 
the two cited successes of the Montreux Document, one is that it helped make states’ 
obligations with respect to PMSC activities in armed conflict be better understood302; thus 
providing a basis to draft better regulations. The second, and most important point, is that it 
informed US policy reform303. Improvements in due diligence and criminal accountability were 
noted.304 Data gathered in the Shadow report showed an increase in suspension and 
debarments for companies that do not uphold standards. 
                                                          
302 Chairs’ conclusions, available at: http://www.eda.admin.ch/Montreux+5 
303 Avant 2013 











In most states, imprecise determination of functions that PMSCs may or may not 
perform 
Inadequate extraterritorial applicability of legislation for PMSCs operating abroad307  
 





Weak monitoring of compliance with terms of authorizations, contracts and licenses 
 
Gaps in legal accountability and judicial liability; gaps remain in this area, whether they 






Problem of Capacity313 
 
Low standards as a basis for authorizations, contracts and licenses314 
 
 
On the other, there remains a gaping need for efficient reporting mechanisms, legal 
requirements on background checks into the past conduct of PMSCs, adequate training, lawful 
acquisition of weapons and equipment. Legal gaps prevent victims of PMSC misconduct from 
                                                          
305 This table is offered for illustrative purposes and is based on a synthesis of both the Official Report and Shadow Report. It is not meant 
to be exhaustive nor to give an ordering of importance of the issues. It is based on Buckland and Burdzy, 2013, Progress and Opportunities: 
Five Years On, DCAF Report, and on Rebecca DeWinter-Schmitt (ed.) Montreux Five Years On: An Analysis of State Efforts to Implement 
Montreux Document Legal Obligations and Good Practices, (2013) 
306 Good Practices 1, 24 and 53 of the Montreux Document relate to which services may or may not be contracted out to PMSCs.  
307 Buckland and Burdzy, P. 6. The report contrast a permissive approach (Finland or Angola) vs. Proscriptive approach (USA or UK in the 
area of export of services and goods in CBN) 
308 Both DeWinter-Schmitt and Buckland and Burdzy agree on this. Cf. Buckland and Burdzy pp. 18-19 and DeWinter-Schmitt, pp. 41-42 
309 From Shadow Report. In Afghanistan, the definition is “activities which provide security of real and natural persons, logistics, 
transportation, goods and equipment, training of security employees [and] warning services.”138 Regulations have further classified security 
services into five different categories:139 a) area security,140 b) convoy security,141 c) fixed-site security,142 d) mobile security,143 and e) 
police training missions 
310 Good Practices 5-13, 14-18, 30–42, and 60–67 cover several reporting mechanisms and requirements and include background checks into 
the past conduct of PMSCs, adequate training, lawful acquisition of weapons and equipment, and internal accountability policies 
311 These gaps prevent victims of PMSC misconduct from seeking or obtaining justice. International legal remedies depend on the expediency 
and willingness of national prosecutors to bring cases before a criminal court. Buckland and Burdzy, 2013, P. 7 
312 Procedures of authorization are outlined in Good Practices 2-4, 25–29, and 54–59. They include: designating a central, publically 
accountable authority, allocating adequate resources to the licensing authority and ensuring personnel are sufficiently trained to meet the task 
of issuing licenses.  
313 Montreux Document-endorsing states have identified a government organ with responsibility for the authorization, contracting and 
licensing of PMSCs but capacity required to adequately carry out their functions, Buckland and Burdzy, P. 30.  
314 Low standards in obtaining contracts, authorizations or licenses, (past conduct, personnel training, and internal company policies are being 




seeking or obtaining justice. International legal remedies depend on the expediency and 
willingness of national prosecutors to bring cases before a criminal court. Another related 
important gap is the inability of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over PMSCs315.  
Further, the failure of institutionalization of a regular dialogue among Montreux Document 
participants prevents norm diffusion. Buckland and Burdzy write: 
 
 Regularising the dialogue between endorsing states would facilitate the sharing of lessons learned 
and good practice. It would also give the Montreux Document a clear voice and identity in relation 
to complementary pillars of the evolving international landscape of PMSC regulation, notably the 
new Association for the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and 
the important work within the framework of the United Nations to develop international 
regulation in this are"316. 
 
In December 2014, in response to this criticism in particular, the Montreux Document 
participants during a ‘Constitutional Meeting’ created the Montreux Forum.317 The Forum is 
going to offer a yearly plenary that brings together all the signatories; it opens the way to the 
standardizing the interchange between endorsing states and regularizing the role of the state 
in voluntary regulation, which will be illustrated in the next chapter.318 
 
                                                          
315 Perrin, Benjamin. "Mind the Gap: Lacunae in the International Legal Framework Governing Private Military and Security Companies." 
Criminal Justice Ethics 31.3 (2012): 213-232. He identifies three types of violations: 1) International crimes (specifically, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes); 2) International human rights violations (e.g., preventing the right to peaceful assembly, arbitrary detention, and 
degrading treatment); 3) Ordinary crimes (e.g., murder, sexual assault, theft, and dangerous use of a firearm).  
316 Buckland and Burdzy, Challenges and Opportunities, p.51 
317 Author’s Interview, February 2015. The first such event took place on 16th December 2014. A website was launched this year: 
http://mdforum.ch/ Accessed November 2015.  







The conclusion from the analysis is that attitudes towards PMSCs norms remain at the stage 
of a developing practice. Borrowing Finnemore and Sikkink’s three categories for norm 
diffusion, PMSCs norms would still be in the first stage of emergence- the second one being 
the norm cascade which occurs when at which at least one-third of the states share the same 
assessment on the emerging norm.319 Entire regions have neither signed up to Montreux, nor 
shown interest in the U.N. initiative, nor started a process of domestic reform, thus making 
the universality of PMSCs norms aspirational. Several countries were still not present at 
Montreux +5, such as for example Central Asia countries. Russia and Kazakhstan, and to a 
lesser degree, Kyrgyzstan- have dynamic private security markets, and these states have bodies 
of legislation that regulate the activities of PSCs320. The same applies to large parts of Latin 
America and Africa.  
Besides, a shortage of regularized dialogue among signatories prevented the diffusion of 
PMSCs norms within Montreux signatories in the first five years. This fits with the branch of 
regime theory that stresses how reaching an agreement is a stage in the negotiation, not the 
end of the process.321 What lacked was a process of reiteration and re-negotiation, a point 
                                                          
319 The third stage happens when norms are internalized. Finnemore and Sikkink, Op. Cit.. See Appendix A for a list of states that endorsed 
the Montreux Document 
320 Proceedings of the Regional Workshop for North East and Central Asia on the Montreux Document, Available at psm.du.edu, Accessed 
December 10th 2014. All three states have indicated an interest in sending their troops and private guards to participate in international 
peacekeeping campaigns. Similarly, Mongolia had still not signed the Document in spite of having hosted a regional workshop in 2011 
(Proceedings of the Regional Workshop for North East and Central Asia on the Montreux Document, Available at psm.du.edu, Accessed 
December 10th 2014 . The workshop was convened by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the President of 
Mongolia and the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It stated that Mongolia was examining whether to support the Montreux 
Document) 




raised by those who have seen the Montreux Document as a work in progress and partly 






Chapter 4  




The previous chapter claimed that at the inter-state level, regime formation also depends upon 
a regular dialogue among Montreux Document participants. At the state-level, a greater 
commitment to reform is required. In particular, this chapter, starts with explaining and 
reviewing what is the role the state in voluntary regulations- i.e. the enforcement mechanism 
embedded in the procurement policy of leading states. I analyze how the strength of 
institutional change depends upon the increased and continued commitment of states. I 
problematize the proposed institutional change by using the IR concept of forum shopping and 
contend that there is a relationship between the increased costs of shifting forum and strong 
states commitment to strict compliance. 
 
4.1 Potential of Voluntary Regulation 
The roots of the ICoC are found in the negotiation of the Swiss initiative and the Montreux 
Document.322 The body tasked with the promotion and enforcement of the code is the ICoC 
                                                          




Association, which is composed of a General Assembly of all member companies, civil society 
organizations, a board of directors and a secretariat.323 The association has a three-pillared 
structure, with representatives from governments, the private security services industry, and 
civil society.324  
In the past, PMSCs have adopted corporate codes of conduct, or participated in voluntary 
industry associations promoting such self-regulation but the ICoC has the potential to be a 
stronger mechanism for control of industry behavior than the previous codes.325 I shall now 
explain why. 
 
4.1.1 Three innovations 
Scholars have noted three positive aspects of the ICoC: its high human rights content, the 
prominent role of states, and the participatory nature of the multi-stakeholder process. Thus, 
the ICoC could be substantially better than older trade association codes. 
First and foremost, is that states are invested in the process and create a higher-level 
enforcement mechanism. A literature associated with the problem of the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
sees the threat of state intervention as a key influence on the willingness of private groups to 
                                                          
323 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association (ICoCA) is a multi-stakeholder initiative established as a Swiss 
non-profit association. http://www.icoca.ch/en/icoc-association  
324 The member governments must have also endorsed the Montreux Document to be affiliated with the Association of the ICoC. Ibid., Art. 
3.3.2. 
325 The private security industry codes in the United States and in the United Kingdom, For a detailed analysis of the codes of the IPOA and 
the BAPSC, which are well-positioned to influence to develop international standards, cf. De Nevers (2010). The Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights are an example of the former. They were established in December 2000, were developed through consultation 
between the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, and the Netherlands. While they were created by the extractive 




develop effective self-regulatory mechanisms; the state-failure and state building literature 
similarly agree that outcomes depend on the strength of institutions.  
 
These arguments apply in this case because threat of state intervention is indispensable to 
make private security firms comply with higher standards. States could require companies to 
sign the ICoC and be member of the association in order to work for them, in their territory, 
or from their territory. The result would be the gradual imposition of human rights norms on 
PMSCs.  
 
Some states have begun to require ICoCA membership for government contracts. For 
instance, the United States and Switzerland have announced they would include the code in 
their contracts.326 It hoped that other states would follow. In time, if states, in their domestic 
law, require membership in the association, a company that violates the code would see its 
capacity to have new contracts seriously compromised. This could be an effective sanction for 
violations of human rights by companies. 
The greater role for states in indirectly supporting and strengthening the role of multi-
stakeholder organizations means that the ICoCA is better placed to serve as an effective 
overseer.  
The second innovation is that the content reflects higher human rights component in spite of 
the difficult conciliation between the demand of the PMSCs and the need to include both 
IHRL and IHL norms.327 The companies impacted the content even further, in that the ICoC 
                                                          
326 Available at http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/fr/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-06-240.html  
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is more focused on IHRL than IHL. This outcome—no norms regulating combat activities 
but numerous standards for police services, for example—was a function of the common 
scope of the companies’ business328. It was in line with the argument that PMSCs’ use of force 
was not combat, but rather individual self-defense.329  
 
The Code devotes considerable attention to violations of human rights, such as the prohibition 
of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  Similarly, the Code prohibit their 
personnel from engaging in sexual exploitation and abuse, gender-based violence, human 
trafficking, slavery, forced labor, child labor, and discrimination. As noted by Dickinson, this 
is significant because the treaties from which these principles are derived are often ambiguous 
about their applicability to nongovernmental actors.330 
 
The third innovation of the ICoC, as described by Dickinson and Perret, was the broad base 
of participation in its creation.331 Yet, in spite of extensive broad-based input, participation 
could have been more inclusive. The governments represented on the steering committee for 
the oversight mechanism consisted entirely of Western, developed countries. Dickinson 
writes: 
 
A meeting in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, or South America would likely have added a 
different mix of voices and perspectives. In addition, private clients of security firms—often large, 
                                                          
328 A. Clapham, quoted in S. Bussard, ‘La Suisse s’entend avec l’industrie pour réglementer l’action des mercenaires privés’, Le temps (2010), 
Cited in Perret (2014) 
329 For an interesting perspective on this evoulution, cf. Petersohn, Ulrich. "Reframing the anti-mercenary norm: Private military and security 
companies and mercenarism." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis (2014): 0020702014544915. 
330 Dickinson, L. A. (2013). Regulating the privatized security industry: the promise of public/private governance. Emory Law Journal, 63(2), 
pp. 421-423  
331 Actors from states, civil society, and business participated in the negotiation of the content of the code. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF), the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (ADH) in Geneva 
supported the entire process. Note that the ICRC, which supports the Montreux Document, did not support the International Code of Conduct. 




multinational corporations such as those in the extractive industries—were mostly absent from 
the process (..) although at least one meeting apparently included such corporations.332 
Only few NGOs are part of the process333. Leading host countries, such as Iraq, were notably 
absent, as were countries from the developing world more generally. Further, conspicuous is 
the absence from the process of another group of stakeholders - the employees of security 
firms.334 
 
4.2 The Challenges in Implementation 
 
However, despite the promise of the Code, problems remain with it.  First, the monitoring 
system has only materialized at the time of writing.335 Five years after the Code was signed, the 
agreed upon method of holding companies accountable for non-compliance - e.g. exclusion 
or suspension of non-compliant actors- is only on paper. 
 
Effective control may remain problematic wherever state procurement policy is not required, 
like in the context of maritime security. At the time of its drafting, legal opinions differed on 
whether the Montreux Document was suitable in the context of counter-piracy operations. 
Some argued that Somali piracy is not “armed conflict” under international law, and thus not 
                                                          
332 Dickinson, L. A. (2013), Ibid.  
333 Only Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First. On the trade off between transparency and independence, cf. Dickisnon. “Civil 
society groups wishing to participate will need to demonstrate that they have a strong record of promoting international human rights or 
humanitarian law and that they operate independent from both government and industry. This provision helps ensure that the civil society 
groups involved are true watchdogs and not mere fronts for government or industry masquerading as NGOs”. Dickinson, p. 449 
334 I thank Bill Douglas at SAIS that helped me see this point. On the issue of Trade Unions and security personnel mobilization, cf. 
McCallum, Jamie K. Global unions, local power: the new spirit of transnational labor organizing. Cornell University Press, 2013 




subject to the IHL obligations endorsed by the Montreux Document.336 The ICoC proposed 
“individuals in a PSC may be bound by international criminal law, including inter alia (…) 
piracy”.337 
 
A second issue is the congruence with existing initiatives.  An outstanding question revolved 
around the extractive industries that were involved late in the process. De Winter-Schmitt and 
Elms describe the trade-off between the Voluntary Principles and the Code: the extractive 
industries have expressed limited interest, in part because the (regulatory) mechanisms are far more onerous 
than the requirements laid out in the VPs.338 
A third and final problem is that the ICoCA lacks capacity. A slim budget and a staff of five 
support the secretariat of the ICoCA although it receives research and operational support 
from other organizations: the Swiss Government and the Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF).339  
Max Weber famously saw the bureaucracy’s capacity to follow rules and orders as depending 
on a variety of mechanisms, one of which being resources.  He wrote that “bureaucracy as a 
permanent structure is knit to the one presupposition of the availability of continuous 
revenues to maintain it” and that “the bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with the 
concentration of the material means of management in the hands of the master”.340  
                                                          
336 However, as Coito writes, the expansion of piracy since 2008, combined with the explicit invocation of IHL by Security Council Resolution 1851, suggest 
that piracy may increasingly be viewed as "armed conflict" in the future Coito, Joel Christopher. "Pirates vs. Private Security: Commercial Shipping, the 
Montreux Document, and the Battle for the Gulf of Aden." Cal. L. Rev. 101 (2013): 173.  
337 Geneva Academy Briefing, No. 4, The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, P.22 http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/docs/publications/briefing4_web_final.pdf , Accessed May 18, 2015 
338 A Critical Analysis of the proliferation, dynamic interaction and evolution of self-regulation within the private security industry, 
Unpublished manuscript, p.34 
339 http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICOCA_Draft_Financing_Model.pdf accessed March 3rd 2015. The latest available budget of the 
ICoCA reflects the same trends, cf. http://www.icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA_Budget%202014.pdf , accessed April 8, 2015 




The effectiveness of organizations, like a state’s bureaucracy’s capacity to influence and 
overcome resistance, depends upon resources and status. It is claimed that once procedures 
are in place funding is going to increase to support operational activities341 but the ICoCA may 
be, at present, under-resourced at the very moment when a project of routinization of PMSCs 
norms and oversight needs to be supported strongly by an independent bureaucracy.  
 
4.3 State Behavior 
 
There are two alternative approaches to how states may react to the rise of external 
international monitoring342. One possibility is that each may bargain within existing institutional 
framework. Another possibility is that states exploit the choice of law or forum to achieve their 
goals343- the so-called forum shopping. The higher the cost of forum shopping, the greater is 
the exogenous, independent influence of proposed institutional changes. Are there, then, 




Variation in Costs of Forum Shopping 
 
The ability of the great powers to shift forum, Drezner argued, raised the costs on future forum-
shifting strategies. 345 The fact that the first International Code has even been created increases 
                                                          
341 Email Correspondence, Swiss diplomat, May 2015 
342 Snyder and Cooley 2015.  
343 It is generally defined as the inclination and the ability of states to either act unilaterally or shift fora to friendlier organizations. Drezner 
2008, Krasner 1985, 1991 
344 Drezner, 2006.  




de facto the forum shopping costs of switching to an alternative structure. States’ incentives to 
shift forum would incur the opportunity cost associated with substituting across governance 
structures- i.e. to articulate a new policy given an already existing one.  
 
Not surprisingly, costs are not the same for all states. The costs would be proportional to the 
level of engagement with the Montreux system and rules- i.e. the higher their engagement, the 
higher the cost. The United States, with Switzerland, would incur high symbolic and political 
costs,346 perhaps the highest of all states. It would be less costly for China, for example, than 
the United States to shift to another regime.347 The latter, also known as Working Group on 
the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA), performs the functions of the 
Advisory Forum of the Montreux Document Participants.348  
 
Further, the panoply of initiatives of self-regulation contributes to regime complexity and to 






                                                          
346 Including the cost of “ceding the field to South Africa and to the proponent of a treaty”. Interview with U.S. government official, April 
2015 
347 China is a signatory of Montreux and a participant to the Montreux Document Forum, but not of the advisory forum the latter is the 
bridge between Montreux and the ICoCA. Yet, China has constantly shown a desire to comply to the highest standard. Author’s interview, 
US government representative, April 2015  




Box: the ISO standards 
When the US government initiated a system of national audit and certification for PMSCs in 
response to the reform process generated by the Montreux Document and ICoC, the aim was 
to “make human rights auditable” and to operationalize the principles of the ICoC into a 
certifiable management system standard349.  
With funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, the ASIS Commission on Standards- 
affiliated with the American national standards body (ANSI)- created an international 
management standard called ANSI/ASIS PSC1 Management System for Quality of Private 
Security Operations. According to Carmola, “the PSC1 is a remarkable document in that it 
speaks in a language of industry standards, but embeds the principles of human rights and 
humanitarian law into policies and procedures that are ‘auditable’.”350 
Then, the standards were submitted to the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO).351 The ISO is a nongovernmental organization with a long history of setting 
international standards; the ISO 9001 quality management system standard is one of the best 
known. The ISO created a new Project Committee and appointed the same leadership that 
headed the ASIS International Initiative.352 
 
 
                                                          
349 For an overview, cf. http://psm.du.edu/international_regulation/global_standards_codes_of_conduct/asis_standard.html , Accessed 
February 2015 
350 Carmola, 2014, p.756 
351 Many of these standards are management system standards, the ISO 9001 quality management system standard probably being the best 
known. For a general overview, cf. Murphy, Craig N., and JoAnne Yates. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO): global governance 
through voluntary consensus. Routledge, 2009.  
352 According to the authors, the ISO DIS 18788 guidelines are: broader than PSC1 (which is only for PSC); ISO is also for extractive firms 








Proliferation of standards 
 
At present, several standards create a confusing web of overlaps often mentioned as the best 
illustration of “keeping options open for states”.353 Until the ISO standards becomes the 
unique golden rule, dynamics of cooperation and competition are going to linger. Even in the 
US, the single largest market, applicable standards are currently competing. 354  
The rivalry between competing standards presently increases regime complexity and spurs a 
global governance of duplication and overlap, potentially undermining the entire system of 
self-regulation. Dezalay and Garth have provided an account of the creation of a specific 
organizational field- i.e. a history of transnational arbitration.355 The conflictual evolution of 
PMSC governance could be comparable as long as it retains a gravitational center but 
institutional proliferation could also compromise the entire development of the Swiss 
initiative. 
The established academic approaches in cases of competition between alternative standards 
have either relied on Gerschenkron’s perspective that timing is a key variable356 or on 
                                                          
353 Author’s Interviews, frm. State Dept. official, New York City, December 2014 
354 In fact, it will default to ASIS to decide if the ISO standard surpasses PSC.1, in which case ASIS can withdraw PSC.1 or let it sunset at its review period, 
writes Rebecca DeWinter-Schmitt http://psm.du.edu/commentary/ , Accessed February 2015 
355 Dezalay and Garth, Op. Cit. Their history stresses the delicate transition from personal charismatic to routinized and specialized expertise 
negotiated by the International Chamber of Commerce 
356 Countries that industrialized first, would be the first to develop product standards (Gerschenkron 1962). Thus, in the early industrialized 




institutionalist approaches focused on events (“critical junctures”) that led to state-led product 
standardization.357  
 
The most recent literature on adaptation and change in standardization stresses the strong 
mediating impact of existing institutional configuration on the speed and direction of 
change358. This literature focuses on product standards, however, and can be relevant only if 
we assume, ceteris paribus, that security can be compared to other goods359, then competition 
between rival standards is ultimately going to depend upon existing implementing institutions.360 
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357 The case of Germany during World War I is an example of an unexpectedly long war necessitating rationalization of supply. The American 
Civil War generated a similar development but left no lasting institutional legacy (Heilbroner and Singer 1994:140 in Witte). In contrast with 
the German and American experience, Witte argues that one of the important and influential global standards-setter, Japan, can be 
characterized as government-led. It started with the establishment of establishment of procurement standards by the navy and the army, and 
became then coordinated by the MITI.  
358 Witte, Jan Martin. Dissertation. (2007) National Varieties of Standardization: A Comparative Study of Emergence, Development and Change in National 
Standardization Systems. Witte argues that the outcomes of change are not pre-determined.  
359 For a conceptualization of security as a public or private good, cf. Engerer, Hella. "Security as a public, private or club good: some 
fundamental considerations." Defence and Peace Economics 22.2 (2011): 135-145.  
360 There is an obvious imbalance between developed and developing countries in the participation to the creation of ISO standards  





Several states have committed to standards that hold some promise. Non-state actors have 
historically found access to law making processes and there is a long history of private rule 
making.362.  
The proposed institutional changes do not challenge the broader existing political and social 
order363 and “rogue PMSCs” that choose to remain outside regulatory frameworks can still 
violate standards. The same holds true for rogue states that didn’t participate to the Swiss 
initiative.  Yet, the Code is perhaps the best form of institutional innovation as it contemplates 
a greater role for states through procurement policy even if what it can achieve depends upon 
the continued commitment of states. The higher costs of forum shopping may not enough 
for strong states who do not want to comply. The effectiveness of voluntary regulation relies 







                                                          
362 Boyle, Alan, and Christine Chinkin. The making of international law. Oxford University Press, 2007,chap. 2. Several historical examples are 
considered, from the mediaeval political structures to commercial enterprises like the East India Company; social movements that campaigned 
for the abolition of slavery or workers right; the people’s movements that have brought down governments.  
NGOs are singled out because they alone are given international legal status by the UN Charter. P.45. Walter Mattli and Tim Buthe, “Setting 
International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?” World Politics 56 (2003) 
363 One of the best contributions on this remains Abrahamsen and Williams, Op. Cit. Also, Leander has written that Codes de-politicize by 
distraction and produced a web of second-order regulation, i.e. of regulation dealing with the rules for setting rules (Leander, Anna. "What do 















Regulatory cooperation in Africa 
 
In the preceding chapters, I argued that variation in regulatory change in global politics is a 
process largely shaped by interests. I now move to explain variation at African state and inter-
state level. 
The dynamic is made more complex because the state interests lead to strategies of 
contestation and extraversion and also because choices and preferences are based on distinct 
normative foundations. While holding a monopoly of legitimate violence is one of the 
hallmarks of the modern legal- bureaucratic state, as Max Weber considered, the norm on the 
monopoly of violence in African political systems does not have the same meaning. In contrast 
to the norms emphasized in Part I, notably neutral humanitarianism, a driver of the Swiss 
initiative- two set of norms matter to the discussion in Part III: democracy and human rights 
can provide long-term prospects for PMSCs norms and are at times in tension with the anti-
mercenary norm. 
In this preamble, thus, more assumptions are required on the linkages between IR literature 
and African studies, on the theoretical expectations on norms’ influence in Africa and on the 




Table C: Regulatory Cooperation in Africa 
Framework Case-study, level of engagement (chapter) 
1. Montreux 
Document 
South Africa: mixed, with contestation 
(chapter 5) 
Uganda: mixed, with extraversion (chapter 5) 
Nigeria: initial engagement (chapter 6) 
Liberia: low-medium (chapter 7) 
Sierra Leone: high (chapter 8) 
2. U.N. Draft 
Convention; 
South Africa: leadership (chapter 2 and 5) 
3. National legislations 
governing PMSCs and 
their activities 




Relevance of IR, norms and regime for Africa 
The relationship between Africa and International Relations as a discipline has been marked 
by the dominance of perspectives in IR that have sometimes dismissed Africa as a weak and 
marginal continent. Cornelissen et al. argued that Africa is generally under-represented in the 
mainstream IR scholarship and is mostly left out of the theoretical debates.”364 Thus, the use 
of IR concepts, like regime theory, that I have so far proposed must recognize the question 
about whether the “values, assumptions and norms that the discipline of IR explicitly or 
                                                          





implicitly promotes are neutral and universal, or whether there are tensions between the 
underlying assumptions of IR and African studies”.365  
In other words, do IR concepts like regime, globalization, or sovereignty leave any agency to 
African politics? My assumption is that agency can be found in African states. Jean-François 
Bayart criticized the arguments that Africa is either marginalized from the rest of the world, 
an exploited periphery perpetually bound in a dependent relation to the center. He showed 
that “the leading actors in Sub-Saharan societies have tended to compensate for their 
difficulties (…) by deliberate recourse to the strategies of extraversion, mobilizing resources 
derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment.”366 The study 
of agency informs scholarship and policymaking and perhaps is in the process of becoming a new 
orthodoxy, according to Chabal, who writes that agency is defined as directed, meaningful, 
intentional and self-reflective social action (Chabal p.11).  
 
My assumption on agency is explored in the case studies. First, the national legislation of post-
conflict Sierra Leone became a source of practice for PMSCs governance in the Montreux 
Document. Second, the Liberian state was one of the actors that shaped the increase 
permissiveness in the use of PMSCs at sea. Third, South Africa led on several fronts, from 
domestic regulation to the involvement with the Montreux Document and with her leadership 
                                                          
365 For a recent examination, cf. the forthcoming Africa’s International Relations: Sovereignty, Extraversion, and China. African Affairs, (2015). 
Brown argues that “sovereignty remains a central organizing device” in African politics, and this “reinforces rather than questions the 
relevance of International Relations to African studies”. Mohan and Lampert pick up the important theme of African agency, arguing that at 
various levels African actors have negotiated, shaped, and even driven Chinese engagements in significant ways 




in U.N. Draft Convention. On balance, the ‘marginalized’ continent has offered more policy 
direction on PMSCs governance than Asia or Latin America. 
Having delineated African states as rational actor with independent agency, I explore the 
influence of global change on the continent, or the second image reversed.367, i.e. the direct and 
indirect role of the United States and China, as chief signatories of Montreux and major player 
in the African continent. Liberia’s choices were set within a wider process, with two U.S. 
PMSCs rebuilding the army, the special police and the justice sector. An account is offered by 
one of its creators: The Liberia program is unique even from the programs in Iraq and Afghanistan in that 
it was entirely outsourced to the private sector. (…) DynCorp’s profit motive drove it to find innovative, efficient, 
and effective solutions to thorny security problems, and this accounts for some of Liberia’s success today368. On 
the other hand, I look at China’s involvement through the lens of countries where Chinese 
PMSCs operate and I assess the Chinese input to the Montreux initiative and the U.N. treaty. 
 
Not surprisingly, research on private security provision simplified or disregarded the question 
of agency. It is claimed that the “elites abandon the public security system” and Haugen argued 
that "throughout the developing world, public justice systems are being replaced with private 
systems of security and dispute resolution”369. These questions directly evoke a debate that has 
a long history in political economy of development and in the study of African politics. What 
is the logic that the author of the Locust Effect describes? Hauger seems to evoke the standard 
                                                          
367 Gourevitch, Op. Cit. 
368 McFate, Sean. Building Better Armies: An Insider's Account of Liberia., 2013. McFate is one of the three individuals who spearheaded DynCorp’s 
effort. ” 




account of the deleterious effects of elite behavior in Africa that highlights their greed and dishonesty 
(Chabal 2013).370  
 
Thus, there is here an added reason that invites an exploration of agency in international 
regulatory cooperation around private security. The agency and the role of the state has been 
central in political economy approaches as well at least since stabilization and structural 
adjustment policies were associated with major reductions in the size and scope of the state371 
so this question has relevance for the debates on privatization in general- i.e. the reduced the 
role and functions of the state as its role as a direct producer of goods and services.  
 
Hauger’s hypothesis on how African elites contributed to “private systems of security and 
dispute resolution” could imply a non-negligible responsibility of African elites. I shall inquire 
whether and how African elites contribute and influence regulatory choices372. This is a 
perspective that development literature stressed. Elite choices can have an autonomous impact 
on developmental performance. Lewis showed for example that at the state-level elite 
coordination can be a key or a hindrance to successful development.  
 
My research suggests that the elites’ role is not as uniform. Neither Sierra Leone, nor Liberia 
and Nigeria can offer explicit corroboration of Hauger’s account. South Africa even 
challenged the unregulated global growth of “private systems of security”. 
                                                          
370 One version transmutes into the contention that the crisis is both inevitable and intractable, which implies that Africans lack agency- cursed as they are by their 
own institutions and traditions. Hence the discourse of agency is in part an attempt to combat the causality of what is called Afro-pessimism (Chabal, ibid, p15) 
371 I refer to Van de Walle, African Economies. 
372 My general inspiration here is two-fold. First, Lewis’ Growing Apart; Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria led me to consider 
how elites and business groups can influence regulatory choices. In the same vein, insofar as I stress the political origins rather than regulation 
itself, I take stock of Mattli and Woods’ warning that the political basis of global regulation is central in order to understand whether regulatory 
change benefits narrow interests or achieves wider public purposes. The regulatory process can be manipulated and captured; it can emerge 




Evolution of the anti-mercenary norm 
In the introduction, I described part of the intellectual and social history of the anti-mercenary 
norm and built the theoretical expectation that the norm has been reformulated but is still 
influential.373 In Africa, more than elsewhere, the anti-mercenary norm can coincide with a 
puritanical condemnation of the use of private force in all forms. 
The anti-mercenary norm is by far the strongest driver or inhibitor of regulatory cooperation 
both at the state level and an inhibitor at the continental level.  At the state-level, it can be 
overcome- like in the case of Madagascar, which engaged, rejected, and then eventually 
endorsed the Montreux Document.374 The Prime Minister underlined his country's support 
for the Document by stressing the importance for Madagascar of human rights and 
international humanitarian law. 
In the case studies, I try and identify who adopts which norms and who are the advocates of 
what. I ask how do ideas come to prevail, and what linkages they have to the political power. 
In Nigeria the anti-mercenary norm works against my expectation- it actually shapes the initial 
engagement with Montreux. In the former case, my hypothesis is that policy-makers try to 
escape the conventional definition that would deem STTEP a mercenary outfit. Thus, they are 
led to consider the regulatory cooperation for the first time.  
In South Africa the dynamic produced engagement and contestation. A minister claims that 
“mercenaries are the scourge of Africa”. He signifies that the anti-mercenary antipathy of post-
apartheid politics is amplified by a failure to create effective domestic control over the flow of 
fighters to Equatorial Guinea and Iraq. I shall explain how the anti-mercenary norm leads to 
the engagement and subsequent contestation of the Montreux process. 
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In the interplay between interests and ideas, popular ideas can be used to propagate and 
legitimize elite’s interests. The narrative articulates the construction of interests- be it national 
interests or economic interests, because interests are not obviously discovered by self-interested, rational 
actors but rather, they are constructed through a process of social interaction.375 In the extreme form, idea 
could be just ‘hooks’ and not play an independent role.376 When states engaged with, signed 
the Montreux Document, or chose to begin a domestic regulatory process, I assess interest-
based explanations. I find the interest-based explanation particularly plausible in Uganda. Her 
association with Montreux amounts to a strategy of extraversion with state choices shaped by 
informal networks between state and business. 
  
 
PMSCs in Africa  
 
The development of regulatory preferences in Africa has to contend with the nature of 
contracting and the distinct features of PMSCs working in Africa. I described the broad 
features of the political economy of PMSCs in the introduction. Here, I specify their activities 
and I describe the unique engagement of Chinese PMSCs. 
Private security activities in Africa can be more specifically described as composed of the 
protection of assets and persons in land; activities organized around the safeguard of 
peacekeeping, humanitarian, diplomatic missions, and to a degree, the activities for protection 
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of maritime trade and maritime activities. The main activity for PMSCs in the African 
continent is the protection of assets and investments on land.  Local and international PMSCs 
protect trade, infrastructure, and resource extraction activities in a number of African 
countries. Firms also participate in operations against terrorist or criminal organizations from 
the Sahara desert to Kenya; they provide support to multi-lateral interventions led by the 
United Nations or the African Union377. The case study of Nigeria in chapter 6 illustrates how 
one firm, Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (hereinafter, STTEP) is 
integrated to the Nigerian army in the battle against Boko Haram. However, the majority of 
PMSCs operate outside of armed conflict. 
G4S is the prime example of a large international PMSC in Africa. G4S is a founder signatory 
of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers although the firm 
generally defines herself as a global provider of security to the public, not a PMSC. Globally, G4S 
has 623,000 employees in over 110 countries. In Africa, it is the largest employer in the 
continent with 125,000 employees and operations in 24 countries.378 G4S protects ports, like 
the Tangier-Med Port, one of the largest capacity ports in Africa, and energy projects, like the 
£500 million Lake Turkana sustainable energy project in Kenya, part of a public and private 
sector joint initiative.379 The firm operates in South Africa and has a number of important 
contracts in Sierra Leone, partly as a result of the takeovers and eventual incorporation of 
other firms380 and where it was able to continue operations during the Ebola crisis.381  
                                                          
377 I deal with the regulatory aspects of this nexus in Chapter two.A significant number of multilateral peace-keeping and peace operations 
have been launched to address African conflicts. By the end of 2013, eight of the UN’s 15 peacekeeping missions were in Africa, and involved 
70 per cent of all UN peacekeepers deployed globally. Notably, PMSCs have been involved in the peacebuilding process in Liberia and the 
United Nations/African Union Mission (UNAMID) in the Darfur region of western Sudan.  
378 Annual Report, available at: http://www.g4s.com/~/media/Files/Annual%20Reports/AR%202014/Full%20ARA.pdf , Accessed July 
30th 2015 
379 Ibid. 
380 Partly as a result of the presence of Wackenhut and the South African company Gray Security in the country prior to their takeovers by 
Group4 and Securicor and eventual incorporation into G4S. Abrahamsen and Williams, Op.Cit, p. 149 




Finally, PMSCs protect maritime trade and maritime activities. By 2012, approximately 40% 
of the 42,500 vessels that transit the Horn used armed guards but while these firms use African 
ports, they are often based elsewhere. This activity represents a smaller share than the market 
on land382 but a growing one.383  
PMSCs on board ships have opened a complicated and long cooperation process, with new 
policy problems for African states. First, the presence of armed guards on ships poses new 
challenges related to the movement of armed guards and arms in ports and territorial waters; 
second, liability issues arise from guards’ use of force and firearms.384  Small arms control 
challenges led to the development of floating armories, which are vessels- part storage depot, 
part housing- positioned in high-risk areas of international waters.385 Armories themselves 
could be targets for attack by pirates or terrorists and they could circumvent national laws 
limiting the import and export of weapons.386  
 
Chinese PMSCs in Africa: Origins and Significance 
The growth of PMSCs I have described should not overlook a parallel development: the 
growth of Chinese corporate security. At the forefront are firms like Shandong Huawei 
Security. 
                                                          
382 Cullen and Berube, Op. Cit.  
383 A source forecasts the global maritime security market to grow from $13.94 billion in 2014 to $20.87 billion in 2019, at a Compound 
Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 8.4% from 2014 to 2019. Available at: http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/maritime-
security-market-1033.html , Accessed April 8, 2015.  
384 Escalation at Sea: Somali Piracy and Private Security Companies, by Nicolas Florquin, 2012. In Small Arms Survey, Available at: Small 
Arms Survey 2012: Moving Targets. 
385 They house weapons and ammunition, as well as guards on board who wait, sometimes for months, for their next deployment. 
386 In a 2012 report, the U.N. Security Council committee on Somalia and Eritrea said that the armory business was “uncontrolled and almost 
entirely unregulated, posing additional legal and security challenges for all parties involved.” More recently, the HRC called attention to the use 
of private security and "floating armories" (…) and the specific challenges included: jurisdiction issues linked to “flags of convenience”; weapons storage in the context 




Patey to writes in the New Kings of Crude that Chinese security firms, such as Shandong Huawei 
Security Group, are part and parcel of the protection of Chinese interests abroad and part of an increasingly 
complex relationship between Chinese National Oil Companies and Beijing.387 The group operates across 
Africa and is training thousands of guards at their international training school with Australian 
supervision.388  
It is hard to see a uniform pattern for the Chinese public-private assemblages but Huawei is 
certainly at the forefront. In South Africa, for example, Huawei Security Group created a joint 
venture between a local company and a number of Chinese resource and logistics firms.389 
With time, Huawei may be able to compete with G4S, a group that is presently unrivaled in 
Africa.  However, while G4S was a founder signatory of the ICoC, Huawei was not.  
Thus, it is important to trace and understand the origins of Chinese PMSC in Africa. At the 
time of writing, Frontier Services Group, a traded logistics and aviation company based in 
Hong Kong, and founded by Citic Group, China’s largest state-owned investment firm, with 
the involvement of Erik Prince.390 Yet, few authors have investigated such origins. 
I previously wrote on one of the earliest documented uses of Chinese contractors in Africa 
and argued that the development of security choices between China and African states can be 
traced to the use of contractors after the attack on the capital of Sudan of 2008.391  
It is important to trace a narrative that helps explain the politics of cooperation and why the 
                                                          
387 He cites Daniel Houpt Assessing China’s response to kidnapping abroad.China Brief, 10, 2012. Patey 2014:258 
388 Australian MSS Security, signed a partnership with Chinese private security company Shandong Huawei in 2012. Cf. 
https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2014/may/1398866400/james-brown/guns-hire, accessed October 2015 
389 Mail and Guardian, 21st December 2014. Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2014-12-21-first-china-sa-security-services, accessed 27th 
December 2014. A Memorandum of Understanding stated the terms of collaboration between HW Raid Security and China Minmetals First 
ChromeMining Co, China Zendai Group and China Xinguang Industrial Group was signed.  
390 Cf. a series of articles by Matthew Cole and Jeremy Scahill, available at: https://theintercept.com/2016/03/24/blackwater-founder-erik-
prince-under-federal-investigation/ Accessed April 16, 2016 




recent Petroleum Act of 2012 explicitly acknowledged private security companies in Sudan392.  
In Sudan 2005, a peace agreement paved the way for the independence referendum, and then 
separation of South Sudan, in 2011. The partition took place relatively peacefully but both 
countries were on the brink of war several times because of a number of unsettled issues 
including border demarcation and oil. 393 
Chinese contractors first entered Sudan in this climate of cyclical insecurity and amidst the 
global economy’s booms and bust, and associated to the oil police, and the international 
patronage for resources. It is presumably in 2008 that firms started to operate. As Africa had 
gradually privatized security over two decades, Sudan was the only country that never did 
and it is worth noting that no foreign firm had been allowed to deploy security teams before 
2008.  
Instead, Sudanese and Chinese security teams started working in close collaboration. This 
hybrid is reminiscent of the security assemblage that has taken place in Nigeria.394 As the Niger 
Delta security worsened, oil companies integrated public forces into their private security 
operations. A similar course may have been chosen in this case, as dangers increased over the 
course of 2008. 
It is a plausible hypothesis that the arrival of private security can be traced to the attack on the 
capital, Khartoum, of 2008, an event that vividly shifted the battleground from the periphery 
to the center.  Despite decades of warfare, Khartoum had not experienced fighting in its streets 
since 1976.  A curfew was imposed, the airport closed down. Many of the regime elites were 
                                                          
392 James, L.; Fields of Control: Oil and (In)security in Sudan and South Sudan . Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies, Geneva 2015. http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP40-Oil.pdf , 
accessed November 22nd 2015. The author notes that many PMSCs employ demobilized SPLA soldiers. 
393 What follows is based on Boggero, M. "Private Security and Governance in Weak States: new and old cases." Sudan Studies Association 
Newsletter 24 (2014). 




forced to go into hiding for the first time. The theatre of war remained no longer in distant 
places, the frontline shifted dramatically, thus providing perhaps new perceptions of security 
at home and abroad. 
Thus, Sudan rewrote private security companies into the legislation with the Petroleum Act of 
2012.  Similarly, the country also participated to the regional dialogue on the challenges and 





                                                          
395 The second Regional Conference on the African continent, was held on 11th November and attended by 16 states from the Anglophone 






CONTESTATION OR ACCOMMODATION  
 
 
The following chapter shows the varying influence of the anti-mercenary norm. In South 
Africa, the anticipation on the norm is partly confirmed with electoral politics contributing to 
exacerbate it. Against the theoretical expectations, the norm is defused by political elites in 
contexts such as Uganda. 
I proceed to contextualize how changes in foreign enlistment stir the anti-mercenary norm; I 
then use the method of process tracing to illustrate how such changes activated the norm and 
shaped South Africa’s preferences towards the Montreux Document. I then contrast the 
trajectory of Uganda, another signatory of Montreux, where the anti-mercenary norm played 
no role in spite of foreign enlistment reaching ten to twelve thousand.  
 
5.1 What do we mean by Foreign Enlistment or Third Country Nationals? 
 
The phenomenon of Third Country Nationals (TCN) consisted in the reliance of PMSCs on 
foreign employees, hired from lower-income countries for a variety of tasks in the security 





The issue of TCNs became associated with a chief weakness of international regulation and 
the Montreux Document- i.e. the absence of protection for a category of employees. It has 
been noted that TCNs, particularly those working in developing countries and areas near battle 
zones, seem especially susceptible to forced labor and human trafficking.396 This topic was 
highlighted in the Montreux Document’s Shadow Report.397   
Percy writes that the foreign enlistment by PMSCs was not considered problematic for 
Western policymakers due to the fact that neutrality laws have never banned foreign 
recruitment. As Percy explains, the ‘real purpose of the neutrality laws was to prohibit the 
commission of unauthorized acts of war by individuals within their countries. In fact, the 
American legislation was shaped in response to an incident sparked by privateering rather than 
mercenary enlistment. Overseas recruitment of PMSCs was, however, problematic. 
 
How did domestic politics lead to permissiveness or opposition to foreign enlistment? Why 
did some countries deported foreigners for attempting to recruit local nationals? Why did 
Zambia or Namibia denied the authorization while Uganda allowed it? In most cases, policy 
entrepreneurs exacerbated existing anti-mercenary feelings and prevented recruitment. Only 
in two cases recruitment succeeded. Permissiveness was authorized by Uganda’s political elites 
who gained from it. On the other hand, South Africa deemed PMSCs recruitment in conflict 
with her domestic laws. The failure to create effective domestic control over the flow of 
fighters and the coincidence with electoral politics amplified the anti-mercenary norms of 
post-apartheid politics. 
                                                          
396 Ibid., DCAF Report, other literature 
397 The States of origin (of Third Country Nationals) may not fall under the current categories of Contracting, Territorial, or Home States. For example, in 
Chile’s situation, some of its citizens were contracted by U.S. companies through non-U.S. based hiring firms under contracts that referenced neither Chilean nor U.S. 
law. The Montreux Document’s State categories do not directly address this situation. Perret in DeWinter-Schmitt, p. 38. It should however be mentioned 
that the Montreux Document refers not only to the home, contracting and territorial states but also to all other states including therefore the 





In Zambia, recruitment was deemed to have violated national anti-mercenary rulings.398 
Zambia deported foreigners for attempting to recruit local nationals. A similar story occurred 
in Namibia; the approval seemed forthcoming only to be later denied. Many were excited about 
the arrival of a firm, an "international force protection" company with clients that include the US Army and 
Marine Corps. (…) local newspapers reported that the government had originally given the company permission 
to set up a branch in Windhoek, the capital.399. 
 
The case of South Africa and Uganda, two signatories of Montreux, are both outstanding. 
While my main focus remains South Africa, I here use elements of a paired-case comparison 
that help the reader appreciate the main case.  
 
Beyond South Africa and Uganda, the recruitment of Africans for deployment overseas has 
been limited. It was not negligible in Kenya and in Sierra Leone400; some were recruited as 
employees of PMSCs in maritime security but in trivial numbers and only from South Africa401. 
Thus, my case selection is somewhat constrained by the fact that few other African countries 
were used for the enlistment of TCNs. 
 
5.2 Existing explanations for Foreign Enlistment 
Economic logic is insufficient to understand the recruitment for the Market for Force. What 
determined or constrained events was something else. A complex chain of events started with 
                                                          
398 Cheap Labor for Private Security, By Jody Ray Bennett for ISN, 2009. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?ots777=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=98671 
399 Private Security Contractors Look to Africa for Recruits, Stephanie Hanes, The Christian Science Monitor, Tuesday 08 January 2008.  
400 cf. Mynster Christensen, Maya. (2014)  





the U.S. government policy decision to outsource tasks to foreign employees, the initial cause 
of the phenomenon, driven by the unique dynamics of the Iraq conflict.402  
While it may appear that the global market for force was driven by the differences in relative 
wages and labor demand in states with high unemployment, the market alone does not explain 
the distribution of Third Country Nationals. A cross-national study of recruitment shows that 
historical-structural drivers, such as military reputation, explain the enlistment.403  For example, 
the employment of labor from Chile or Uganda was due to the country’s military reputation 
and ties to the United States. Similarly, Fijian soldiers had helped combat the Japanese in 
World War Two, and gained a reputation as fierce and disciplined soldiers. 
This is not enough, however, to explain state choices. The policies of territorial states crucially 
delineated the global market. 404 Some states permitted enlistment; others did not. Firms and 
entrepreneurs embarked in a search for labor the world over in a truly global market for 
security, from Uganda to Namibia, Mozambique, Burundi. At times, governments opened 
their doors. Other times, they did not.  
 
5.2.1 What aggravated the anti-mercenary norm 
 
In South Africa, the anti-mercenary norm lingered in post-apartheid politics and was amplified 
both by foreign enlistment and by the Wonga coup. The anti-mercenary norm by itself was 
not an autonomous driver of state preferences and regulatory cooperation. 
                                                          
402 Not the Afghan war. Note that the use of TCNs differed between Iraq and Afghanistan due to the different relationship that U.S forces 
had with local armed groups. In the former case, the U.S. had disbanded the army. In the latter case, Afghans were employed in the private 
security sector and there was no great reliance on TCNs. One could speculate that had the Iraqi army not be disbanded, the need for TCNs 
would not have emerged. 
403 Döring, Katharina. Chilean professionals, reliable Fijians and affordable Ugandans: Transnational Recruitment for the Private Security Sector in Iraq, 2003-
2011. Diss. 2014. 




During the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea, the activation of the social antipathy and 
rhetorical devices associated to the anti-mercenary norm was also associated to electoral 
politics amplified the tone and resonance of the norm. Second, the problem of enlistment the 
difficulty in the application of domestic laws related to the identification of armed conflict which 
shaped state choices towards regulation.  
 
5.2.2 Domestic reverbations of the Wonga coup 
Before the Iraq War, the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea had high resonance in South 
Africa and shaped the belief that laws were ineffective. Two reasons defined the significance 
of the coup and strengthened anti-mercenary feelings.  
 
First, the coup attempt started unfolding in the midst of South Africa’s third democratic 
election campaign. President Thabo Mbeki and was fighting internal and external opponents 
when on March 7, the first South Africans were arrested in Harare. Elections were only one 
month away. Unpredictably, all was happening at once: first, the death of the first South 
African employed in Iraq as security contractor in January; then, Alberts and Rouget were 
arrested for mercenarism in Ivory Coast.405 Then, the coup in Equatorial Guinea.  On March 
10, Nick du Toit was paraded on TV in Equatorial Guinea. Two of the Africa’s most reviled and 
ignored dictators, Zimbabwe’s Mugabe and Equatorial Guinea’s Obiang Nguema, became saviors of post-
colonial Africa (Pelton 327).  
                                                          
405 In 2002, South African Carl Alberts and French-born South African Richard Rouget, worked in Ivory Coast.  The former officer in the 
French army became the first person convicted of mercenary activities under the 1998 legislation. He admitted recruiting fighters for the 
Ivory Coast conflict and was sentenced to either five years in prison or a fine equivalent to US $14,500. He paid the fine. 
http://mg.co.za/article/2004-03-03-sas-security-experts-defy-the-law. Rouget then went on to work in the USA as a governance mentor. Cf. 





The government may be punished at the poll for the inaction, with internal ANC politics 
already marked by tumultuous conflict. Mbeki tried to suppress competition and extend his 
hold on power by maintaining the presidency of the ANC; Lekota, a challenger for the job, 
was given the poisoned chalice of the defense ministry406. 
 
 
5.2.3 Iraq War: effects of Foreign Enlistment on the anti-mercenary norm 
While the Equatorial Guinea case came to a close, the Iraq war endured. The participation of 
South Africans in the war became unequivocal: an initial estimate of two thousand in Iraq 
increased to five thousand in mid-2006407. Criticisms to the government rose as wounded 
returnees from Iraq came back.  
 
Among the South Africans involved, there were former leaders of the apartheid state army 
and police.  The participation of many former Executive Outcomes veterans also made it seem 
like business as usual for the apartheid cowboys408. Political entrepreneurs could proceed to 
use the heightened anti-mercenary antipathy and claim “mercenaries are the scourge of 
Africa”.409  
                                                          
406 Mbeki‘s competitor eventually made it to the ANC presidency in 2007 (Gumede 2005:316) . Gumede also writes: Lekota made a comeback and 
blocked attempts by Mbeki to capture the six top positions in the ANC (…) in 1999 he grudgingly gave Lekota the poisoned chalice of the defense ministry in the 
hope that his impeccable credentials would be tainted by a stint in the hot seat  
407 Scahill reports two thousand (Scahill 2007:431). Legal advisers from the defence department Siviwe Njikela report 5000. Business Day 
(Johannesburg, South Africa) - Wednesday, June 7, 2006  
408 Slap on wrist will not stop apartheid cowboys. Business Day, Johannesburg, South Africa, Tuesday, April 13, 2004 




Engaging with Montreux in 2008 seemed like a sensible option because of the main concern 
that foreign states and companies must respect the South African law and refrain from recruiting South African 
nationals.410  
 
As the problem of TCNs rose, South Africa engaged its counterparts but periodically 
threatened to opt out. At the “Montreux + 5” conference, the withdrawal from Montreux is 
seriously considered. On the eve of the conference, Gumedze writes: the only document which 
links South Africa to the Montreux Document is the Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
(DIRCO) Strategic Plan 2010-2013 (Strategic Plan)411.   
 
5.2.4 Other factors 
 
At that juncture, norms partly shaped preferences about international regulatory cooperation 
but this is not to say that other factors did not exist. Fragmentation and capacity problems 
constrained outcomes. Hardly a robust structure before, the NCACC has had less and less of 
the required clouts to make authoritative claims. With the transition from Mbeki to Zuma, 
policy coordination became even less clear and the NCACC was never strengthened.412  
Besides, there were at least two other capacity problems. First, as the numbers of involved 
South Africans grew, individual prosecutions would be harder to carry out. Second, new 
extraterritorial responsibilities in territorial states created a new problem of capacity- for 
                                                          
410 Ibid.  
411 S. Gumedze (2013) in the Shadow Report to Montreux Document. The document states that DIRCO will, among other things “consider, supporting 
and participating in the Swiss Government’s initiative to disseminate the Montreux Document on Private Military and security Companies.”  




example, governments must provide consular assistance to families of PMSC personnel under 
investigation if they get problems in countries where they operate.413 
 
Beyond capacity, international factors prevented effectiveness and shaped South Africa’s 
international engagement. In fact, the new law passed, the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities 
and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act of 2006, was once 
again ineffective. On the one hand, it depended on a notion of armed conflict poorly 
defined,414 reflecting the unresolved question of how to delimit armed conflict and what is 
direct participation to hostilities415. Second, there was a difficulty in identification. The broader 
definition of services and assistance contained in the bill cast a wide net that included all actors 
in armed conflict employing South African nationals.416 In an attempt to identify Third 
Country Nationals, the law outlawed the activities of United Nations peacekeepers and 




                                                          
413 Cited by Amb. Abdul Minty, cf. http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/iihl_minty_south-
africa_2012.pdf , Accessed March 8, 2015 
414 The legal adviser of the South African Police Service said there was no formal way of deciding when armed conflict began or ceased in 
international law. Business Day, Johannesburg, South Africa, June 7, 2006. For a definition of armed conflict, ICRC proposes the following 
definitions, which reflect the strong prevailing legal opinion: 1. International armed conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed force 
between two or more States. 2. Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental 
armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva 
Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a 
minimum of organisation. cf. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf , Accessed March 15, 2014 
415 Cf. Melzer, Nils. "Interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law." (2009). 
Available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf , Accessed September 22, 2014 Melzer, Nils. "Keeping the 
Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities." NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 42 (2009): 831 
 
416 The issue came up during the discussion of the bill. Jacobs also said the committee should consider exempting certain recognised 
international organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, from being regulated by the bill. Business Day, 
Johannesburg, Wednesday, June 7, 2006.  
417 Heitman, unpublished document provided to the author. “The Act renders third country nationals potentially liable to arrest in South 
Africa for providing medial or other emergency services in a country or area that South Africa has deemed to be in conflict or where conflict 




5.3 Accommodation with Montreux: Uganda’s strategy of extraversion 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the opposite policy developed in Uganda. The case illustrates 
a choice where Montreux is associated to the endorsement of foreign enlistment and used as 
an added ‘extraversion’ strategy for domestic political and material benefit.418  
Unlike South Africa, Uganda was not an original signatory of Montreux. The signing of the 
Montreux Document was a standalone act. Uganda has not participated to debates on PMSCs 
regulations at the United Nations, and did not attend the diplomatic conference Montreux+5, 
and similarly disregarded the developments of the Montreux Forum.419  
As South Africa was pursuing a principled and sustained opposition to the foreign enlistment, 
Uganda’s network of state and business created a flow of recruitment. Local entrepreneurs 
like Bob Kasango, an attorney at an influential law firm in Kampala initiated the transfer of 
labor by linking the Washington based security provider firms to the Ugandan security 
company Askar.420 Entrepreneurs like Kasango, a relative of Salim Saleh, the younger brother 
of president Museveni, and companies like Askar ensured that an estimated ten to twelve 
thousand Ugandans served in Iraq.  
 
In Uganda, state policy acted as a key enabler. Ugandan authorities could have stopped the 
flow at an early stage, like Zambia or Namibia. Following complaints on deteriorating working 
                                                          
418 Some of the classic studies of ‘extraversion’ are Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: The political instrumentalization of 
disorder (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1999); Jean-Francois Bayart, L’État en Afrique: la politique du ventre (Fayard, Paris, 
1989); Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The politics of state survival (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1996) 
419 Author’s interview. March 2015 
420 The New Vision, cited in Döring, Katharina. Chilean professionals, reliable Fijians and affordable Ugandans: Transnational Recruitment for the Private 




conditions, signals emerge of a possible temporary halt on official recruitment421. When in 
2005 the first Ugandans left for Iraq, Döring writes: 
 
While ministers criticized this labor export, they were in turn blamed for not doing enough to 
create employment that would prevent people from seeking jobs abroad. The parliament was 
urging the government to investigate the situation, but Foreign Affairs Minister Sam Kutesa 
simply stated that neither was the government involved in the recruitment, nor did it want to 
interfere. Eventually a meeting between his office and the recruitment companies was arranged. 
It included the clarification that people would only go as private individuals and were themselves 
responsible for their working conditions and security in Iraq.422 
 
A plausible supposition is that personal networks between state and business informally 
sanctioned policy. Analogous state-business networks did not exist in South Africa. One firm, 
headed by Kellen Kayonga, a relative of Salim Saleh.423 Salim Saleh, used to be involved in 
Branch Energy, and more recently in Saracen Uganda, a subsidiary of a company formed from 
the remnants of Executive Outcomes.424  
Substantial benefit accrued to government coffers.  The Ugandan government cites revenue 
of 90 million USD per year; “while the traditional main export of coffee brings only 60 to 70 
                                                          
421 The respective special division had only one employee and a limited budget (Izama 2007a in Döring), p.37  
 
422 Döring, Op. Cit.p.37 
423 Gyezaho, 2006 in Döring. For a biographical account cf, Drohan, Madelaine. Making a Killing: How and why corporations use armed force to do 
business. Random House Canada, 2003. pp. 290-319. Drohan accounts include the entanglement in the privatizations of the nineties and 
Saleh’s exploitation of the Ugandan army occupation in Congo 
424 A UN report accused General Saleh and other Ugandan officers of using their ties to paramilitaries to plunder Congolese diamonds, gold 
and timber and it recommended placing financial restriction upon Saracen Uganda. Cf. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN doc. S/2002/1146. 




million US Dollar”, says a cabinet minister425. Some are presumably remittances flows and 
many individuals used their earned savings back in Uganda to open up small businesses but 
lack of data on inward workers’ remittances does not allow testing this hypothesis.426 
The signing of the Montreux Document a strategy of extraversion that fits with Reno’s 
suggestion that Uganda’s government “found salvation in African warfare’s role in world 
politics” as a recognized ally and in the global condemnation of the Lord’s Resistance Army’s 
use of child soldiers and commission of atrocities.427 The Montreux Document figured in this 
broad strategy where issues of security have historically shaped state formation and the way 
the state is rooted in local society 428.  
Conclusion 
 
Gourevitch reminded scholars that the international context often influenced domestic 
structures. In an instance of second image reversed, the formation of interests and preferences was 
greatly determined and bounded by events taking place in international politics. Yet, this chapter 
shows how norms were influential: the activation of the anti-mercenary norm depended upon 
the varying effect of foreign enlistment upon political entrepreneurs and elite beliefs, and on 
contingencies- such as electoral politics. The case of Uganda showed how norm can be defused 
by political elites.  
In this chapter, I have also noted that foreign enlistment has been mostly ignored by the IR 
                                                          
425 Most media indicate that the source of this statement is Mwesigwa Rukutana, is a Uganda lawyer and politician. He is the current State 
Minister for Labor in the Ugandan Cabinet.  
426 The flow of remittance from security work fits within a trend of significant growth in remittances from US$299 in 2003 to US$773 in 
2010 (World Bank 2011). The first Uganda Workers’ Remittances Report is from 2008. https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bou-
downloads/publications/TradeStatistics/RemittanceMonitoring/Rpts/All/Uganda_Workers_Inwards_Remittance_Report_2008.pdf 
accessed February 10, 2015 
427 Reno in Harbeson, pp. 162-164 




literature. Historically, the aim of neutrality laws for states was to prohibit unauthorized acts of 
war by individuals within their countries. Thus, most states have never banned foreign enlistment. 
This research has important implications for the debate on private security because the 
contracting states’ preference for TCNs will endure and contestation to regulatory cooperation 








NIGERIA’s ENGAGEMENT  
 
 
In January 2015, the government of Nigeria hired a South African firm, called STTEP, as 
technical advisors in the fight against Boko Haram. Soon afterwards, Nigeria policy circle 
engaged for the first time with regulatory cooperation. In this section, I explain this choice; I 
illustrate and problematize this case of contingent contracting which has distinctive features. 
I then argue that this episode of contracting is the key that drives Nigeria’s engagement 
towards Montreux.  
 
6.1 Context 
Several things are notable about the use of STTEP. First, Eben Barlow, the South African 
veteran who formerly headed Executive Outcomes, led the operations. Second, the work was 
carried out without South Africa’s approval. “We work under the radar as far as possible,” 
Barlow says, “and will never compromise a government or a client429.  Third, the use of STTEP 
was integrated to the Nigerian army- and presumably to the larger multinational effort. This 





fit with the current wisdom that contractors operating alone rarely fill the security gap and 
usually accompany the international community in military interventions.430   
Fourth, it could be hypothesized that the military objective was attained without apparent loss 
of state control. “(We worked with the) Nigerian Army division commander in the area of 
operations who gave us his intent, guidelines, and restrictions.”431 At the same time, not 
enough evidence may be available. It is unknown how these private forces are organized, and 
how their remuneration will be arranged, a Nigerian government spokesperson was quoted 
stating ‘that the government in not engaging in “any backchannel or unlawful recruitment”’432. 
Last but not least, STTEP was reportedly involved in direct combat.433 “We did not develop 
the strategy to destroy the enemy,” Barlow elaborated, and STTEP was indeed integrated 
within the larger force but their role went beyond the role of “technical advisers”. 
 
6.2 STTEP and the problem of definition 
As I wrote in the introduction, mercenaries are difficult to define and conventional definitions 
revolved around two elements: the foreign status and the motive of financial gain. While a 
growing community of states endorses the criteria for naming PMSCs, paucity in defining 
mercenaries has not disappeared.  
                                                          
430 Branovic, Op. Cit. 
431 Blog post, Jack Murphy: http://sofrep.com/40633/eeben-barlow-speaks-pt-3-tactics-used-destroy-boko-haram/#ixzz3buTIuECZ 
Accessed June 1st 2015. Also: Barlow advocates, relentless offensive action means immediately exploiting successful combat operations to 
keep the heat on the enemy. This strategy relies of the synchronization of every asset brought to the battlefield, and applied on multiple 
fronts against Boko Haram. One of those tactics includes the relentless pursuit of enemy forces. 
 
432 Al Jazeera, ‘Nigeria Acknowledges Presence of Foreign Mercenaries’, 14 March 2015, http://www. 
aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/03/nigeria-foreign-mercenaries-boko-haram-150313122039403.html (accessed 25 August 2015).  
433 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11596210/South-African-mercenaries-secret-war-on-
Boko-Haram.html His air power unit was “given ‘kill blocks’ to the front and flanks of the strike force and could conduct missions in those 




In this dissertation, I adopted Percy’s definition and I have defined mercenaries on the basis 
of low attachment to a cause and low legitimate control.434 
Adopting Percy’s criteria to analyze recent mercenary cases in Africa, I now propose to 
contextualize the case of STTEP. In what follows, I show that according to conventional 
definitions that rely on foreign status and financial gain, STTEP is a mercenary outfit. With 
the Percy’s definition, it would not.  
Following the table below, I proceed in chronological order starting with the case of Equatorial 
Guinea, Libya, Ivory Coast before returning to Nigeria.  
Equatorial Guinea is the classic case of mercenaries of the old kind, à la Bob Denard or Mike 
Hoare. Simon Mann, formerly at Executive Outcome with Eben Barlow, was accompanied 
with South African, Angolan, Armenian, German and Sao Toméan colleagues and Mark 
Thatcher, who funded the operation.435 Because of the foreign status and presumed 
motivation- financial gain- they would be defined as mercenaries in the U.N. and Geneva 
Convention. Following Percy, instead, they exhibit low attachment to a cause and low 
legitimate control. In fact, these individuals could not be presumed to have an attachment to 
a particular cause or ideology- say, democratization in what is commonly considered an 
authoritarian context- associated to the fall of the regime in Equatorial Guinea.  
Another recent case is Libya, where mercenaries used by the Libyan government to violently 
suppress political protests. This case is potentially novel as noted by a UN Commission of 
Inquiry: there is some uncertainty about whether these foreign nationals meet the international definition of a 
                                                          
434 Her definition avoids several important conceptual problems inherent to the conventional definitions. Cf. Introduction 




mercenary. The Working Group agreed with this assessment.436 
 
Table 7: Recent instances of mercenarism 
Case Contracting party Meets 
definition of 
mercenary 
Equatorial Guinea (2004) Independent entrepreneur yes 
Libya (2011) Incumbent government yes 
Ivory Coast (2012) Both ousted leader and elected new 
leader 
yes 




                                                          
436 Rona also note the important point that he Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya departs from the traditional practices witnessed 
in the Twentieth Century; mercenaries were not used to overthrow the Government: allegedly, they were used by the Government to quell 
civilian protests. Rona, Gabor. "A tour de horizon of issues on the agenda of the Mercenaries Working Group." Minnesota Journal of International 




Further, Liberian and Sierra Leonean mercenaries were employed in Ivory Coast. After the 
presidential elections, clashes broke out in various parts of the country after the refusal of Gbagbo to concede 
victory to Ouattara. Mercenaries were recruited by both sides.437 
I can now return to the case of Nigeria and STTEP. Conventional definitions relying on 
foreign status and financial gain would deem STTEP a mercenary outfit.438 Thus, an 
outstanding problem of legitimacy is raised by the continued use of STTEP. Does counter-
terrorism policy justify the use of mercenaries?  
In what follows, I look at the changing threat level and I trace the crucial events that drove 
policy choices; finally, I suggest that the case of STTEP to shaping Nigeria’s relation to PMSCs 
and shaping preferences towards the endorsement of the Montreux Document. 
 
6.3 Changing threats: Tracing policy choices 
In this section, I argue that crucial events- i.e. the high-level attacks and abductions- drove 
policy choices439, including the hiring of a STTEP. The increase in threat level, contingent to the 
decreased accessibility of military aid, has led policymakers to look for non-state solutions and 
use PMSCs. Contracting of security occurred prior to regulatory cooperation which followed 
quickly afterwards with an engagement with Montreux that I study in the following section.  
                                                          
437 According to the United Nations an estimated 4,500 mercenaries were recruited to fight in both conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, with a large 
number coming from the west, where the country borders Liberia, and from other countries, such as Burkina Faso and Angola 
438 Not so for Percy’s definition. The criterion of low legitimate control would exclude STTEP from the mercenary definition since it 
was closely associated to the Nigerian army. Percy made this point when she wrote that historically, mercenaries were differentiated from 
other fighters according to the degree of control they were under (and) that differentiation is still sensible today, when legitimate control is provided by the 
sovereign state and some international organizations composed of sovereign states.  
 




In the context of civil-military strategies of African states, choices revolve between regional 
intervention, private security and Western sponsored upgrades of state militaries, as Howe put 
it, increased vulnerability shaped policymakers choices.440 The high-level attacks and 
abductions- created information effects that drove choices towards private security. The most 
important event was the kidnapping of 250 schoolgirls, in Chibok, Borno State, which drew 
international media attention. One source explicitly cites this event as the origin of the 
contract.441 Nigeria’s difficulties in countering terrorism were also associated to other factors, 
such as technology and independence, but a key aspect was the information effect created by 
the schoolgirls kidnapping.  
Kidnapping is a relatively recent phenomenon in Nigeria; the targets evolved from mostly 
foreign to a mix of nationals and internationals.442 For Boko Haram, it became a tactic 
increasingly used, with the first kidnapping of foreigners in 2011.443 According to an estimate, 
600 people are now kidnapped in the country every year.444 
 
In this context, Alex de Waal noted, the abduction of the schoolgirls was momentous: Boko 
Haram had been killing, abducting and terrorizing for more than two years before Nigeria’s elite or Western 
actors began to take notice: it took the girls’ kidnapping (to spur) a leading instance of ‘hashtag activism’ – 
the #BringBackOurGirls campaign.445 After a few months, this major unresolved incident, 
                                                          
440 Howe, Op. Cit. 
441 Jack Murphy’s interview to Eeben Barlow mentions this event as the game changer. “STTEP was contracted to deploy to Nigeria. Their 
mission was to train a mobile strike force to rescue the Chibok school girls kidnapped by Boko Haram.”  
442 I referred to Oriola, Temitope B, Dr. Criminal Resistance? : The Politics of Kidnapping Oil Workers. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013. 
http://JHU.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1164386 (accessed August 11, 2015); also cf. IDEHEN, S. The Legal And Socio-Political 
Implication Of Kidnapping In The Niger Delta Region Of Nigeria. Conflict Resolution & Negotiation Journal. 1, 93-102, Mar. 2012.First case of 
kidnapping took place in 2005 when militants abducted some expatriates working on the AE fields of Shell Petroleum Development Company 
443 Comolli, Op. Cit., P.66. 
444 The Economist. Private security is hollowing out Nigeria’s security forces. October17th 2015. The source cited is Red24, a Scottish security 
firm 
445 De Waal, A. (ed.) Advocacy in Conflict-Critical Perspectives on Transnational Activism. Chicago University Press (2015).The Nigerian campaign 
focused equally on Boko Haram and on the Nigerian gov- ernment, and its ineptitude, corruption and brutality. It criticizes not only Boko 
Haram’s devastating actions, but also the environment that has given the group its raison d’être and the ability to conduct such a major attack. 
Nigerians asked for the return of the Chibok girls, of course, but also for better governance, more security and less corruption. The activist 




associated to the advent of the national elections in 2015, drew the attention of policymakers 
around the world.  
With the increasing sophistication of the attacks, Nigeria’s failure to mount a response may 
have been associated to other factors, such as technology and independence.  
First, a foreign company offered guarantees of independence for rulers wary of the complicity 
with the militants446- in this line, president Goodluck Jonathan had himself acknowledged that 
the militants have sympathizers or enablers throughout the government.447  
Second, and most important, political rulers needed technology that only certain firms were 
able to provide. In this line, Pham argued that the need has been less a matter of personnel 
and equipment than training, especially in intelligence and investigations.448 The lack of 
additional U.S. commitment to provide intelligence support drove the leadership to look 
elsewhere.449 The U.S. confirmed its willingness to support Nigeria after the abduction and a 
resolution introduced by American senators urged the government to assist in a rescue 
operation.  No details were made available, however, of specific support.450 Thus, the use of 
PMSC could have turned into an expedient and pragmatic choice. I suggest that contracting 
was contingent rather than a strategic long-term policy choice (cf. table in preamble). The 
                                                          
446 Authors’ interviews, March 2015 
447 “some of them are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary/legislaive arm of government, while some 
of them are even in the judiciary. Cited in Pham, J. P. (2012) 
448 Pham, J. P. (2012). Boko haram's evolving threat. Africa Security Briefs, (20), 1-8.  
449 Authors’ interviews, March 2015 




newly elected government renewed the contract to STTEP,451 but this does not change the 
essence of this security privatization: contingent and time-limited. 
The agency and the role of the state has been central in political economy approaches as well 
at least since stabilization and structural adjustment policies were associated with major 
reductions in the size and scope of the state452 so this question has relevance for the debates 
on privatization in general- i.e. the reduced the role and functions of the state as its role as a 
direct producer of goods and services.  
The acceleration in lethality of Boko Haram’s attacks are shown in the data gathered by the 
Nigeria Social Violence Project. The table below shows the increased intensity of violence and the 
distinctive contribution of Boko Haram to such escalation. The surge in attacks in Nigeria, 
was coupled with increasingly international alliances between radical militant groups in the 
Sahel, sophistication of its tactics and an attack on the U.N. headquarters in Abuja.  
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Table 8 Violence and fatalities in Nigeria 
 
Data from the Nigeria Social Violence Project453 
 
Countries across the region responded with a multinational force but the increased threat also 
led the authorities in Cameroon to the unusual step of advising business, schools and churches 
to recruit private security agents. 454 While the hiring of a PMSC in Nigeria may seem like an 
isolated event, its importance needs to be contextualized. 
 
6.4 Elaborating a new framework 
In this section, I argue that the involvement of private contractors may not be an isolated 
event and could actual reveal a rapprochement towards Montreux.  
  
                                                          
453 The Nigeria Social Violence Project is led by P. Lewis at the African Studies Program at Johns Hopkins SAIS; Available at: 
http://www.connectsaisafrica.org/research/african-studies-publications/social-violence-nigeria/ 




So far, the Regulatory body for PMSCs has been organized through the Nigeria Civil Defence 
and Security Corps (NCDSC) within the Ministry of Interior. Many PSCs- and only one 
PMSCs455- are authorized by NCDSC and contracted by the Federal Government of Nigeria 
to do anti-bunkering patrol along territorial waters.456  
 
So far, the regulatory body overseeing PMSCs had not taken any interest in working within 
the framework of the Montreux Document but the hiring of STTEP introduced the 
recognition that international standards are needed. For the first time, the Pan African 
Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFSTRAG) is engaging both the NCDSC and the 
firms in developing a national framework and a national approach to the Document.457  
 
This could indeed reveal to be a key juncture, I argue. Nigerian attitudes reflected a national 
consensus: Nigerian foreign policy never participated to Montreux events nor to U.N. sessions 
on private security. Now, almost a decade after the start of the Swiss initiative, there is an 
indication of change. Further, the strategy includes the possibility of a regional approach: “in 
the immediate future we will engage ECOWAS and later the AU”458.  
 
6.4.1 Relevance of Montreux for Nigeria 
Nigeria’s policymakers have for the first time stated an intention to create a national approach 
to the Montreux Document but how is the Document important for Nigeria? I argue here that 
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Nigeria’s signing could play an important part in clarifying the assessment of state 
responsibility and play a prospective role in promoting PMSC compliance with international 
law.459 Further, the position of Nigeria would be influential on other African states, a nexus 
that is explained in the concluding chapter.  
At this stage, however, I shall describe how the Document can be important in clarifying 
responsibilities and obligations of states towards the use of international private security. Legal 
scholarship has argued that inappropriate or harmful conduct by a PMSC or a PMSC employee 
may give rise to international responsibility of any or all of three states, home, contracting or 
territorial.460 In practice, this gives rise to question of responsibility in case say, a PMSC had 
mistakenly abused, wounded or killed civilians. What would have been the responsibility for 
states? Would the obligations to prevent and remedy have been clearly delineated?  
In the case of the firm STTEP, there are several problems. First, both Nigeria and South Africa 
could have incurred a state responsibility because Nigeria did not sign the Montreux 
Document. Nigeria would have incurred a responsibility as a territorial and contracting state. 
Additionally, there could be another responsibility of another territorial state if STTEP had 
crossed the border- but this is beyond the realm of the present analysis.461  
South Africa did sign but did not authorize the deal with Nigeria so it could have incurred a 
responsibility as the home state, where STTEP is incorporated.  The South African Defense 
Minister avoided the problem by saying that: “They are mercenaries whether they are training, 
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skilling the Nigerian Defence Force, or scouting for them”.462  Besides, STTEP is not a 
member of the ICoC, which poses a problem of legitimacy to the Code.  
There are two ways in which such responsibility may arise. The first involves direct attribution 
of wrongful PMSC conduct to the hiring state, in this case Nigeria; the second - derives from 
a state failure to prevent, investigate, punish or redress the PMSC conduct.463 
States on whose territory PMSCs operate must ensure the respect for IHL, protect human 
rights of all persons under their jurisdiction, and investigate and prosecute alleged misconduct. 
The endorsement of the Montreux Document is an initial but significant step in clarifying the 
assessment of state responsibilities. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I documented and explained Nigeria’s first engagement with regulatory 
cooperation. I suggested that it was the consequence of a type of contingent contracting, rather 
than a strategic choice. The policy continues subject to the incidence of threat and conditional 
on other elements. 
The agency and the role of the state has been central in political economy approaches as well 
at least since stabilization and structural adjustment policies were associated with major 
reductions in the size and scope of the state464 so this question has relevance for the debates 
on privatization in general- i.e. the reduced the role and functions of the state as its role as a 
direct producer of goods and services.  
                                                          
462 “They are mercenaries whether they are training, skilling the Nigerian Defence Force, or scouting for them. The point is that they have 
no business to be there.”. Foreign Policy, March 27 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/27/nigeria-boko-haram-south-africa-
jonathan/ Accessed 4th May 2015 
463 “and does not involve attribution nor state complicity in PMSC misconduct.” Tonkin 2014:261 





If contingency drives contracting, what normative driver shape engagement in regulatory 
cooperation? I probed for the influence of the anti-mercenary norm and found a surprisingly 
result- it drove a rapprochement to regulatory cooperation. I suggested that it is in the interests 
of the Nigerian state to distance itself from older definitions associated to the anti-mercenary 
norm. Unlike the trajectory shown in South Africa, one could not contrast the varying 
influence of the anti-mercenary norm with cycles of electoral politics or international factors, 







State and Non-State choices in Liberia 
 
 
The next two chapters focus on the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, two strikingly similar 
contexts that offer a great deal of variation in regulatory choices. The case of Liberia is notable 
because of the influence of the U.S. in post-conflict reconstruction and also, more surprisingly, 
because of the role of the Liberian maritime administration in creating the new global rules 
for security on board ships. In Sierra Leone, regulation was created in the pre-Montreux years 
and is still shaped by the experience of Executive Outcome. Then, in the context of the recent 
Ebola epidemic, the regulatory framework of PMSC governance is tested in a context of 
unprecedented devastation.  
I start by showing how the likeness of these two countries allows accentuating the comparative 
value of the analysis when juxtaposing preferences towards regulatory cooperation. I also draw 




The selection of the two Mano River states of West Africa is germane because of many shared 
contextual similarities. First, the two countries emerged from civil war and were long 
considered post-conflict. Second, both countries had experience with external security actors- 





Sierra Leone President Strasser contracted Executive Outcomes, which helped train the 
loyalist army and push the rebels out of the capital, retake the diamond-mining area, and 
destroy the rebel headquarters.465 Liberia suffered under a mercenary experience. Since Charles 
Taylor’s incursion in 1989, Liberia symbolizes the impact of the rise of violent organized 
transnational networks interested in exploiting minerals or timber; control over these 
resources became key during the years of the civil war (1990-2003)466.  
 
A continuum linked the two countries’ patronage, finances, and violence across international 
borders. The Sierra Leone war began in 1991 as a spillover from Liberia since Charles Taylor’s 
return in 1989. The war took a character of its own but retained crucial Liberian links (Gberie 2005:5). 
As Reno writes: 
 
Charles Taylor used his connections with the RUF to entrench his own position in the cross-border 
trafficking in diamonds that had been the preserve of members of the prewar government in Liberia. 
This relationship linked Sierra Leone rebels to the political and commercial interests of their patron 
in the neighboring country, and not to the productive energies and networks of the aggrieved Sierra 
Leoneans in areas that they controlled.467 
 
Another conspicuous similarity is that both countries have witnessed protracted phases of 
violence. The savagery was described for example in Stephen Ellis’ Mask of Anarchy, a story of 
                                                          
465 Reno William, Warlord Politics and African States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.132  
466 Warlord’s authority was based on the control of gold, diamond mining, timber and rubber (Reno, Ibid., 1998:79). For an account of the 
character of Charles Taylor, cf. Waugh, Colin M. Charles Taylor and Liberia: ambition and atrocity in Africa's lone star state. Zed Books, 2011. The 
author traces some of his influence to Liberia’s elite belief that Taylor was an outsider.  




Liberia’s descent into chaos. Sierra Leone became the heart of the new barbarism thesis in in 
Kaplan’s Coming Anarchy. The nexus of conflicts uniquely inspired decades of research in the 
political economy of war468. A further correspondence between the two cases was the extensive 
involvement of international actors during the post-conflict phases, particularly the United 
Nations with its peacekeeping missions. 
 
Certainly, there are significant differences too. Liberia is more ethnically fragmented political 
landscape. Ethnic diversity can make it more difficult to form a consensus for growth-
promoting public goods469.  Elections, party-systems and legislatures also differ, and Sierra 
Leone had more years of experience with multiparty democracy.  
 
However, there are deeper socio-political affinities, like the existence of old decentralized 
socio-political institutions that govern many rural towns and villages within Sierra Leone and 
Northern Liberia.  Such power associations like the Poro and Sande ‘secret societies’, share 
practices and symbolisms. Both Mano River states emerged as lands of freed slaves with 
patterns of antagonism between the ruling elite- Americo-Liberians in Liberia and Creoles in 
Sierra Leone- and the indigenes. Further, There are other historical, economic and geopolitical 
elements that are salient for a comparison, including being coastal states, similar level resources 
rents, foreign assistance levels, and membership in regional and continental unions. 
 
 
7.1.1. Theoretical expectations and puzzle 
                                                          
468 The seminal contribution by David Keen noted that economic motivation prolong conflict (Keen 1998); it led to the research on greed 
and grievance and to a near categorical rejection of grievances (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). While resources are central in grievances and 
identities but political factors are key to understand roots and objectives (Arnson and Zartman 2005) 





The underlying question of the next two chapters is that given all these similarities, what is the 
distinct explanation for differing regulatory choices? One would expect an analogous path of 
agency and preference formation. Instead, Liberia did not endorse the Montreux process, 
whereas Sierra Leone did. This question matters for my overall research question on 
cooperation in private security provision, and it matters specifically for Liberia since it was the 
first instance of a PMSC building a sovereign nation’s military and police capabilities.  
I build my case studies with two theoretical expectations.  The first is that a greater 
international influence exists than in the preceding case studies. I have described in this section 
the deep and the recent historical reasons for such influence. 
Yet, I find a greater level than agency than expected.  I discover that an array of non-state 
actors, from open-registries to insurance firms, shaped the on-going institutional change where 
Liberia has a non-negligible role. Further, Sierra Leone’s regulatory experience is increasingly 
recognized as a source of practice in several areas. 
A second theoretical expectation is that a strong anti-mercenary norm exists given the 
resonance of recent experiences. I anticipate the norm to be even stronger than in the 
preceding case studies- one of the cases where the norm has become puritanical, as Percy writes. 
I find indeed that the norm has an influence for example in the long and complex reaction to 
the use armed guards on board ships through an institutionalized resistance similar to what I 
illustrated in chapter two. The anti-mercenary norm however cannot entirely explain 






7.2 PMSCs building the army of Liberia  
Liberia sustained a 14-year civil war that ended in 2003. Of a population of approximately 3 
million, an estimated 270,000 Liberians were killed and hundreds of thousands were displaced, 
infrastructure had crumbled, unemployment rate hit 85 per cent. The United Nations Mission 
in Liberia (UNMIL), the largest peacekeeping mission in the United Nations history, 
maintained the fragile peace. In that context, the lengthy and complicated process of 
reconstruction rested on American shoulders. Stephen Ellis once said that an American NGO 
founded Liberia470 and the history of U.S. involvement bred what Amos Sawyer called an 
unhealthy psychology of dependence. How did it happen, though, that an American PMSC 
raised the new army of Liberia, as McFate put it471? More importantly for this research, what 
does it mean that the only country whose army is built by a PMSC, does not endorse the 
Montreux process? 
 
7.2.1 Argument for External Influence 
There are two plausible explanations for Liberia’s state choices, I argue. First, the 
precariousness of the State, after a long and debilitating war, and the second is the external 
influence of the United States. These explanations, which I develop below, are not mutually 
exclusive, nor do they discount for a role of contingency. 
 
Let us proceed with order and examine the state weakness hypothesis first. After fifteen years 
of civil war, the Liberian state was in ruin. In the midst of the post-conflitc process, the main 
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priority was reconciliation, disarmament and demobilization. The justice system was under 
total overhaul. Ninety-five percent of the prison population was pre-trial. 472 In 2007, 
according to a RAND report, the principal concern was the inadequate oversight of security 
forces, and it recommended a focus on courts and prisons, rather than the oversight of private 
security companies.473 The report briefly concludes, however, that in the future, it would be 
important to accredit and monitor private security companies. However, the clear priority was 
how to address reconciliation and as Amos Saywer wrote, democratic governance cannot be 
implemented without peace and security.  
  
Alternatively, in an instance of second image reversed, the formation of interests and preferences 
could have been largely bounded by influence and events taking place in international politics. 
The external influence of the U.S. on the DDR process is in fact presumed by much of the 
literature.  
Since the Peace Agreement of 2005, the U.S. had the lead role in restructuring the Army of 
Liberia. The U.S. State Department provided support for recruiting and training about 2,100 
soldiers. In addition, it hired two PMSCs to help the Government of Liberia in its reform 
process: DynCorp International provided facilities and training for the Army of Liberia, and 
Pacific Architects and Engineers built military bases and provided advanced training and 
mentoring to Liberian Army officers. According to DCAF, this created a direct line between 
contractor and the US Government474, a point reiterated by Gumedze when analyzing the 
                                                          
472 International Crisis Group, “Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System,” Africa Report, no. 107, April 6, 2006, 18. 
473 “Cf. Mehler: “a security sector review was conducted by the RAND Corporation. This report was seen as the basis for a national dialogue 
on security-sector reform.“ Mehler, Andreas, “Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security Evidence from Liberia and the Central African 
Republic.” Armed Forces & Society, 2012, 38 (1). The Rand report is available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG529.pdf 
474 The process was de-linked from parallel efforts to reform the national police so coherence across the security sector was an issue. And finally, the lines of accountability 
for this work ran between the contractor and the US Government. National ownership of security reforms was undermined by the failure to provide accountability to 




relation between Liberia and the United Nations- the involvement of U.S. PMSCs pointed to 
a lack of democratic accountability475.  
 
One could presume that the decision not to endorse Montreux lied somewhere within this 
direct line between contractor and the US Government. This point poses a fundamental 
question in Liberia’s security sector reconstruction process- and SSR processes in general- that 
is whether private contractors can build democratic institutions responsive to civilian oversight 
and in an atmosphere of at least partial secrecy476, a point also made by Bryden: 
 
The reform model initially proposed for the army was not grounded in Liberian realities, values and 
priorities. The process was de-linked from parallel efforts to reform the national police so coherence 
across the security sector was an issue. And finally, the lines of accountability for this work ran between 
the contractor and the US Government. National ownership of security reforms was undermined by 
the failure to provide accountability to the nascent Liberian executive, parliament or civil society.477 
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http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/Bryden%20San%20Remo%20remarks1.pdf 
475 “Dyncorps sees itself as an extension of the US interests; it is neither responsible to the United Nations nor to Liberia” Panel Event on 




It adds that: For three years, Crisis Group has attempted to gain access to the contract defining DynCorp’s work in Liberia. Four people who 
have read it have indicated in interviews that the description of the work is approximately three pages but vague. 
Another question surrounding State Department contracting of PMCs is the use of indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts. 
These contracts, opened for bidding once every five years, gave DynCorp and PAE monopolies for all peacekeeping related work in Africa.  
477 PMSC Regulation: The Way Forward by Alan Bryden.35th Round Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law. Sanremo, 6-8 





Gumedze reiterated the same point when analyzing the relation between Liberia and the 
United Nations: “Dyncorps sees itself as an extension of the US interests; it is not responsible 
to the United Nations nor to Liberia.”478 A Crisis Group report adds that:  
 
If the day-to-day practices of PMC contracting contradict their given raison d’être can there be another 
explanation for them? One, already given, is that U.S. government involvement in undertakings like 
Liberian SSR might never happen if the contractor option did not offer a kind of “openly clandestine” 
approach to doing diplomatic and military work overseas479.  
 
Thus, it is hard to discard that the decision not to endorse Montreux may have taken place 
somewhere in the continuum between contractor and the US Government. Yet, one could 
not discard contingency. The policy choice of privatizing the reconstruction of the army of 
Liberia has been described as fortuitous by Sean McFate who personally led the work of 
Dyncorps. McFate writes that: 
 
The government considered four options for who should conduct implementation: the U.S. military 
alone, the U.S. military with light contractor involvement, a contractor with light U.S. military 
involvement, or a contractor alone. They would let a second SSR assessment trip combined with 
budget considerations decide the matter. (…) Following the assessment mission, the DoD quickly 
concluded it could not conduct the SSR program due to resource constraints and ongoing operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the DoS was left with a Hobson’s choice: Either outsource 
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the entire DDR and SSR program to the private sector or have no program for the AFL. The 
DoS chose the former and made history without meaning to.480 
 
7.3 Liberia and Montreux 
Given the history of U.S. involvement it is not surprising to find U.S. influence on policy 
choices. However, there is an exceptional and contradictory element in the fact that the only 
country whose army is built by a PMSC does not endorse the Montreux process. It is 
conceivable that the U.S. Government did not originally intend to outsource the building of 
Liberia’s military and that contingency drove policy. Some may argue that the non-
endorsement of Montreux lies in a simpler explanation- there was no capacity to write or 
endorse international laws. However, Liberia has quickly complied to all pertinent 
conventions; she is not only a signatory of both the Geneva conventions and the anti-
mercenary convention481, more recently she signed the Arms Trade Treaty. Even more 
problematic for such an argument is the fact that Liberia did implement guidance for PMSCs 
at sea, thereby authorizing and legitimating private contractors at sea- a point to which I turn 
below.  
 
The implication of this part of the research is important. The security sector is still poorly 
regulated and the endorsement of the Montreux Document could have constructive 
consequences. In Liberia, security firms have mushroomed482 and developments in the 
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resource sector are going to strengthen this trend483 in an already problematic nexus of public 
and private family ties and companies484.   
 
7.4 Liberian entity as policy entrepreneur 
In the case of the use and regulation of armed guards on board ships, I argue that the policy 
entrepreneurs were the open registries485 and the insurance firms who bore the costs of the 
enduring failure to suppress piracy.  
I proceed as follows: I first give a cursory introduction on the rise of Somali piracy; then I 
study the open registry ships because they were the first to be targeted and then show how the 
Liberian registry created the first guidelines for the use of armed guards on board ships and 
led the coalition for change that led to the new IMO policy on armed guards, which I describe 
in the last section. 
7.4.1 Piracy in the Horn of Africa 
Historically, no area has been entirely immune from maritime piracy but around the Horn of 
Africa, piracy created alarm and attention, as well as an abundant literature that explored the 
strategies for high-seas suppression, the practices of naval operation patrolling the waters off 
the coast of Somalia486; the morality of paying ransoms to the human rights violation of 
arresting pirates487; the on-shore consequences of piracy and military response to the first-hand 
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accounts of piracy operations or kidnappings.488 Several authors emphasized the economic 
explanation that leads Somali fishermen to piracy489. 
For my research, three features have been particularly salient: the lingering status Somalia’s as 
a failed State and its inability to patrol its own waters, the failure of the interstate naval 
response, the coincidence between the increase in piracy and the 2008 economic crisis. First, 
one should start with the origin of piracy, which lies in the failure of the state.490 The increase 
of pirate activity in the Horn, as Peter Pham writes, has taken place since the mid-1990s (and) has 
a direct correlation with the disappearance of anything even remotely resembling a functioning central government 
in Somalia.491  
When in 2008, the number of attacks rose from twenty to over a hundred a year, the 
international community considered a naval response. The pirates involved militias and 
warlords and numbered over 2000 with seven syndicates; their equipment became more 
advanced- with mother ships and fast ‘skiffs’. Their range extended. The yearly cost rose to $7 
to $12 billion492. Thus, the policy response was the creation of a naval corridor to protect 
merchant shipping and prevent piracy. The UN adopted a series of resolution at the Security 
Council in 2008 and a naval operation was launched. By 2011, however, piracy kept increasing, 
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attacks turned to larger ships and turned more violent. A key turning point was the use of 
armed guards.  No pirate attack has ever succeeded with armed guards on board. By 2012, 
approximately 40% of the 42,500 vessels that transit the Horn used armed guards.493 I explain 
this transition in the following sections. 
A third point that matters to this discussion is that the spike in piracy coincided with the global 
economic recession and led shipping.  In fact, resistance to the use of armed guards remained 
as several levels. Both the shipping industry and the IMO were concerned that the use of 
private contract armed security personnel on board ships could lead to an escalation of 
violence. Only when pressed with more deadly attack and relatedly, higher insurance costs, the 
shipping industry agreed towards more defensive measures that include armed guards on 
board. 
 
7.4.2 From the S.S. World Peace to the LISCR 
 
The open registries are organizations that register ships owned by foreign entities and in 
contrast to national registries, accept ships with no connection to the state in terms of crewing 
or ownership. Initially, open registries were lax regulators and became known as ‘flags of 
convenience’.494 Regulation became more effective in the 1990s.495  
Faced with an increase in piracy attacks, and with the second largest Flag State for merchant 
shipping in the world, Liberia was the first state to issue short guidance for safely hiring and 
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utilizing private security on the high seas in 2008. I shall start with some context to explain what are 
the open registries and why open registries ships were the first to be attacked. Then, I describe 
how Liberia became a proponent of guidelines for the use of armed guards and how these 
same guidelines inspired the IMO standards. 
 
7.4.3 LISCR and armed security on board 
 
The Liberian fleet operates through an open registry, the Liberian International Ship & Corporate 
Registry, a corporate structure that includes a joint venture with the government of Liberia. The 
registries are also referred to as flags of convenience; the three main ones being Panama, 
Liberia and the Marshall Islands. From the first ship, the S.S. World Peace, the Liberian open 
registry flags, including oil platforms and rigs, have now become 3900.496  
The registry, originally created after World War II, is located in Vienna, VA, United States. It 
has the responsibility to enforce Liberian laws and treaties, inspect Liberian-flagged ships and 
make recommendation to Liberian state. Two diplomats, are permanently based at the 
Registry, liaise with the Bureau of Maritime Affairs in Monrovia and the Liberian 
government.497 
The LISCR started to consider the possibility of private security on-board only as threat 
increased. Their ships were the first preys of pirates. Palmer writes that the piracy gangs 
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employed spies at various ports to pass along information on prospective targets and open-
registry ships were their primary objective.  
Palmer writes of Liberian-flagged vessels thus: 
their slow speed, low freeboards and relatively small crews make them favorites with Somali 
pirates – their details passed, via satellite phones, from Suez, Singapore and Dubai to Eyl, or 
Bosaso in Puntland- their IMO number, AIS code and transit details, with the insurance 
value of their cargo.498 
In this context, the international community chose to support a traditional strategy: an anti-
piracy naval fleet. Some states, including the U.K., the European Union and the African 
Union, launched ambitious maritime security strategies but could not agreed on how to reform 
the use of private force at sea499.   
A perceived ineffectiveness of the naval response, or what Mattli and Woods call 
“demonstration effects” associated with perception of policy failure, created a demand for 
new regulatory vehicles by those who were the most affected.500 The lingering attacks on ships, 
notwithstanding the increased naval presence were the “demonstration effects” and the 
hijacking of the US-flagged Maersk Alabama in 2009 and the kidnapping of its captain, was 
the most vivid evidence that military deterrence may not suffice.  
An added set of anti-piracy best practices was created, the Best Management Practices to Avoid, 
Deter or Delay Acts of Piracy, or Best Management Practices (BMP). These standards of behavior for 
shipping companies, captains and crew concern how to prevent a piracy attack and what to 
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do in the case of an attack or hijack.501 These are largely non-lethal tactics that include armed 
guards on board. 
They were originally developed by the private sector but were endorsed by states. The shipping 
industry drawing on earlier versions of best practices created the BMP. Then, these were 
advanced by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia as a tool kit of legal rules and 
procedures to regulate how piracy should be embedded in national legislation and which 
procedures should be used to prosecute piracy suspects. With the BMP guidelines endorsed 
by a state organization, the open registry companies and insurance firms became, again, leading 
policy entrepreneurs for change. As Bueger and Stockbruegger write that: 
 The BMP as a governance technique gained further authority by the so-called New York declaration. 
This declaration presents a formal agreement of states to comply with the BMP. It was originally 
signed by four flag states (Panama, Marshall Islands, Bahamas, Liberia). Flag states have started 
to disseminate the BMP through education tools for crews, but also insurance companies increasingly 
use the BMP to blacklist non-compliant companies.502 
Thus, the open registries were key policy entrepreneurs responding to a confluence of 
vulnerability and increased assessment of financial risk.  
Both the registry and the Liberian state, one of a few states to gain revenues from their status 
of flag of convenience503 risked seeing their revenues at risk. Thus, the Liberian Registry 
recommended a set of vetting procedures, skill sets, training, equipment, and management 
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support for Liberian ships contracting maritime security companies.504 In practice, the security 
desk produced the guidelines at the headquarters of the Liberian International Ship & 
Corporate Registry. It was followed by the quick endorsement of the two Liberian diplomats, 
the stroke of a pen by two state representatives.505 Liberia was the first flag state to make the 
change; the guidelines were the first laws in the field of maritime private security in 2008, i.e. 
the same year when the Montreux Document was signed.  
The insurance firms were the other agents of change. In reaction to the growing threat and 
cost of ransoms, the insurance industry responded by increasing its premiums, especially in 
high-risk piracy zones, a more affordable insurance was provided only for securitized ships.506 
In 2011, when, piracy kept increasing, and pirates turned to larger ships and became more 
violent, shipping industry coalesced towards more measures. Eventually, shipping industry 
overcame the resistance to include armed guards on board even if the International Chamber 
of Shipping declared that under normal circumstances private armed security is not 
recommended on board commercial vessels. 507 
The open registries, especially LISCR, and the insurance firms, were key agents of change, 
supported by national governments- i.e. Liberia and the U.S.- and an international 
organization, the I.M.O. At the IMO, a coalition for change led by the U.S. and Liberia that 
overcame organizational reticence. 
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7.4.4. IMO Guidelines 
 
By 2015, after long resistance, the IMO had devised a strategy to permit armed guards on 
board ship as part of a number of measures to improve safety and security.  However, the UN 
agency had long discouraged the practice. The transition occurred with the IMO Interim guidance 
adopted in 2011 and 2012, a document based on the first standards issued by the Liberian 
administration. 
 
Walking a thin line, and mutatis mutandi, the IMO faced risked similar to ICRC in the Swiss 
initiative.508 Both the Montreux Document- and the ICRC itself- had to reiterate that they were 
not legitimating PMSCs. In the same way, the IMO did not want to be a driver of 
intergovernmental discussion on a topic with as contentious a history as privateering.  
 
Thus, the IMO initially deferred to flag States as well as to ship-owners, and distanced herself 
both from ICoC and Montreux: 
 
because, in the case of the Montreux Document, it applies only during "armed confiict," and 
in the case of the ICoC, it only identifies a set of principles and processes for private security 
service providers related to support for the rule of law and respect for human rights, but is 
written in the context of self-regulation and only for land-based security companies, and is 
                                                          




therefore not directly applicable to the peculiarities of deploying armed guards on-board 
merchant ships to protect against acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea509.  
 
Then, the IMO Interim guidance was adopted in 2011 and 2012. This was “just guidance; it is up 
to the ship operator and flag state to decide (…) The guidance on vetting just says vetting is 
essential; it doesn’t take a view on how or who.510  However, these were the first standards to 
be adopted. 
 
They rules are based on the document issued by the Liberian administration.511 Private security 
firms must be able to provide documentary evidence on criminal background checks, history 
of employment, military and law enforcement background checks, certification in the use and 
carriage of firearms.512 Some rules are service provision considerations for ship-owners, who 
should consult with their insurers prior to contracting with and embarking armed guards. 
PMSC should provide evidence that they hold and will maintain a valid insurance. The size, 
composition and equipment of the proposed armed security team should be carefully 
discussed and agreed as necessary by the ship-owner contracting with the firm.  
 
Further debate took place between 2012 and 2015. European states remained unenthusiastic 
but “from being even reluctant to discuss, administrations found themselves going down this 
road”513.  
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The end result came in June 2015, when the IMO Maritime Safety Committee produced the 
interim Recommendations for Flag States regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel 
on board ships in the High Risk Area and the Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States 
regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area.514 
 
The IMO, placed at the supranational level as the key organization that could facilitate or 
hinder regulatory change, discouraged armed contract security on board ships but was led to 
a conspicuous institutional change. From the times of the Titanic disaster of 1912- which 
galvanized attention toward improving safety of shipping and led to the first major treaty- and 
eventually to the creation of the IMO itself515- her mandate expanded over the years to include 
other important issues, especially around maritime security.516 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I searched for state choices in a particularly intractable case. I argued that the 
decision not to endorse Montreux may have lied somewhere in the continuum between 
contractor and the U.S Government. In the same way as the choice of the U.S. Government 
to use contracting were contingent in the first place, so were choices on Montreux. This would 
be compatible with Avant’s reflection that increased U.S. outsourcing was never intentional517, 
and parallels the result of chapter six. Liberia reveals contingent choices- rather than 
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preferences- for regulatory cooperation on private security provision. Unlike South Africa and 
Sierra Leone, Liberia’s choices were not prior to specific interstate political interactions, i.e. 
Montreux. Thus, they were not causally independent of the strategies of other actors.518  
 
Secondly, I explained choices in the context of how an array of state and non-state actors, 
from open registries to insurance firms contributed to the premises for a de facto form of 
governance.  The process is vast and while I do not claim to articulate all the components, I 
offer a narrative where the agency of states can be found. In the filigree of events, the 
contested process seems dominated by private authority but a role for states can be recovered 
at key stages. 
  
                                                          






SIERRA LEONE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE  
 
 
This chapter examines how the national legislation of post-conflict Sierra Leone became a 
source of practice for PMSC governance. Second, the Ebola epidemic has created the 
conditions to study continuity and change in standards in PMSC in a territorial state during a 
post-disaster setting. I study state choices in a post-conflict context and find that the anti-
mercenary norm turns out to be relatively less influential on rulers and policy-makers than 
expected. I study the context of the recent Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic in Sierra 
Leone and the governmental response. I emphasize in particular the overall control retained 
by the state during the implementation of emergency measures.  
 
8.1 A source of practice  
 
In 1991 the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded Sierra Leone from 
Liberia. The war that ensued included a number of factions, a collection of militias, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG), a largely Nigerian peace-keeping 
force, and military outfits, like the British firm Gurkha Security Guards, the South African 
Executive Outcomes, and the British Sandline. EO was hired to provide short-term stability 




ECOMOG actions. The story of private security in Sierra Leone is capture in several 
perceptive accounts519 but the danger of the symbolic association with the degradation of 
Sierra Leonean politics is shown in Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone where Will Reno 
introduced the notion of ‘shadow state’.520 Reno also revitalized the notion “warlord politics,” 
where private interests of the ruler and the collective interest of the state are fused and where 
politics is not based on elite accommodation, but rather on support and resources from highly 
mobile businessmen and commercial partners.521  
In short, Executive Outcomes (EO) was hired to provide short-term stability to the 
government but became deeply involved in the political arena by way of training the Kamajors, 
an ethnic group that rose in power as a result of this external support, and paving the way for 
elections in 1996. Executive Outcomes created a parallel force and contributed to fragmenting 
the political system.522  
Later, when the multi-national effort led by ECOMOG forces failed to recapture the capital, 
the exiled president Kabbah turned to another firm, Sandline International. Sandline’s contract 
was to train and equip 40,000 Kamajors, to coordinate the recapture of Freetown, and to 
provide arms and logistics for the assault coalition. The Sandline intervention, however, came to a halt 
when the firm’s shipment of arms was declared in contravention of the UN arms embargo and was impounded 
by Nigerian forces at Lungi.523 The Arms to Africa scandal erupted when the British investigation 
began both around Sandline and a Canadian mining company, Diamond Works. The 
parliamentary inquiry tried to establish if the firms were in breach of a UN arms embargo and 
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concluded with a report that that arms had been shipped against the UN sanctions which the 
UK had proposed524.  
 
The experience of EO and Sandline led the Sierra Leonean State to approve the National 
Security and Intelligence Act of 2002, which was particularly attentive to the regulation of the 
private security and required companies in Sierra Leone to register with the Office of National 
Security.  
Ralby writes that: 
the Standard Operating Manual for Private Security Companies in Sierra Leone (SOP) took 
effect in January 2006, setting forth numerous requirements for obtaining a license from ONS and 
establishing what standards must be maintained in the operation of private security businesses. The 
SOP provides the legal standards by which licensed PSCs must abide, covering everything from 
minimum wages and gender discrimination, to uniforms and sick leave. 
This experience in regulation allowed Sierra Leone to contribute to the preparatory works for 
the Montreux process.525 The experience of EO and Sandline led the State to approve the 
National Security and Intelligence Act of 2002, and eventually the Montreux Document, with 
state choices taking place in the background of a lessened influence of the anti-mercenary 
norm on policy-makers526.  
                                                          
524 The Legg Report. Cf. D. Harris, Sierra Leone: A Political History, Oxford University Press, 2014 . On the significance of the Arms to 
Africa affairs, cf. Kinsey 2006: 90-93. The Arms to Africa affair and subsequently the United Kingdom Green Paper of 2002 were a turning 
point in the perception of the legal nature of PMSCs As Kinsey writes, it would have been a simple matter of procedure to outlaw PMSCs 
but “there occurred a shift in the perceived legality of the activities” of PMSCs. 
525 Cockayne writes that: “in the summer of 2007, IPI, DCAF and the ICRC drafted detailed discussion papers, totaling over 100 pages, 
drawing together existing practice—of states, private clients and industry associations (…) the most important sources of practice were: 
national legislation in the United States, UK, South Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Sierra Leone.” Cockayne, Op. Cit. 
526 Cf. Christensen, Maya Mynster. "The Underbelly of Global Security: Sierra Leonean Ex-militias in Iraq." African Affairs 
(2015): pp.29-30. In her interviews, she writes: “‘We are not sending mercenaries to Iraq and Afghanistan, if this is what 




Enforcement and application of Montreux Document oversight were not sufficient, as 
documented by Christensen the abuses on Sierra Leonean contractors, which included 
discrimination and deportation527. The abuses on Sierra Leonean contractors fall into the 
category of TCN described in chapter five, with responsibilities for both territorial and 
contracting states. These abuses have failed to stir the anti-mercenary norm, which could be 
due to several factors: first, the lack of fitting political entrepreneurs and electoral politics, as 
in the case of South Africa; second, and most importantly, due to the extraordinary nature of 
the Ebola epidemic since 2014. 
 
 
8.2 Maritime Security in Sierra Leone 
 
There is another area where the Mano River country is a source of practice- the modern use 
of PMSC in a coast guard capacity originated in Sierra Leone.528 When Executive Outcomes 
was hired for land operations in 1995, insecurity at sea also spread from the use of stolen 
speedboats by rebels attacking the local commercial traffic in the coastal waters. Additionally, 
a fleet of international trawlers had begun operating without permission denying the 
government of important revenue. The turn to private security, in the form of a sea platform, 
was proposed to the client government but rejected. 
                                                          
‘ex- servicemen’ for security contracting. (…) he stressed that this was a programme launched (…)to tackle the huge youth unemployment 
problem”.  
527 Cf. Christensen, Maya Mynster. "The Underbelly of Global Security: Sierra Leonean Ex-militias in Iraq." African Affairs (2015): pp.29-30. 
Relying on her recent field-work, she writes: “‘We are not sending mercenaries to Iraq and Afghanistan, if this is what you think,’ an employee 
at the Ministry of Labour told me a few weeks after it was announced that Sabre International would be recruiting ‘ex- servicemen’ for 
security contracting. (…), he stressed that this was a program launched (…)to tackle the huge youth unemployment problem”.  




However, a former EO employee and his company Southern Cross Security picked up the 
idea of private sea operations and the firm was awarded a fisheries protection program (1999-
2002) after agreeing to wipe out a group of pirates in a single and successful anti-piracy 
operation. In this case again, one can agree with Abrahamsen and Williams that while it is an 
exaggeration to say with one of our interviewees that ‘the Sierra Leonean private security sector is rooted in 
EO’, it is undoubtedly the case that the company’s legacy is highly pertinent to the present situation.529   
In Cullen’s account, Southern Cross Security operated teams of expatriate personnel and 
embedded Sierra Leone police personnel, on high-speed patrol boats, with heavy weapons 
received from the army. 
According to Cullen, SCS exerted significant influence in three ways: 
“It created a fisheries protection program that did not (and likely would not have) 
existed at the time due to limited logistical capacity. (…) SCS had essentially invented 
and implemented an important aspect of maritime security policy in Sierra Leonean 
waters. Second, the everyday operational content and practice of maritime security 
was designed by SCS (…). Third, SCS entrepreneurially designed a new and punitive 
maritime security program that changed the target of governance for the purpose of its 
profit-motivated agenda.”530 
The business strategy of SCS, the author shows, shifted towards maximizing profits with 
exclusive emphasis on punitive enforcement mechanism, seeking short-term gains from 
issuance of fines and inclusive of arrests. 
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8.3 Sierra Leone and the Ebola Virus Disease  
 
Pathogens and diseases are an unseen enemy that moves populations, creates boundaries and 
shapes state-market relations. Dominant explanations of institutional development rely on 
epidemics as a key factor of change.531 Diseases typify a very real risk- a risk unlike armed 
conflict or piracy but one that is reconfigured as a security risk for firms, creates a demand for 
security, reshapes the security market. Hence, the recent Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic 
that affected Western Africa offers a unique opportunity to study a key dynamic of institutional 
change.  
I organize the discussion as follows. First, I start by outlining the motivation of the study by 
showing how the responsibilities of territorial states during post-disaster phase are increased. 
I typify the challenges of post-disaster situations in territorial states described by the existing 
literature- i.e. that private security may be co-opted by political groups, that supervision by 
public forces may be lessened and further, that in the case of PMSCs working under status of 
mission agreements, firms may be given immunities and privileges that decrease the scope for 
domestic oversight. Second, I move to describe the context of EVD in Sierra Leone and the 
governmental response. I emphasize in particular the overall control retained by the state 
during the implementation of emergency measures. 
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8.3 Sierra Leone and the Ebola pandemic 
 
8.3.1 Typical post-disaster challenges in territorial states  
The EVD epidemic was the first urbanized outbreak in history and spawned with widespread 
consequences in the region and across the world. In 2014-15, the epidemic resulted in 
unprecedented human devastation and brought new and immediate challenges to the state.  
There is a gaping need to research the challenges and the relevant norms for a post-disaster 
situation and the EVD epidemic offered one such avenue for research. I refer to the norms 
that can be found in the domains of IHRL, IHL, and refugee and internally displaced person 
law, as well as an emerging category known as international disaster response laws, rules, and 
principles (IDRL).532 Scholarly work has highlighted at least two broad governance problems 
during disaster and post-disaster times.  
First, the lack of control increases the risk of private security “be[ing] co-opted by political 
groups and becom[ing] involved in criminal activity”.533 PMSCs may also work for gangs or 
criminal groups, representing an even more direct threat to security. As Perret writes: 
Incidents have illustrated how the lack of regulation of PMSCs at the national level renders 
PMSCs a source of insecurity instead of a complement to public security. In 2010, not long 
after the earthquake, a PMSC employee killed a looter and was about to shoot another one 
when US soldiers intervened.
 
Just a few days later, one PMSC agent accidentally shot another 
                                                          
532 D. Fisher, ‘Domestic regulation of international humanitarian relief in disasters and armed conflict: a comparative analysis’, 89 (866) Int’l 
Rev. of the Red Cross, (June 2007), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_866_fisher.pdf. in Perret, Op. Cit. 
533 This has happened in the recent past in Haiti in particular. SSR Issue Papers. No. 1: Security Sector Reform in Haiti One Year After the 
Earthquake, Isabelle Fortin (March 2011). Burt, Geoff. From private security to public Good: regulating the private security industry in Haiti. Waterloo: 




during a bank looting. 
Another issue that may occur in post-disaster contexts relates to the accountability of PMSCs’ 
employees engaged in a multi-lateral mission. In this case, exercise of the host state’s 
jurisdiction depends on the status-of-forces agreement or status of mission agreement with 
immunities and privileges that are meant to facilitate activities and functions of foreign agents 
in the country where they are accredited. 
 
8.3.2 The EVD and the response of the state 
The EVD epidemic created a mortal danger to the existence of Sierra Leone as a nation. At 
the time of writing, there have been 3,773 deaths and a total of 11,889 cases of Ebola in Sierra 
Leone.534 The justice system was stopped or slowed as officials stayed away. More arrests were 
made under emergency laws, putting pressure on Sierra Leone’s already overcrowded prisons. 
Schools were closed for a whole year. With a history of conflict and high youth unemployment, 
the potential for instability has been very high. 
In this context, the state remained in charge. Max Weber’s widely accepted definition of the 
state as the organization with the “monopoly of legitimate violence” in society, is borne out 
in the midst of the epidemic. Without such a monopoly and the degree of centralization that 
it entails, the state cannot play its role as enforcer of law and order, let alone provide public 
services and encourage and regulate economic activity. I shall show that the emergency 
regulations empowered the government- at the risk of human rights violations and 
deteriorated democratic governance. The use of public-private assemblages remained 
                                                          




analogous to the pre-epidemic days, and focused on the protection of private property. 
Overall, it may have helped curb a problem of limited resources and personnel as the police 
and army protected public order. 
  
8.3.3 Emergency Regulations, state authority and public-private assemblages 
As the medical response introduced quarantine protocols to target the disease, state authorities 
focused on managing physical movement and social interactions, and introduced public 
emergency regulations. It is worth briefly describing these measures before studying the 
relation between state authorities and the private sector. 
The State of Emergency (from now SOE) was conceived in collaboration between 
governmental and non-governmental experts and was first implemented in June 2014.535 The 
measures curbed personal freedom, freedom of movement and assembly and they empowered 
the government to arrest without a court order.  An ‘Ebola czar’ was appointed within the 
ranks of the military and a newly established National Ebola Response Center (NERC) was 
given authority for the implementation of the national Ebola Response Plan and all programs 
pertaining to Ebola response.536 
I shall summarize the effects of the SOE as follows. First, they dictated that the “infected or 
suspected to be infected” shall not leave the epicenter; the person that contravenes commits 
an offence and is liable to a fine or to imprisonment.537  Second, the SOE define limitations 
                                                          
535 Authors’ interviews, September 2015, Freetown 
536 The office was located in town, next to the United Nations Mission for Ebola Response and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, west of 
the city of Freetown. 
537 Cf. Sierra Leone Public Emergency regulations, Art. 3 
http://www.parliament.gov.sl/Portals/0/BILLS/PUBLIC%20EMERGENCY%20REGULATIONS%2020%20AUGUST%202014.pdf 




to freedom of assembly include the prohibition of public meetings and gatherings, sporting 
activities, the prohibition of nightclubs, cinema or video centers.538 Third, and most important 
to our purposes, they defined the role of the police and military in restricting the movement 
of persons and vehicles, protecting health care providers, conduct regular patrols.539 
The SoE greatly reinforced the government without suggesting major changes in the use of 
public-private assemblages, let alone of the regulatory component. As Herbst writes, the states, 
to a certain extent, are their boundaries,540 and at the state borders, the public authorities rather than 
the public-private assemblages enforced special regulation. The state of emergency involved 
greater activities both for the Sierra Leone Police and for the army; 750 soldiers were 
dispatched to the border areas to enforce quarantine measures.541  
The SOE regulations also involved the local councils in making bye-laws542; but both in the 
province and in the city, private security was only used to protect private property, not to quell 
or suppress protests.543 In Freetown, the administration and oversight over private security 
companies even during a crisis remained in the hand of the government, and of the ONS in 
particular. The ONS, created in 2002, is still funded by the United Kingdom and international 
partners with an international advisor in the staff.544 
According to the United Nations, only G4S and Acal security had their own patrols, like the 
police and the UN itself.545 These patrols are run with unarmed private guards working 
alongside an armed official from the police. Firms like G4S were particularly visible. Over they 
                                                          
538 Ibid., Art. 15-17 
539 Ibid, Art. 5 
540 Herbst, 2000, p. 263 
541 http://time.com/3086145/sierra-leone-troops-ebola/ 
542 Ibid., Art. 13 
543 Authors’ interviews, September 2015, Freetown 
544 Authors’ interviews, September 2015, Freetown 




years, G4S acquired a number of important contracts, partly as a result of the presence of 
Wackenhut and the South African company Gray Security in the country prior to their 
takeovers by Group4 and Securicor and eventual incorporation into G4S. 546 The firm 
educated its 1600 employees on Ebola regulation in-house and continued running their patrols 
during lockdowns. 
This arrangement may have bolstered the security apparatus with public forces contending 
with limited resources and personnel. Abrahamsen and Williams write of the consistent reduction 
in the size of the RSLAF, from 14,000 to 10,517 by the end of 2007. 547   
However, the SoE critically reinforced the powers of the government without upsetting the 
balance of public-private assemblages. The symbolic power of security can paradoxically 
become a resource for others to challenge the monopoly of the state and to legitimate the 
entrance other actors- a dynamic tension identified by Abrahamsen and Williams.548 The 
symbolic power of the public was largely preserved during the epidemic. Nonetheless, the 
government became free to crack down on protest and criticism. Some journalists were 
arrested.549 Some of the policies adopted, such as the quarantines initially imposed on the two 
hardest hit districts, which were bastions of opposition support, were misconstrued as 
deliberate attempts to hurt their populations.550 Not surprisingly, a vigorous debate in 
parliament informed the choice whether to renew the SOE in August 2015. 
Conclusion 
                                                          
546 Abrahamsen and Williams, Op.Cit., p.149 
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This chapter examined three inter-related aspects. First, how the conflict experience in Sierra 
Leone became a source of practice for PMSC governance. In the case of Sierra Leone, interest-
based explanations provide insights on regulatory politics, and on enforcement and application 
of oversight. State choices do not reflect the influence of the anti-mercenary norm.  
Second, domestic commitment to regulation remains insufficient, as documented by 
Christensen work on the abuses on Sierra Leonean contractors, with lingering responsibilities 
for both territorial and contracting states.551 The cases of Sierra Leone- like South Africa, in 
chapter 5- point to a need for scholarly attention and advocacy towards the problem of Third 
Country Nationals. 
Third, the Ebola epidemic has created the conditions to study continuity and change in PMSC 
standards during a post-disaster setting. The state retained control over PMSCs during the 
implementation of emergency measures. In each context, I emphasize state choices where the 
anti-mercenary norm is relatively less influential on policy-makers. 
  
                                                          






CHAPTER 9  
SYNTHESIS: IDEAS, INTERESTS & EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 
 
 
9.1 Choices and preferences in regime formation 
 
 
My study proceeded at both the inter-state and at the state level to disaggregate a complex and 
vast phenomenon.  
 
The use of international regulatory cooperation as the dependent variable- the formal activity 
that goes from agenda setting to negotiation and implementation- reveals that at the global 
level, regime formation depends upon the continued recognition of a unique patronym for 
security firms. I have described the content and slow emergence of PMSCs norms, which build 
upon the support of states but without the binding commitments of legal agreements.  
 
At the unit-level, how countries “choose” to exercise their agency depends upon the prior 
international choices. The emphasis on state choices and preferences was based on the 
assumption that preferences matter to international politics- first, and more generally, 
determining preferences is key to cooperation and conflict.552 As Moravcsik writes: “Extensive 
                                                          




empirical evidence supports the (assumption that) even in ‘‘least likely’’ cases, where political 
independence and territorial integrity are at stake and military means are deployed, relative 
capabilities do not necessarily determine outcomes.”553 Secondly, and most important, 
variation in state preferences defines regime complexity. Alter and Meunier write that where 
state preferences are similar, “lawyers overcome fragmentation by crafting agreements that 
resolve conflicts across regimes, and thus legal ambiguity is transitory”554, but where 
preferences diverge, states block attempts to clarify the rules and ambiguity persists, allowing 
countries to select their preferred rule or interpretation.555  
 
State preferences are not obvious because they are not directly observable. Behavior may 
seamlessly reflect preferences; or it may differ because of the influence of institutions, context, 
and uncertainty.556 Thus, Nigeria’s preferences are not directly visible but choices reveal a 
preference formation process. 
 
While both capacity and aligned preferences are fundamental during the implementation 
phase, preferences are a basic sine qua non for the initial phase of norm construction.557 Probing 
state choices and preferences of African states, I noticed that many have been reluctant to 
participate in this policy debate. In general, their policymakers rarely discuss how to regulate 
                                                          
553 Moravcsik, Op. Cit “Unless we know what these preferences are (that is, unless we know the extent to which states value the underlying 
stakes), we cannot assess realist or institutionalist claims linking variation in the particular means available to states (whether coercive 
capabilities or institutions) on interstate conflict or cooperation.” 
554 The citation include a footnote: The International Law Commission has working groups and subcommittees that seek to overcome this 
fragmentation (fn 21, p.22) 
555 Alter, Karen J., and Sophie Meunier. "The politics of international regime complexity." Perspectives on politics 7.01 (2009): p. 16 
556 Frieden, Op. Cit.; he explains three main errors: confusing preferences and strategies; focusing on preferences and ignoring context; 
focusing solely on context and ignoring preferences 
557 Stephanie Hofmann’s study of European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) shows that preference divergence created significant 





PMSC;558 this is particularly problematic because African states are obvious ‘territorial states’- 
states where PMSCs operate - and in the context of increased external involvement in Africa’s 
internal conflicts.559  
However, both the cases of South Africa and Nigeria imply a preference for regulation, 
resulting from the varying effect of the anti-mercenary norm. I find agency in large African 
states. Preferences of smaller states are more difficult to define. In those contexts, the effect 
of the anti-mercenary norm is relatively less defined. Choices may depend upon lack of 
capacity; external influence or contingency can play a role.  
Arguments of lack of capacity often apply to the politics of implementation of signatory 
states.560 In analogous regulatory efforts, like the Arms Trade Treaty, there was insufficient 
national experience to formulate technical interventions and contributions561 but this was not 
the case with Montreux. Sierra Leone and South Africa were co-opted specifically because of 
the experience and practice.  
 
 
9.2 Varying Influence of the anti-mercenary norm  
I have argued that the formation of choices and preferences are greatly determined and 
bounded by events taking place in international politics but the role of norms often stood out 
                                                          
558 Avant 2014, op.cit 
559 Evidenced by events in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and the Central African Republic, during which French forces intervened. More over, the 
increase in armed violence from around 2010, potentially reversing the gains made immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, ISS 
Report, 2014 
560 Emilie Hafner-Burton finds that during the implementation stage, opponents of human rights linkages to trade agreements have used the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to strip out the human rights requirements demanded by the European Parliament.  




as persuasive both at the state and inter-state level. The anti-mercenary norm can be re-
activated by unsolved issues in the inter-state systems like foreign enlistment. It remained 
institutionalized within the U.N. system. 
It has a varying effect at the state-level that depends upon political entrepreneurs and 
contingency- such as electoral politics. In the case of South Africa, the anti-mercenary norm 
of post-apartheid politics was amplified by a failure to create effective domestic control over 
the flow of fighters to Equatorial Guinea and Iraq. I argued that the anti-mercenary norm led 
to the engagement- and then contestation- of Montreux.  
The direction and effect on regulatory politics is not always unambiguous. In the case of 
Nigeria, I found a surprising result- the norm could also drive a rapprochement to Montreux. 
My hypothesis is that policy-makers try to escape the conventional definition that would 
censure contractors and are led to consider regulatory cooperation.  
Further, I find that the anti-mercenary norm has no particular relevance in the study of 
standards for PMSCs standards in territorial state during a post-disaster setting.  
Finally, the construction of interests, be it national interests or economic interests, are not 
obviously discovered- they are constructed through a process of social interaction. When 
states engaged with or signed the Montreux Document, or chose to begin a domestic 
regulatory process, I found that state preferences could be a response to a perceived threat to 
state interests or a change in salient economic interests.  
The contracting out of security by Nigeria- prior to the rapprochement with Montreux- as 
explained in chapter seven, suggests a change in interests themselves. The awareness of greater 




consolidation. Extant literature showed that state interests favor international policy 
coordination particularly in the realm of anti-terrorism.562 The case of Nigeria adds to the 
plausibility of this view in the African context.  
Secondly, states’ interests elicit state choices- rather than preference formation- in a case like 
Liberia. Difficulties in the construction of an explicit linkage between economic costs and 
interests of African states can prevent regulatory cooperation. I illustrate and contextualize 
with some further examples. Thirty-eight African states have maritime interests.563 In the area 
of maritime security the use- and regulation- of PMSCs is discernable in areas that impinge 
economic interests, from trade to fishing. Piracy affects vital trade flows;564 violent crime is a 
threat to fishing.565  
Wherever these economic interests were defined, state choices occurred. In states like Liberia, 
one of a few states to hold titles and revenues from the open registry shipping, it did so 
exceptionally swiftly. In general, however, African states have not articulated their interests 
and policy formation was slow. An interest-based explanation could rely on the concept of 
information asymmetries as an obstacle in overcoming global market failures.566 Market actors, 
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563 I define African states maritime interests as the economic interests of 38 states (Of the 53 African countries, 38 are either littoral states or 
islands. The security of their territorial water where trade, fishing, and 12.6 per cent of the world’s output of oil, gas and minerals are produced. 
Cf. Ncube, Mthuli, and Michael Lyon Baker. "Beyond pirates and drugs: unlocking Africa's maritime potential and economic development." 
African Security Review 20, no. 1 (March 2011): 60-69.  The authors note the regulatory activisim that follows the recognition of the economic 
benefits of the maritime domain. More than 50 countries worldwide have made submissions to the United Nations to increase their maritime 
territory (e.g. Extensions of EEZs). (…) Ten countries in Africa have either made full or partial submissions or are working on submissions, 
to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for such extensions of their EEZs 
564 See introduction 
565 The fishing sector is a major contributor to rural income and employment in most coastal countries in Africa. Attacks on fishing boats 
can be 20 times that of crimes involving tankers, cargo ships or passenger. Urbina, Ian, The New York Times, July 21, 2015. Data is from 
Charles N. Dragonette, who tracked seafaring attacks globally for the United States Office of Naval Intelligence. 
566 Information asymmetries create problems in overcoming other market failures. Market actors, not states, feel the direct losses from crime 
and piracy. The losses from crime and piracy include cargo losses (e.g. petroleum products), ransom demands, theft of cash and possessions, 
and even damage caused to equipment and vessel infrastructure during armed attack, requiring additional time in port for repairs; further, 
indirect losses, such as extra day rates and fuel costs are incurred by companies diverting vessels away in an attempt to reduce risk should 




not states, feel the direct losses from crime and piracy. There is a difficulty in the construction 
of an unambiguous linkage of how direct and indirect economic costs and the interests of 
African states. Arguably, the path of state choices also depended on the fact that the Montreux 
seemed, at least initially, to offer no direction in anti-piracy policy. In fact, the Document was 
signed before the unprecedented expansion of piracy (2008-2012) that led to an increased use 




9.3 Tension between anti-mercenary norm and human rights norms 
 
Two sets of norms appear to stand in tension in shaping preferences in regulatory cooperation. 
Democracy and human rights, on the one hand, can provide long-term prospects for PMSCs 
norms while a set of ideas associated to the anti-mercenary norm can be in conflict.  
A recent case provides evidence on this tension. The island nation of Madagascar is a recent 
case where policymakers’ attitudes shifted back and forth under the varying influence of the 
anti-mercenary norm. 
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Madagascar is a context where the expectation of influence of the anti-mercenary norm is 
based on a history of mercenary coups in neighboring states.568 Policymakers’ attitudes are 
partly dependent upon anti-mercenary feelings associated with a worldview born during 
decolonization.  
At the same time, Madagascar has a developed commercial security sector with 50 PMSCs and 
over 30 in the capital. Firms like G4S employ as many as 2,500 people.569 As such, the country 
was invited to participate to the Montreux regional conference for francophone Africa. 
Following the consultations, the representative of Madagascar agreed to bring up the 
endorsement of Montreux in front of the legislature. Yet, when parliament came to discuss 
the Document, confusion arose between PMSC and mercenaries. It was argued that the 
endorsement might negatively affect laws on mercenaries.570  
 
The belief that the laws on PMSCs may affect the laws on mercenaries, however, was solely 
based on deep-rooted perception; no recent empirical observation contributed to form such 
an opinion. The anti-mercenary norm led to the refusal of specific criteria to distinguish 
PMSCs and create legal clarity conflict with an array of inherited emotions and loyalties. 
 
                                                          
568 While Madagascar never recorded cases of mercenaries, neighboring states did- the Comoros and Seychelles have suffered from threats 
of mercenaries. Mercenaries have assisted three coup attempts in Seychelles (1979, 1981 and 1986). The Comoros has suffered from several 
coups (1978, 1989 and 1995) and coup attempts (1981, 1983, 1987 and 1990) which all involved mercenaries. Moreover a mercenary leader, 
Colonel Robert Denard, influenced politics in Comoros for a decade. Phillip M. Allen, Security and Nationalism in the Indian Ocean, Westview 
Press, Boulder, 1987. Malyn Newitt, The Comoro Islands: Struggle Against Dependency in the Indian Ocean, Westview Press, Boulder, 1984 
569 Dakar regional conference on the Montreux Document, conference proceedings, report available at: http://www.dcaf.ch/Project/The-
Montreux-Document , accessed July 17, 2015 




The anti-mercenary norm was overcome following a round table held in the capital to present 
the Montreux Document to the Malagasy authorities. It led to Madagascar becoming the 53rd 
country to lend its support to the Document.571 The Prime Minister underlined his country's 
support for the Document by stressing the importance for Madagascar of human rights and 
international humanitarian law. 
 
This example adds a recent story of how the trajectories of choices also depend upon the 
tensions between rival sets of ideas. The power of principled ideas, as Sikkink called it, in the 
form of democracy and human rights, may provide long-term prospects for PMSCs norms. 
In this sense, the Prime Minister of Madagascar hinted at this characterization when he 
stressed the importance of human rights for his country.  
 
PMSCs norms can build legitimacy in the context of a gradual democratization and conditional 
to an increased recognition of the legitimacy of the defined patronym and issue-area, described 
in the introduction and in Part I. Huntington’s Third Wave of democratization introduced 
unprecedented pressure for observance of basic human rights;572 and Crawford Young 
cautiously argued that African states have become increasingly politically pluralised, and 
democratic.573  In this sense, Montreux Document and the ICoC are built upon an 
acknowledged high human rights tradition.574 Legal scholarship posited that human rights 
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572 Harbeson, John Willis, and Donald S. Rothchild, eds. Africa in world politics: reforming political order. Westview Press, 2012. 
573 Young, C. (2012: 222–224). Young contends that for most African countries this opening up has signified a move ‘away from 
authoritarianism rather than to full democracy’, the introduction of more regular elections and freer civil societies than has previously been 
the case on the continent 




courts nested in “regional-level mechanisms represent a promising intermediate ground 
between the international and national levels . . . for responding to transnational challenges 
such as the privatization of security.”575 In this sense, Perret argued that: 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has dealt with the duty to prevent 
violations of human rights, including those perpetrated by non-state actors: “An act by a private 
individual can generate responsibility of the state because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the 
violation or for not taking the necessary steps to provide the victims with reparation.”576 
It should be noted that the force of human rights led to the creation of the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights- an initiative that gathered momentum after abuses 
occurred in Colombia and in Nigeria. The underlying principles have become a baseline 
standard defining how companies in the extractive industries and other sectors should deal 
with the human rights risks posed by their security arrangements. The international financial 
institutions embraced the application of the Voluntary Principles,577 particularly in the context 
of resource extraction in Africa.578 The security provisions in IFC Performance Standard 4 are 
adapted from the Voluntary Principles.579  
 
9.3.2. Challenges to this approach 
                                                          
575 Perret, Op. Cit. 
576 Thus, a state’s failure to exercise due diligence to prevent human rights violations—even those committed by private actors—gives rise to state responsibility.
 
However, the due diligence obligations are circumscribed by a qualification that states must only act with the means “at [their] disposal.”
 
The AComHPR elaborated 
three principles to define these limitations 
577 The belief in the VPs was shaped by a previous controversy. The Voluntary Principles can provide an essential bridge across the current disconnect 
between the treatment of conflict as an insurable risk, and the potential for a project to influence the dynamics of conflict in a way that might cause harm to local 
communities. World Bank Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), CAO Audit of MIGA's Due Diligence of the Dikulushi 
Copper-Silver Mining Project, November 2005. Available at: http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=94  
578 On how the credibility risks for IFI in extractive oil and mining is at stake when investing or lending in the Extractive Industries, Cf. 
Abadie, Delphine. "Canada and the geopolitics of mining interests: a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo." Review of African 
Political Economy 38.128 (2011): 289-302. Bray, John, and Antony Crockett. "Responsible risk-taking in conflict-affected countries: the need 
for due diligence and the importance of collective approaches." International Review of the Red Cross 94.887 (2012): 1069-1087. 





There are challenges to the argument that democracy and human rights norms can influence 
PMSC governance process. The most obvious, perhaps, is that sixty-nine countries in the 
world are currently considered to be non-democratic, despite the fact that all but twelve have 
held national elections in the past fifteen years.580 Most importantly, the characterization of 
norms that underlines scholarship is not unambiguous. Issa Shivji, in The Concept of Human 
Rights in Africa, argues that human rights are flexible, ambiguous, and often contradictory. They 
can be drawn on to construct a wide array of different discourses that, by emphasizing 
different rights and agents for the fulfillment of those rights, can mobilize, legitimate, or 
constitute radically different modes of political practice. Buidling upon Shivji’s work, Adam 
Branch raised the important point that emancipatory discourses of human rights can serve to 
help “mobilize and legitimate political action to contest forms of domination that may 
themselves use the language of human rights”.581  
The second limit is that the guidance provided by human rights ideals has fallen short of 
shaping state choices where it matters the most- the endorsements of the Voluntary Principles 
by African states remained on paper;582 and a risk-based conceptualization of human rights 
holds within International Financial Institutions. While a plurality of opinion exists, the experts 
I interviewed recommend that programs fit the local conditions first while still meeting 
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the World. Technical report, Freedom House, 2015. 
581 Branch 2011, Op. Cit. 
582 Author’s interviews, Swiss Foreign Department representative, Washington, DC; February 2014. No African country participated with 
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international norms. They share a concern for the proliferation of standards.583 One claims 
that: 
The ICoC is a useful beginning . . . but is so broad and general that almost any organization 
can qualify. In fairness, none of the other codes, guidelines or “standards” involved the security 
industry in formulating their recommendations, which was a major error  . . . . I cannot comment 
on the ISO standard.584 
Last but not least, a third problem is the gap that remains in the literature on the nexus between 
PMSCs and democratization. Abrahamsen and Williams provide anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that private security can distort electoral dynamics within emerging democracies.585  
On the one hand, PMSCs can act as tools for democratization. Kinsey writes that PMSCSs 
have acted as “proxies for the US government determined to strengthen the democratic 
process, but fearing the political consequence if something went wrong.”586 The increased use 
of PMSCs as foreign proxy is also supported by recent quantitative data.587 In this line, 
however, the interpretation of Musah and Fayemi, who had framed the problem as one of 
“mortal danger to democracy,” before the reformulation of the anti-mercenary norm,588 has 
become anachronistic.  
On the other hand, the academic debate is divided; explaining patterns is difficult with a certain 
                                                          
583 Cf. Chap. 4 
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actors that make up strategic complexes. 
587 Branovic 2011. According to statistical survey PMSCs are more and more used as foreign policy proxies in weak and failing countries 





level of circularity. Arguments directly or indirectly related to Avant’s hypothesis that weak 
states have the most to gain (or the least to lose) from privatization, but are the least able to 
manage private forces for the public good – efforts to harness the private sector for state 
building in weak states are often desperate gambles.589 These arguments rely on the logic of 
economic institutionalism and expect the private delivery of sovereign services to erode 
functional control and change in political control590.  
Scholars are divided between cautious and optimistic approaches.591 Carmola writes of “the 
ability of PMSCs . . . to pursue policies that are beyond the reach of democratic control.”592 
Mandel reflects the laissez-faire argument that “privatization of security may enhance citizen 
awareness of potential abuses, and this would certainly help the functioning of democracy.”593 
 
The problem is particularly intractable where democratization faces significant electoral 
violence- in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, one in five elections since 1990 have been 
afflicted by violence, mostly perpetrated by ruling parties.594 As I have argued at several steps 
in this dissertation, the use of PMSC as an inherited patronym must become an accepted and 
diffuse practice in international politics. Only then, the gaping need to understand the nexus 
between PMSCs and democratization could then be filled. It is at this juncture that China’s 
choices could be either procrustean or symbolic.  
                                                          
589 Avant 2005. Also cf. Avant 2006: 508: market options also offer transitional or immature states short-lived increases in capacity, but the use of these options 
often reinforces patterns that frustrate the creation of legitimate and capable state institutions. The conceptualization of weak states belong to Migdal. Migdal, 
Joel S. Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World. Princeton University Press, 1988. 
590 Avant relies on Williamson: “replication of a public bureau by a private firm, with or without the support of regulation is impossible”, 
“Public and Private Bureaucracies”, p.311, in Avant 2005:49 
591 Cautious (Musah and Fayemi 1999; Avant and Sigelman 2010; Percy 2011; Carmola 2010); Uneven (Avant 2005, Singer 2003, Kinsey 
2007) Optimistic (Mandel 2006; Shearer 1989) 
592 any attempt to establish some kind of reasonable command and control seems insincere and half-hearted. Sometimes the right hand wants 
to allow the left hand to get away with certain behaviors even as it scrambles for the image of doing the right thing. Carmola, Op.Cit. (p. 
139).  
593 some form of coercive protection is often necessary to make sure that popular elections and governmental checks and balances work properly and private security 
could at least create the possibility that this transition would be a peaceful one (Mandel, 2006:45) 






9.4 Challenge to PMSC norms? The Chinese Perspective 
 
In this section, I return to the role of China and her influence, as chief signatory of Montreux 
and major player in the African continent.595 In African studies, it is suggested that hegemony 
accurately describes external actors influence but at the same time, no single actor, let alone 
the US- nor China- does control political outcomes in Africa.596 Having already examined the 
role of the United States in Montreux in chapter one and their influence on Liberia in chapter 
seven, I offer here elements of comparison in their influence on states’ choices.  
 
China has become the largest investor, trader, buyer and aid donor for an increasing number 
of African countries. In a drive for resources, China also has a distinct developmental model, 
which their strategists believe has valuable lessons for Africa. Thus, the development of a 
Chinese practice in the governance of security matters a great deal. If African states are viewed 
as naturally seeking to preserve their sovereignty while the objective of the outsider is just to 
establish dominance597, how do African states cooperate with China’s state capitalism private 
security overseas? Is China’s regulatory politics part of contingent or strategic approach? I 
describe the origins of Chinese PMSCs in Africa and the participation of Chinese foreign 
policy to the Montreux and U.N. initiatives. First of all, I lay the background for the discussion 
by examining the expectations derived from the extant literature on China-Africa.  
                                                          
595 Cf. Preamble to Part III 
596 Taylor and Williams 2004 




Strategic interests have marked China’s state-led economic cooperation.598 A vast economic 
influence creates the basis for a challenge of current balance of powers599 even if the Beijing 
consensus cannot aim to represent an alternative nor an indictment of Western views of 
development.600  
The argument that the Chinese approach may undermine efforts to promote good governance 
and development has been mitigated by approaches that stress the multi-faceted nature of 
China-Africa relations.601 Earlier developmental experiences offer alternative models602 and the 
constructivist literature may indeed have neglected the voices and role of non-Western 
actors;603 ignoring that China led normative development in the past.604 Norms may be traced 
to the idea of non-interference and respect for sovereignty that has characterized the Chinese 
model in Africa.605  Large writes that: “From Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to Khartoum in 1964 
to President Hu Jintao’s visit in 2007, the Chinese foreign policy principles organized around 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference have endured at the level of political 
discourse.”  
At the same time, the account of Chinese activity that “recalls the patterns of empires of the 
past,” as French wrote,606 is more than impressionistic. Chinese normative approaches have to 
contend with the problematic issue of human rights. Within the context of decolonization, 
                                                          
598 Taylor, Ian. "China's oil diplomacy in Africa." International affairs 82.5 (2006): 937-959. 
599 Sanderson, Henry, and Michael Forsythe. China's superbank: debt, oil and influence-how China Development Bank is rewriting the rules of finance. John 
Wiley & Sons, 2012; Broadman, Harry G. Africa's silk road: China and India's new economic frontier. World Bank Publications, 2007. 
600 Williamson, John. "Is the" Beijing Consensus" Now Dominant?." Asia Policy 13.1 (2012): 1-16. 
601 Bräutigam, Op. Cit.; Alden, Chris, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares De Oliveira. China returns to Africa: A rising power and a continent embrace. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Rotberg, Robert I., ed. China into Africa: Trade, aid, and influence. Brookings Institution Press, 
2009. 
602 On the strategies of the developmental model, cf. Brautigam, 2009; Huang in Rotberg, Robert I., ed. China into Africa: Trade, aid, and 
influence. Brookings Institution Press, 2009.ch. 14  
603 Acharya (2014). Part of the reason, he argues, has to do with its relatively narrow conceptualization of agency. On this point, also cf. 
Chabal, Patrick. Africa: the politics of suffering and smiling. Zed books, 2009.  
604 Helleiner, Eric. "Southern Pioneers of International Development." Global Governance 20.3 (2014): 375-388. 
605 Taylor in Harbeson and Rotchild, Op. Cit., 2013:298 
606 French, Howard W. China's second continent: How a million migrants are building a new empire in Africa. Vintage, 2014. Migration, in his view, 




newly independent states embraced the very ‘right’ of self-determination as a human right. 
Besides even if a more minimalist, neutral interpretation in comparison with the grand visions 
of the past, human rights provides a moral approach and acts as an enabler of politics.607 
Thus, this brief review of the literature on the engagement of China in Africa leads us to 
anticipate that as Chinese interests expand, a modest but growing engagement in regulatory 
cooperation on PMSCs will be pursued. On the one hand, Chinese businesses need PMSCs. 
On the other hand, engagement is modest by virtue of the fact that the complex regime that I 
have described in chapters three and four, is based on the human rights content of Montreux. 
I proceed to test these expectations by assessing the input to the Montreux initiative and the 
U.N. treaty. 
 
9.4.1 Chinese participation to Montreux and the U.N. debates  
The Chinese delegations had already participated to several of the debates on regulation when 
Chinese contractors entered Sudan in 2008. A post-conflict setting set the stage for partition 
and eventually the troubled birth of the continent’s newest independent country, the Republic 
of South Sudan.  
China’s signing of the Montreux Document and the related liberalization of the market for 
security services were part of a set of liberalization policies undertaken in China. Between 2008 
and 2010 the state reorganized both the supervisory role of the government for the domestic 
industry and opened the Chinese market to foreign firms that were previously excluded.608 
                                                          
607 Moyn, Samuel. The last utopia. Harvard University Press, 2010. 





In the realm of international regulatory cooperation, Chinese diplomacy proceeded in two 
ways. First, China actively participated to the discussions within the U.N. Human Rights 
Council that eventually produced the Draft Convention.609 In an emblematic statement the 
delegation acknowledged that “especially outside their respective home countries, there was a 
lack of effective regulation, accountability and monitoring and oversight mechanisms”. 610 
Hence, China supported the proposal of an international treaty: 
 
National legislation was important, but could not be relied upon on its own, given that many PMSC 
activities were transboundary in nature. China (is) open to the idea of a legally binding international 
instrument, and expresses its support for more in-depth discussions on the issue of elaborating an 
international regulatory framework. 611 
 
Secondly, Chinese officials participated to the “Swiss Initiative” process. However, they only 
joined the third and fourth meetings of experts. The engagement with a human rights initiative 
as early as 2006 when the first meeting took place may have been challenging to justify. The 
first two meetings had tackled what seemed to be a new problem in international affairs by 
way of trying to clarify the relevant bodies of humanitarian law and human rights law that 
                                                          
World Regions. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. As for the former, Catallo mentions the 2008 Ordinance on the Management of Security 
Services issued by the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council; as for the latter, the Security Service Management Regulation Act of 
January 1 2010 (p.124) 
609 Cf. chapter two 





would apply.  
 
At the fourth and concluding meeting on the Swiss Initiative in Montreux on 15-17 September 
2008, the Montreux Document was finalized and China was one of the participating 
governments that adopted it. Subsequently, China became increasingly involved in the 
Montreux Forum and stressed that the problem of Third Country Nationals should be 
included in MD.612  
 
The increased engagement with a human rights initiative may have been problematic but 
according to Na Jiang, regardless of whether China’s current practices uphold the human 
rights standards, “China is gradually accepting the concept of human rights and is taking 
measures to fulfill its international human rights obligations. China also submits reports on 
human rights to UN treaty bodies, drafts new international human rights instruments, engages 
in numerous multilateral, regional and bilateral dialogues on human rights.”613 
As I argued that anti-mercenary norms and human rights norms provide distinct and at times 
rival set of ideas for PMSCs governance, the influence of China in the process stands out. 
China’s growing economic involvement in many African countries is not necessarily made to 
                                                          
612 Author’s interviews, February 2015. On TCN, cf. chapter five 
613 Jiang, Na. China and International Human Rights: Harsh Punishments in the Context of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Springer 
Science & Business Media, 2013. He notes that China has participated in a number of UN proceedings on human rights and has ratified over 





support and realize broad purposes implicit in the conceptualizations of democracy.  As 
Harbeson writes: 
The extent to which they do, or do not, will in turn have an important bearing upon the extent to 
which sub-Saharan African countries uphold or undermine the strengthened and increasingly 




                                                          















I turn here to areas where there are still important research gaps and where regulatory politics 
invest in areas that go beyond what was covered by Montreux or the U.N. initiative in the 
previous chapters. The literature of private security contractors has developed in isolation 
from the developments in development and political economy and research overlooked the 
question of ownership of security companies. I study the rationales of the policy of 
nationalization in South Africa and show some of the risks of rent-seeking. I suggest that the 
proposed nationalization would not represent a unique or isolated case of limited ownership.  
Another area where gaps remain is domestic labor policy. My treatment of Third Country 
Nationals introduced the reader to aspects of domestic policy on labor condition but only 
Abrahamsen and Williams have described the nexus between labor policy and competition 
policy. I elaborate on their work and study how collective action in the private security industry 
a question both for policy and for political stability.   
 
 
10.1 The disparities of Trade Dependence615 
                                                          






Why has South Africa repeatedly tried to nationalize foreign-owned security companies? Are 
there legitimate, developmental policy goals? Are there international standards that all states 
preferences should converge to?  
In what follows, I examine the main arguments given by proponents and critics of 
nationalization. I attempt to cast a wider net on international standards and argue that the 
proposed expropriation would not lead to a unique case of limited ownership. Several 
countries- including USA, China, Brazil, Russia and Canada- have limited private security to 
nationals within those countries or placed severe limitations on foreign ownership.616 Hence, 
there is no ‘international standard’ of legitimate ownership. Thus, trade arguments can actually 
be revealed to have some limits and represent instead, in Hirschman’s language, the 
articulation of the disparity of trade dependence.617 I also review the little evidence that PMSCs 
represent a national security threat and review the legitimate concerns of rent-seeking 
strategies, which have notable precedents in the political economy of indigenization policies 
in Africa.618 
 
10.1.1 Background and Significance 
 
                                                          
616 Author’s interviews, Geneva, July 2014 
617 An often cited review of legislation pertaining to foreign ownership in private security industries, in fourteen countries, mentions that five 
of these countries (USA, China, Brazil, Russia and Canada) had limited private security to nationals within those countries and eight countries placed severe 
limitations on foreign ownership.  
618 Lewis, Op. Cit., Pp.137-145. The author shows how a class of local entrepreneurs relied on illicit transactions and corruption in what 
amounted to Bhagwati, J. "Directely Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities." Journal of Political Economy (1998). Krueger, Anne O. "The 




The limitations on foreign ownership refer to the PSiRA Bill or “Private Security Industry 
Regulation Amendment Bill” of 2012. Originally, the establishment of PSiRA, the Private 
Security Regulation Authority dates from 2005 and it replaced the more limited Security 
Officers Board whose history can be traced back into the apartheid years.  
The persona of PSiRA was built from scratch as an “organization in authority” with symbols 
rooted in African history. The logo includes a lion and a shield, which stands for 
“craftsmanship and defensive weaponry in warfare”. It is an African shield and “it’s for all 
South Africans”.  According to recent report, PSiRA oversees an industry with 1,953,605 
registered security officers, which amounts to ten percent of the active population.619  
Before I proceed to trace and compare the arguments in the attempted nationalization of 2001 
to the more recent on-going process (2012-15), I should note two points. First, expropriations 
across sectors around the world have become less frequent compared to the 1970s but the 
number of takings has risen again since the mid-1990s.620 Second, foreign firms are more 
vulnerable to expropriation in resource-based sectors, particularly in mining and petroleum to 
which the private security industry is closely associated. Governments break contracts and 
devalue foreign holdings through forced renegotiations, discriminatory policy changes, or 
other interference with foreign firms’ operations in actions known as creeping 
expropriation.621 Thus, there is the concern that the government policy may reach beyond the 
security sector per se at the extractive industries.  
10.1.2 Three arguments 
                                                          
619 Data include active and non-active registered security officers registered with PSiRA (report 2012-13); Active population data is from the 
World Bank; 18,687,019 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.IN) 
620 Wellhausen, Rachel L. "Investor–State Disputes When Can Governments Break Contracts?." Journal of Conflict Resolution (2013): 
0022002713503299.  




Abrahamsen and Williams noted that three arguments of national security, rent seeking and 
free trade figured in the policy debate on nationalization of 2001622.  
 
Over the recent years of negotiations and talks, the government has relied heavily on the 
argument of national security, as previously, but it also stressed the nature and scope of the 
industry, the technological advancements in the private security space, and developments since 
9/11.623 Thus, similar arguments have appeared in the 2012-14 phase, but with relatively 
greater emphasis on the loss of sovereignty due to the debates around Third Country 
Nationals, shaped by the problems that South Africa encountered during the last decade. In 
2001, this element was not part of the argument of national security; the government stating 
that that ‘the connection that some of the actors in the private security companies have with foreign intelligence 
services and the similarity of objectives informed by their past co-operation in the Cold War era (…) makes 
them free agents to be exploited for espionage activities.’624  
 
The comparison shows as more continuity than change especially in use of the rent-seeking. 
First, the industry fears are the same: rent-seeking, political machinations, collusion with public 
officials. A leading lawyer for the industry argues that the nationalization would be a restricted 
sale to a selected few, and the ownership clause a downright confiscation.625  This echoes the 
perspective from 2001 that “this industry is perceived to be very profitable and that changes 
in ownership will benefit a politically connected elite”, as Abrahamsen and Williams noted.626 
                                                          
622 Abrahamsen and Williams, Op. Cit, p. 77 
623 Police Committee Meeting, 28th January 2014, https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16812/, Last accessed 26th February 2015 
624 Abrahamsen and Williams, Op. Cit, pp. 97-98 
625 Author’s interviews, November 2014.  
626 Key individuals behind the campaign also argued, probably with some justification, that the legislation was in part motivated by elements 
of the domestic security industry seeing an opportunity to see off competition and potentially pick up foreign owned companies at distressed 
prices. See Abrahamsen and Williams, ‘Privatisation, Globalisation and the Politics of Protection in South Africa’. Abrahamsen and Williams, 




The elitist nature of the governing party, a closely-knit group that fields most of the presidents, 
premiers, members of the cabinets and deputies that run the government627, is sometimes 
associated to this argument. Authors noted that rent seeking was common in several 
precedents of indigenization policies in Africa and the result was ‘Directly Unproductive 
Profit-Seeking Activities’.628 
 
Secondly, trade liberalization politics have appeared more forcefully in the more recent policy 
development phase. One distinctive change is the existence of a new trade preference 
program, such as AGOA- where South Africa is the largest beneficiary. Politicians and think 
tanks have relied on trade arguments to protect existing ownership; they point to the 
obligations under General Agreement on Trade in Services of the World Trade Organization, 
or to the Protocol on Finance and Investment of the Southern African Development 
Community629.   
 
The World Trade Organization includes private security in the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services and encourages member countries to allow free and fair competition in security 
services.630 Trade classification can thus pose as neutral and commentators argue that domestic 
compliance must follow from international classifications.631 The key difference for trade 
                                                          
627 a ‘governing class’ of 42 people; (..) presidents, premiers, members of the cabinets and executive councils, parliamentarians and heads of civil service departments 
Politics in Southern Africa, Tom Lodge, p. 22.  
628 Lewis, Op. Cit., Pp.137-145. The author shows how a class of local entrepreneurs relied on illicit transactions and corruption in what 
amounted to Bhagwati, J. "Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities." Journal of Political Economy (1998). Krueger, Anne O. "The political 
economy of the rent-seeking society." The American economic review (1974): 291-303. 
629 The main think-tank involved in the trade debate was TRALAC. Cf. http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5715-the-regulation-of-
private-security-firms-in-south-africa-what-are-the-governance-signals.html and http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5590-south-
africa-s-private-security-industry-amendment-bill-and-the-sadc-protocol-on-finance-and-investment.html  
630 Abrahamsen and Williams provide the example of China’s decision to open its security market to foreign investment in advance of the 
2008 Olympic Games was partly in response to WTO requirements. The EU has also sought to promote free trade in security services across Europe as 
part of its Services Directive, although the Europe-wide security industry association Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) has contested this, arguing 
that with over twenty different criminal justices systems a genuine internal market is impossible and that a lack of regulation in some member states will give companies 
originating there an unfair  competitive advantage over those imposing more stringent rules 
631 See for example the work of TRALAC. “This definition corresponds to the definition of security services and security activities regulated 




arguments has been the greater reliance on business expectations and climate, and the use of 
argument associated to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) negotiations632. I 
return to this trade agreement below- in the section ‘Sources of international leverage: AGOA 
negotiations as a focal point’. 
 
It is notable that the PSiRA amendment bill challenged the established procedures. A Green 
Paper generally originates in the department of the Ministry concerned and is published for 
feedback. A submission date is usually given for input from civil society. Then, the document 
forms then the basis for a White Paper that is a broad statement of government policy.  
 
Instead, the process proceeded in two stages and only in the second one, the government 
commissioned studies and requested advice. 633  The government presented a first version of 
the Private Security Industry Regulation Amendment Bill634, introducing it to the Police 
Committee on Police in the Parliament on the 30th October 2012.  In an instrumentalization 
of the reform process, the government decided the general strategy first and only later 
requested the advice of the Department of Trade and Industry. Confronted with the risk of 
international arbitrage or the renegotiation of trade treaties, the research department was asked 
to look for evidence on the track record of foreign-owned security companies, such as G4S.  
Yet, no evidence was found to support the claim that foreigners were an actual obstacle to 
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632 “South Africa is, in the three months to March 2014, the largest beneficiary of AGOA preferences and also has the most diversified export 
palette with respect to US exports. It remains important to understand the broader context and background to South Africa’s AGOA status 
when looking at the proposed legislation, which would place restrictions on the foreign ownership of investments and assets relating to the 
South African security industry” 
 
633 Author’s interviews, July 2014 




oversight and accountability,635 an element that would have strengthened the national security 
argument.  
 
Successful reform requires autonomy from interests opposed to reform for decision makers 
to conceive and design reform programs.636 In this case, the government insulated itself by 
operating through a strategy of obfuscation, somewhat akin to the design and management of 
the public sector reform policies in Sub-Saharan Africa- the politics of obfuscation, ambiguity and 
indirection637. This was not new.  First, the 1998 Act was already a strong attempt at reining in 
political authority with obfuscation. According to Malas and Cilliers, subverted parliamentary 
oversight and accorded Minister Asmal extensive discretionary powers. This extraordinary 
power, they claimed, is more reminiscent of the apartheid era, than of Mandela's Government.  Second, 
when the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country 
of Armed Conflict Act was created in 2006, the consideration of the Bill by Parliament was 
characterized by high international interest and submissions by various foreign private security 
companies, non-governmental organizations and civil society638 but participation was 
hampered by a lack of transparency and feedback. The industry was not able to provide input, 
according to the head of domestic business association639 and international firms claimed the 
government was secretive about its content.640  
                                                          
635 Author’s interviews, July 2014 
636 The reference work is of course Evans, Peter B. Embedded autonomy: states and industrial transformation. Vol. 25. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995. Also, cf. Van de Walle, Op. Cit., pp.44-45, ‘On the autonomy of the African state’. 
637 I refer to several works that have used this concept in the past, cited in Van de Walle, Op. Cit., p.37. Herbst, The Politics of Reform in 
Ghana, 1982-1991; Thomas M. Callaghy, “Lost between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia and 
Nigeria” in Joan Nelson (ed.), Economic Crisis and Policy Choice; Samba Ka and Nicholas Van de Walle, The Political Economy of Structural 
Adjustment in Senegal, 1980-1991,” in Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb (eds.) Voting for Reform: Economic Adjustment in new 
Democracies, pp.290-359; West, “The Politics of Implementation of Structural Adjustment in Zambia” and Peter Lewis, The Political 
Economy of Public Enterprise in Nigeria..  
638 Submissions to the Portfolio Committee of Defence on the Bill introduced in Parliament focused on issues such as the affect of the Bill on the constitutional right to 
the freedom of trade, occupation and profession; retrospectivity; an exemption in the Bill in respect of freedom struggles (not included expressly in the new Act); the fact 
that the Bill addressed the regulation of humanitarian aid; enlistment in foreign armed forces; and private security services. Jacobs 2008:71 
639 Interview, April 2014 






10.1.3 Sources of international leverage and the AGOA negotiations  
However, the use of trade related arguments had a new source of international leverage, as 
this section describes.  
 
Property rights are entrenched in the South African Constitution.641 Petersen writes that: 
“international treaties concluded by South Africa . . . may have extended even greater 
protection for (foreign-owned) property against government interference and incursion, and 
without benefit of any meaningful public debate or scrutiny of such a move.”642  
 
SIA and the United States were not alone in the use of trade related arguments: the 
Scandinavian and UK governments also relied on the same premises. In the latter case, the 
South African Government was warned that it would contravene the bilateral investment 
treaty between the two countries.  
 
Given the large investments held in the security sector by foreign firms, notably American 
firms, there has been a stronger backlash against expropriation from the United States. I shall 
illustrate with a few examples.  First, the Security Industry Association (SIA) is a U.S. based 
advocacy organization, whose stated aim is to advocate for pro-industry policies and 
legislation. The organization has used trade arguments focused on AGOA. SIA wrote to the 
                                                          
641 Not without controversy, according to A.J. van der Walt and G.J. Piennar, Introduction to the Law of Property, 4th ed., Juta & Co. Ltd, 
2002, at pg.343 in Peterson (2006) South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties. Implications for Development and Human Rights 





chairman of the Senate’s finance committee, and protested the South African government’s 
proposed legislation. South Africa would be in contravention of international trade 
obligations, SIA claimed. Specifically, AGOA requires eligible countries to provide evidence 
that they are meeting, or attempting to meet, the Act’s eligibility requirements, including “the 
elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment, including...the provision of 
national treatment and measures to create an environment conducive to domestic and foreign 
investment”.643 In response, a U.S. Senator stated at the Finance Hearing on the AGOA: 
“South Africa is undertaking a number of policies that undermine investor confidence. These 
include a Draft Intellectual Property Policy that erodes some IP protections and security 
services legislation that would contravene South Africa’s international trade commitments”.644 
 
In the 2012-2015, politics of trade agreements shaped the political debate over foreign 
ownership in the private security industry making Abrahmsen and Williams’ intuition on the 
earlier experience resonate once more: 
 
principles of free trade related to a specifically depoliticized vision of security successfully trumped 
concerns for national security and calls for the protection of domestic industry. By embedding 
security privatization in broader global norms connected to processes of commodification and 
responsibilization, the home states of the foreign companies were able to intercede on their behalf 
by using commercial arguments and forms of market-norm coercion, skirting the much more 
sensitive and difficult ground of ‘national security’ policy.645 
 
                                                          
643http://www.siaonline.org/SiteAssets/GovernmentRelations/Letters%20To%20Con/Security%20Industry%20Association%20AGOA
%20Wyden-Hatch.pdf  
644 cf. letter to South African Ambassador; appendix B 




10.2 Labor policy 
 
In chapter four, I noted the conspicuous absence of trade unions in the process of creation of 
the Montreux standards. Standards in labor policy are notable for two reasons: the first is the 
concern for equity; the second is that in this labor-intensive industry mobilization can be 
violent- and has indeed been so. Further, wages are fundamental to analysis of political 
economy because they affect the nature of market competition and the sources of competitive 
advantage. Hence I argue that it is going to be an important area for future research.  
A democratic governance of the sector that accounts for the relevance of private security 
unions is relevant for several reasons, not least their capacity to mobilize and protest. Unions 
are often portrayed as ineffective and lacking capacity. However, they have shown to be able 
to paralyze entire sections of the economy by calling strikes, including armed strikes. A strike 
by security guards in 2006 supported by the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union and 
15 other trade unions lasted more than three months. It was particularly violent and deserved 
a parliamentary session.646 The fact that security guards are both able to get access to weapons 
and legally permitted to strike,647 can be a powerful- and perilous- additional tool for 
mobilization and advocacy, augmenting the capacity of an organized group.  In several 
countries, security guards are both able to get access to weapons and legally permitted to strike. 
The result is that there are simply no global standards. 
                                                          
646 “Breaking windows, breaking up cars, looting. And very, very worrying too are these reports - I do not know if they are correct - of people 
being thrown out of trains “ PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THURSDAY, 18 MAY 2006, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2006pq/pqp12.htm Last accessed September 2014 . A more recent example of long-term coordination capacity 
is the six-months strike in the platinum industry. The Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) reached deals to that 
salaries will rise by around 1,000 rand a month each year until 2017. Cf. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27996445  
647 Note that in some countries the right to strikes is regulated so that police and private security personnel are not permitted to become 





10.2.1 Drivers of mobilization and of violent action  
The simple observation that security guards are both able to get access to weapons and legally 
permitted to strike makes collective action of workers in the private security industry a 
question both for policy and for political stability.   
The first question is what shapes collective action. Recent data on strikes shows that 
mobilization is spurred by grievances due to minimum wage violation648. A study of the 
determinants of non-compliance in South Africa shows that across several sectors, violations 
in the security sector are the highest with estimates of nearly 70 per cent.649  
A related question is what are the mechanisms of collective action and their effectiveness. Are 
unions able to represent workers? Research has shown that loss of leadership that caused a 
huge decline in capacity650 when COSATU leaders were nominated by the ANC to run for 
parliament in 1994. Some mention the growing gap between bureaucratized leadership and 
rank and file worker, the decline of quality of service offered, and the reconfiguration of the 
alliance, with the ANC effective at wielding state patronage.651 In general, the union movement 
never succeeded in penetrating the poorest sectors of the workforce- farmworkers, domestic 
workers, and the informal sector652 and private security unions cater to low pay security guards.  
                                                          
648 Bhorat, Haroon, Ravi Kanbur, and Natasha Mayet. "Minimum wage violation in South Africa." International Labour Review 151.3 (2012): 
277-287. 45% of covered workers get paid wages below the legislated minimum, whilst the average depth of shortfall is 36% of the minimum 
wage. Around this average, violation is most prevalent in the Security, Forestry and Farming Sectors.  
649 Bhorat, Haroon, Ravi Kanbur, and Natasha Mayet. "The determinants of minimum wage violation in South Africa." Charles H. Dyson 
School WP 5 (2011). The results suggest that there are a variety of factors impacting on violation, including firm-level, sectoral and spatial 
characteristics. One of the key determinants of violation is found to be the local unemployment rate  
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651 Adler and Webster 2000:14  




Against this wisdom, however, McCallum argued that private security unions have obtained 
remarkable successes653 with international solidarity chain. South African and Indian organized 
labor, McCallum claimed, were part of a global campaign managed to win new rights for 
hundreds of thousands of security guards around the world654.  
 
 
10.2.2 Contingency  
Changes in minimum wage policy can affect standards broadly defined. Abrahmsen and 
Williams showed that a transnational labor campaign against G4S changed the symbolic power 
and legitimacy of public-private assemblages. The controversy started with unions 
campaigning against a global giant driving down wages and standards and focused on unfair 
dismissals, denials of union rights and failure to comply with minimum wage conditions. The 
case was resolved by an OECD mediator that actually “set the standard of appropriate, 
effective and legitimate actions for states, companies, groups and individuals” because G4S 
sought to turn the concessions into a victory and a form of symbolic capital.655 The authors 
argue that this could be read as a liberal story of spreading global norms but warn against the 
uncertainties of political authority in fragile contexts and the ambiguous symbolic power of 
security. 
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My research in Sierra Leone supports these results with a minor caveat. Minimum wage laws 
can affect the labor price and alter the competitive balance between PMSCs; where labor is a 
relatively high part of the costs, this is important. Yet, as opposed to the case described by 
Abrahmsen and Williams, in the context of an emergency or crisis, the possibility of a 
mobilization for or against policy change is greatly diminished.656  
In the pre-Ebola days of 2014, the government decided to change the minimum wage policy to 
Le 500’000. It meant a 50% net increase in take home pay.  The policy change was introduced 
in 2014 and timing is of the essence. The policy change was drafted during the boom created 
by the upswing in iron ore mining but by the time it became law, the commodity super-cycle 
had ended and Ebola had arrived.657 
Large firms were opposed the bill fearing a competitive disadvantage. They expected 
asymmetrical cost increases because smaller firms, relying on lack of enforcement, would not 
increase their wages. Thus, small firms arguably drove a "race to the bottom" of wages and 
standards. 
This policy choice has a precedent in Africa, in 2003, in Kenya. 658 In that context, a bill 
introduced the increase in the minimum wage of 12.5% and divided companies into two blocs, 
one in favor and one against. However, there are some important differences between the two 
cases. First, in Kenya, there was actually mobilization against the minimum wage change, 
which in Sierra Leone did not occur. Certainly, scale is a factor- Sierra Leone’s economy is 
smaller in comparison to Kenya and less sophisticated in terms of industrial representation. 
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Further, mobilization was arguably impossible because of the national emergency. Large firms, 
like G4S, for example, did not endorse the bill and criticize both the timing and the lack of 
enforcement, but they remained committed to complying with national laws.659 
A second difference is that small firms in the Kenyan context led an opposition to minimum 
wage. The firms that opposed the bill broke away and formed a second industry association 
of some thirty firms; they went on to ignore the rules and there was no sign the government 
tried to enforce them. 
This part of my study confirms an Abrahamsen and Williams’ results. Labor policy can affect 
the labor price and alter the competitive balance. In the private security sector, where labor is 
a relatively high part of the costs, this is significant. At the same time, contingency can impede 
the possibility of a negotiated policy dialogue. 
  
                                                          





This chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters.   I shall 
emphasize five points in particular. 
First, regime formation depends upon global norms and interests, and particularly, state 
choices towards the Montreux Document, the only tool to account for new networks and 
relations between states and markets and the only instrument to address the concern that 
PMSCs operate in a legal vacuum. I argued that the tractability of this issue-area largely consists 
in facilitating the acceptance of the term PMSC, the invention of which is akin to a ‘permanent 
inherited patronym’. 
Second, regime formation is weaved in a texture of global and domestic choices driven by 
broad social norms. State interests as well as contingencies are only one of the determinants 
of state choices and are an insufficient explanatory variable. Conventional theories that claim 
that global issues and policies reflect the underlying military and economic capabilities are 
insufficient to explain state choices, since these theories don’t allow for a distinction between 
strategy and contingency. They are also unable to account for international factors – the role 
of the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the role of 
Switzerland as an actor and originator of the Montreux process – a decision that led to 
important insights about the interplay of interests, ideas, and institutions. Yet, constructivist 
approaches are also challenged because assuming the existence of PMSCs norms would be 
simplistic. These norms are in an early stage of formation and cannot be said to be 
determinants of state behavior nor can they be shown to be global and proscriptive social 




norms are still in the first stage of emergence. The universality of PMSC norms is still 
aspirational. This fits, however, with the branch of regime theory that stresses how reaching 
an agreement is a stage in the negotiation, not the end of the process. 
Regime formation built upon the Swiss initiative but state choices on PMSCs bear upon the 
varying influence of broader norms, such as the anti-mercenary norm. As Percy recalls, the 
Swiss turned their backs on their mercenary past in 1848 by outlawing the long Swiss tradition 
of exporting mercenaries.660  
 
Which broad social norms shape change? On the one hand, the neo-liberal norm stirs greater 
unconstrained use of private security- with increased contracting also depending upon 
concurring factors- i.e. the increased Western unwillingness to intervene and changes in the 
availability of military supplies and personnel. On the other hand, the norm against mercenary 
use has historically constrained or restrained states’ choices in deciding whether or not to use 
private force, or how to compose the armies.  In contemporary contexts of late state 
development, the influence of the anti-mercenary norm remains higher but varying.  
 
Fourth, in my empirical investigation at the state level, I proceeded to assess the role of social 
norms.  In the time period under study, electoral politics and political entrepreneurs were able 
to stir the anti-mercenary norm, in a context where African states either use or warrant the use 
of private security within their borders, but mostly ignore the Montreux Document.   
 
A tension between neoliberal and anti-mercenary norm can be appreciated both in South 
Africa and Nigeria. 
                                                          




A chain of events started with the U.S. government policy decision to recruit foreign 
employees, driven by the unique dynamics of the Iraq conflict.  The recruitment strengthened 
the anti-mercenary norm in certain locations. In South Africa, recruitment coincided with the 
attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea fielded by South Africans, which unfolded in the midst 
of South Africa’s third democratic election campaign- further bolstering the anti-mercenary 
norm, and largely driving South Africa’s engagement in international regulation.  
 
Describing the anti-mercenary norm in the context of Nigeria’s engagement, I found two 
related aspects. First, the increase in threat level, contingent to the decreased accessibility of 
military aid, led policymakers to adopt PMSCs. In that specific milieu, state choices were driven 
neither by neo-liberalism nor by strategy but rather by contingency- i.e. the acceleration in 
non-state actors’ lethality and the related kidnapping, associated with the January election.  
Nigerian policymakers, not unlike U.S. policymakers after 9/11 or the French ones after the 
Paris attacks of 2015,661 have turned to contracting core functions to the market. Faced with 
increased threats, states initially harness the resources and capacity of the private sector.  
Second, the rapprochement towards Montreux is driven by the anti-mercenary norm; state 
choices towards private security were not shaped by the neo-liberal norm. The chapter 
indicates the relevance of state choices: Nigerian foreign policy had never participated in 
Montreux events nor in U.N. sessions on private security. Now, almost a decade after the start 
of the Swiss initiative, there is an indication of change in the role of the anti-mercenary norm 
in shaping Nigeria’s regulatory politics. ‘Varieties of contracting’ approaches suggest that 
commercialization comes first, followed by regulation. Yet, continuity and change also depend 
                                                          




upon the varying influence and competition between the neoliberal norm and the anti-
mercenary norm.  
 
Finally, the comparison of Sierra Leone and Liberia highlighted further aspects of state choice 
and regime construction, not necessarily reflecting changes in social norms.  In these 
contexts,dated perceptions, assumptions and second-hand accounts could have stirred the 
anti-mercenary norm but it did not happened.  
 
I noted that the policy choice of privatizing the Army has been described as fortuitous in Liberia 
but the security sector is still poorly regulated and the endorsement of the Montreux 
Document should be advocated and pursued. An ambiguity remains at the heart of this 
context- i.e. it is the only country whose army was built by private security and yet, it does not 
endorse Montreux nor PMSCs norms.  
In Sierra Leone, the national legislation is recognized as a source of practice for Montreux. 
Most importantly, I provide fresh evidence on public-private assemblages during crisis by 
researching the public-private nexus during the Ebola epidemic. Against some of the 
prevailing literature, I suggest that in a territorial state, during a post-disaster setting, the state 
remains in charge, and there is not necessarily a boom in private security.  
 
The fifth and last point is that African states have greater agency than expected. First, South 
Africa alternated between leadership, collaboration and criticism. In Nigeria, an engagement 
with regulatory cooperation represents a reversal of long-standing position. The agency of 
states can be clearly traced in post-conflict contexts like Sierra Leone and to a lower degree, 





What does state agency reveal?  It suggests that in spite of increased interconnectedness, due 
to changes in technology, states are far from irrelevant. Abrahamsen and Williams wrote that 
the state’s monopoly of legitimate force is increasingly “enmeshed in networks and relations 
that cannot be contained within the boundaries of the national state”, but states eventually 
establish ownership of the shifts in the boundaries between market and state. In fact, the 
general wisdom in the political economy of development is that domestic rulers generally hold 
the final and critical role in encouraging or inhibiting market arrangements662.  This conclusion 
finds substantiation in my work but domestic rulers’ agency crucially depends upon a two-
level game and the international agreement on identification- i.e. PMSC as an inherited 
patronym.  The international influence of strong states, can either directly drive regime 
creation or indirectly suppress it.  
 
Finally, this research does not justify or endorse the increased use of private security but it 
comes strongly in support of further recognition of PMSC as an internationally assigned 
acronym indispensable for accountability and regime construction. At the global level, 
attitudes towards PMSCs norms remain at the stage of a developing practice.  There is a 
lingering concern on TCNs- an issue that by itself can heighten the anti-mercenary norm and 
could be at the center of a future Montreux +10.   Foreign enlistment was never considered 
problematic in the inter-state system due to the fact that neutrality laws have never banned 
foreign recruitment- the purpose of the neutrality laws was to prohibit the commission of 
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unauthorized acts of war by individuals within their countries- but it can be considered 
problematic by some states. The extent to which concerns on TCNs increase is going to be 
the pivotal to the direction of PMSCs norms. 
 
I argue that continued involvement of the governments of the United States and China is 
indispensable. Noting the growing Chinese engagement in regime formation on PMSCs, both 
with the input to the Montreux initiative and to the U.N. treaty, their engagement has been 
unassertive by virtue of the fact that the complex regime is based on the human rights content 
of Montreux. Strong states must continue to promote a regularized dialogue among 
signatories, continue to assign the patronym of PMSCs to firms- regardless of how they define 
themselves- and engage in advocacy for norm promotion.  
 
At the time of writing, after a time of scaling back a return to greater use of private security is 
again associated with extremism in Africa and instability in the Middle East. From Nigeria to 
Yemen, PMSCs contribute to the composition of armies, which directly or indirectly 
participate in conflicts. In such contexts of late state development where conflict is re-
emerging, the norm against mercenary use constrains both international intervention and 
domestic state policy in deciding whether or not to use private force, how to compose their 
armies, and whether to regulate PMSCs. The international intervention is hampered by the 
anti-mercenary norm; the absence of mention of the use of contactors in implementing the 
strategy to destroy the Islamic State suggests a continuation of this trend. Domestic policy is 
reliant on contingent and ambiguous reactions to increased threats, initially using the resources 
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